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Submarine commanding officers (COs) must execute their duties amid an endless 
stream of incoming information and data. This is a problem in a hierarchically structured 
organization because the key decision maker, the commanding officer, can quickly 
become overwhelmed. To address this concern, Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) and Submarine Development Squadron TWELVE (DEVRON-12) partnered 
with the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (APL) and IDEO, a world-
renowned design thinking firm, to guide a group of senior submariners through a 
collaborative design thinking and innovation workshop. The goal of this forum, 
appropriately named the Executive Tactical Advancements for the Next Generation 
(TANG), was to capitalize on the creative potential inherent in design thinking to 
improve the effectiveness of the commanding officer. This also provided a unique 
opportunity to examine how these processes play out amidst a group of experienced 
leaders, highly indoctrinated into the organizational culture of their war fighting 
community. Using established design thinking and change management theory, the 
researchers intend to synthesize the key elements of the Executive TANG experience, 
extracting those that may prove useful to future design thinking endeavors within the 
Department of Defense (DOD). 
B. BACKGROUND 
The case study has become a popular and effective tool used by most business and 
management schools as well as leadership courses throughout the world. According to 
Gary Thomas, the case study “provides the most vivid, the most inspirational analysis 
that an inquiry can offer.”1 Case studies are effective in teaching management and 
leadership principles because they immerse the reader in the particular situation, giving 
the student a feeling of similar experience to that in the case study. When compared to 
                                                 
1 Gary Thomas, How to Do Your Case Study: A Guide for Students and Researcher (Los Angeles:  
Sage Publications, 2011), Preface X.  
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the traditional lecture-style instruction, conducting case studies is more effective at 
promoting critical thought in students as well as accurate assessment by teachers of 
students’ ability to grasp key concepts.2 
Despite the proven effectiveness of the case study method in the instruction of 
some of the most revered members of society, such as lawyers, doctors, and business 
executives, the DOD is woefully behind in employing this method. While the Defense 
Department has grown to utilize guided discussions and other forms of less-traditional 
learning, the default method of instruction is still lecture, followed by demonstration, 
followed by practical application, if applicable. The DOD, however, requires more 
recorded case studies in order to apply this effective method of teaching within DOD 
schools. More specifically, it requires an increased number of case studies that record 
organizational change as well as technological innovation. The Executive TANG 
provides an opportunity to add to the DOD’s library of case studies. In order to develop a 
case study based on the events leading up to, during, and after the Executive TANG, the 
researchers will utilize Yin’s six-step model as their primary guide along with Robert 
Stake’s The Art of Case Study Research.  
C. PREVIOUS RELATED RESEARCH 
This thesis represents the third in a series of TANG-related theses from students 
at the Naval Postgraduate School. Each research effort examined a different aspect of the 
overall TANG initiative. The sections to follow present the findings of the previous 
research efforts. 
1. The Original TANG Case Study (LCDR Hall) 
The first in the series of Tactical Advancements for the Next Generation (TANG)-
related research from the Naval Postgraduate School, authored by Lieutenant 
Commander (LCDR) Thomas Hall, is a case study with supporting analysis examining 
how design thinking and participative collaboration contributed to producing actionable 
technological innovation for the Submarine Force. “A Case Study of Innovation and 
                                                 
2 Thomas, How to Do Your Case Study, Preface X. 
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Change in the U.S. Navy Submarine Fleet” describes the TANG Forum as an initiative 
driven by a few key actors within the submarine community to break the normative 
processes that govern technological advancement in the submarine force. With the 
involvement of IDEO and the support of Admiral (ADM) John Richardson, current 
Director of Naval Reactors (NR), it was the goal of the first TANG to capitalize on the 
creative potential inherent in design thinking. By conducting design thinking sessions 
among junior levels of submarine operators and leadership, new, innovative, and viable 
technological innovations emerged—innovations that will capture the technical skills and 
paradigm-shifting potential of the newer generation of operators not yet fully 
indoctrinated into submarine culture.  
The genesis of TANG was a 2010 white paper, written by Josh Smith of the 
Applied Physics Lab at Johns Hopkins University, an organization tightly linked to the 
submarine community. As a former submarine officer, Smith wrote of his frustration with 
innovation in the submarine community and his concern that the Navy was hemorrhaging 
innovative ideas as junior personnel left the service. Now a civilian, Smith envisioned an 
environment for junior personnel with good ideas to communicate openly and 
collaboratively for the betterment of the fleet. The concept contained in the white paper 
initially caught the attention of a few key proponents: Mr. Pete Scala of Integrated 
Warfare Systems 5A (IWS 5A) and Commodore Bill Merz of Submarine Development 
Squadron TWELVE (DEVRON-12). Recognizing the potential to add fleet users’ voice 
to the technology-development processes currently in use, they briefed Smith’s idea 
contained in the white paper to then Vice Admiral (VADM) John Richardson, 
Commander of Submarine Forces (COMSUBFOR). While commanding the U.S. relief 
operation in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake, the Admiral developed an appreciation 
for the innovative capabilities of the civilian sector. In Smith’s white paper, Richardson 
recognized an opportunity to bring those innovative capabilities to his force. With 
support from the top, Smith’s ideas evolved into what eventually became the TANG 
Forum.3 
                                                 
3 Thomas J. Hall, “A Case Study of Innovation and Change in the U.S. Navy Submarine Fleet” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
 4
The first TANG Forum was held in November 2011 with junior personnel 
representing the officer, Sonar Technician, and Fire Controlman communities—those 
principally involved in operating the tactical systems aboard the submarine. Over 3 days 
in San Diego, CA, 27 sailors participated in IDEO’s design thinking process. Coached by 
IDEO and facilitated by Smith and his team, these sailors produced numerous innovative 
ideas, two of which are scheduled for introduction into the submarine fleet in Fiscal Year 
15.4 
Throughout the TANG Forum, the junior personnel that were directly involved in 
the design thinking process were observed by senior personnel in another room over an 
audio/visual link. This was done for two main reasons, 1) to keep the senior leaders from 
influencing the creativity of the junior personnel and 2) to allow the senior leaders to 
directly observe the process so that they could better understand the eventual outputs.5 
Deemed an “amazing success” by ADM Richardson, the TANG Forum and its 
outputs were validated by introduction to the fleet.6 Design thinking and the IDEO 
method could indeed be used by junior submariners to innovate technology and processes 
in a manner that would not be permissible or even possible under established cultural 
conditions. The decision was made to extend the TANG Forum to submarine 
commanders to address some of their challenges. Thus, the Executive TANG was born. 
Originally scheduled for February 2013, it was postponed until September 2013 due to 
funding constraints.7 The Executive TANG will serve as the foundation of the case study 
to be developed through this research. 
2. Leveraging the Millennial Generation to Influence Innovation (Major 
Gavin) 
In research efforts closely related to those of Lieutenant Commander Hall 
described in the previous section, Major (Maj) Michael Gavin analyzed the underlying 
                                                 
4 Hall, “A Case Study of Innovation and Change in the U.S. Navy Submarine Fleet.” 
5 Ibid. 
6 Vice Admiral John Richardson, “TANG”–A Vision for the Future. January 17, 2012, 
http://comsubfor-usn.blogspot.com/2012/01/tang-vision-for-future.html (accessed May 17, 2013). 
7 Hall, “A Case Study of Innovation and Change in the U.S. Navy Submarine Fleet.” 
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theme of the initial TANG Forum: “leveraging the millennial generation sailor’s 
seemingly innate familiarity and proficiency with technology” to improve end-user 
satisfaction, as well as tactical capability, by capitalizing on design thinking to bridge 
gaps between traditional requirements-based acquisition practices and the users who must 
actually employ submarine systems in combat.8 
Sponsored by the Acquisition Research Program at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Major Gavin cataloged the events within the various acquisition and program 
management offices, going back as far as the early-1990s, which permitted a radical idea 
like TANG to gain traction and produce results. Then, relating those events to Kotter’s  
8-step model, Gavin described how key actors ushered in critical changes to the 
established practices of the submarine acquisition programs. The result was an 
appreciation of the strength of collaboration and peer review as integral to producing 
quality, useful technology.9 
Gavin’s research chronicles the development of the Acoustic Rapid COTS 
(commercial off-the-shelf) Insertion (ARCI, pronounced ar-kee) program that replaced 
the traditional in-house development of sonar systems by Navy laboratories with a 
program that sourced competitive technology from the commercial sector. Still in use 
today and undoubtedly successful, ARCI was not born quickly or easily. It took persistent 
effort from key organizational actors to convince the traditional hierarchy of the 
submarine acquisition community that COTS technology was relevant, useful, and 
appropriate, and could be introduced in a manner that allowed the fleet to maintain 
acoustic sonar superiority at a consistent pace that was much faster than traditional 
methods.10 
Though ARCI was successful at providing technological innovation at a rapid 
pace, it had unintended consequences, namely, that the training and support elements 
could not keep pace with the rapidity of technological change. This naturally led to 
                                                 
8 Michael Gavin, “A Case Study of Managing Information Technology through Design” (master’s 




resistance efforts on the part of entrenched actors within those affected communities. The 
efforts of those resistors eventually led to a moderation of the full capabilities of the 
ARCI program. Rather than providing upgrades and insertions at the pace of 
development, the program was purposely slowed to allow the support elements to remain 
effective at training and fielding a combat-capable crew. While certainly an important 
concern, the slowing of the introduction of technology solely in the name of training and 
familiarity begged the question of why such training took so long and was so intense. 
Could the fleet field more-intuitive technology that required less training and delivered a 
more usable interface?11 
This, to both Gavin and Hall, is the crux of the many questions eventually leading 
to the TANG initiative. Gavin contends that design thinking methodology offers a 
“reproducible means to foment contextual understanding” between disparate 
stakeholders. In this case, those stakeholders are the acquisition professionals, engineers, 
and scientists tasked with developing future submarine technology and the users who 
must employ those products at sea, under arduous conditions. To Gavin, TANG offers a 
platform by which users can express ideas in a manner that enhances the ability to 
communicate those needs to the acquisition community, which then must translate those 
ideas and needs into the traditional requirements-based language that continues to drive 
the acquisitions process. In other words, TANG offers a forum to better communicate the 
needs of the fleet operator in a manner than can be dissected and digested more easily by 
engineers who must design and build the requested product. By taking input from those 
who will employ future technology, rather than from a specification contained in a 
requirements statement, the likelihood that a superior product emerges is greatly 
increased.12 
Gavin predicated his thesis on observations from the initial TANG Forum 
described within Hall’s research, in which IDEO employed a design thinking 
methodology amongst a group of junior officers (JOs) and petty officers—all members of 
                                                 
11 Gavin, “A Case Study of Managing Information Technology through Design.”  
12 Ibid. 
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the “digitally native” millennial generation.13 The question remained, at the time of 
Gavin’s writing, whether those methods would prove equally effective when applied to a 
group of experienced, senior leaders at the Executive TANG. 
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The DOD does not have sufficient case studies based on successful technological 
change implementation. The U.S. military has done well innovating in the deployed 
environment due to pure necessity derived from extreme operational demands. It has, 
however, a poorer track record of innovation when not in a forward-deployed and austere 
setting. Technological innovation is crucial if the DOD is to maintain relevance as it 
moves forward into a world of increasing technological advancement.  
E. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research is to produce a technological innovation case study 
that will allow DOD leaders to hone skills in implementing organizational change. As the 
DOD moves forward into a period of technological development in concert with a 
fiscally constrained defense environment, it will be essential for DOD leadership to 
understand how to technologically innovate. 
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research will explore how the Executive TANG Forum utilizes participative 
design thinking to develop innovative solutions to problems in the submarine community. 
The case study will have particular emphasis on the involvement of mid-level leadership 
in the design process, with additional emphasis on the role played by IDEO, the external 
support agent. The following two research questions will be addressed: 
 What are the benefits and other implications of utilizing a participative, 
design thinking process within the DOD? 
 How can the benefits of design thinking be extended to mid-level 
managers in the DOD? 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
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G. RESEARCH METHODS 
Both primary and secondary research will be used for this study. Through 
observation of the Executive TANG Forum as well as interviews with key participants, 
the researchers will develop a holistic case study of the process and outcomes of the 
innovation conference.  
H. PROPOSED DATA OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS METHODS 
The qualitative approach to research will be utilized to produce the case study. To 
capture the event and transform it into a learning tool, the case study method is the most 
appropriate approach for this research. The researchers will observe participants in the 
conference and conduct interviews to obtain multiple perspectives of the process and 
relationships within the conference.  
I. POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
The primary benefit of this case study is increased understanding of 
organizational change and design thinking as it relates to technical innovation within the 
DOD. Additionally, this research will improve the ability of Defense leadership as mid-
level managers utilize the case study as a tool to learn the design thinking process. The 
main limitation of completing a case study is the potential for biased writing as a result of 
the researchers’ involvement in the events of the case. To mitigate this limitation, the 
researchers will collect data from multiple sources and ensure that no outlying opinions 
are completely negated.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The researchers gathered the information used in this chapter through an 
extensive literature review of all required conceptual categories. Considerable time was 
spent reviewing material on case study methodology, organizational change, design, and 
design thinking as well as previous theses related to the Executive TANG Forum. As the 
research progressed, it became clear that this case would focus on issues related to 
change management and design thinking. This literature review was therefore guided 
primarily by those two areas and will serve as a basis for comparison and contrast during 
the case study’s analysis. 
B. THE CASE STUDY METHOD 
The case study has become a popular and effective tool used by most business and 
management schools as well as leadership courses throughout the world. Simply defined, 
a case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in 
depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”14 According to Gary Thomas, the case 
study “provides the most vivid, the most inspirational analysis that an inquiry can 
offer.”15 Case studies are effective in teaching change management and leadership 
principles because they immerse the reader in the particular situation, giving the student a 
feeling of similar experience to that in the case study. When compared to the traditional 
lecture-style instruction, case studies are more effective at promoting critical thought 
from students as well as accurate assessment from teachers on students’ ability to grasp 
key concepts.16 
When asking whether the case study method is appropriate, one’s choice depends 
largely on his or her research questions; the more the research questions seek to explain 
                                                 
14 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks: Sage Inc., 2009), 18. 
15 Thomas, How to Do Your Case Study, Preface X. 
16 Ibid. 
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“how” or “why” a social phenomenon works, the more the case study method will be 
relevant.17 The Executive TANG provides an opportunity to add to the DOD’s library of 
case studies as the researchers attempt to explain “how” and “why” this innovation effort 
was successful or unsuccessful. In this effort, the researchers’ second research question, 
“How can the benefits of design thinking be extended to mid-level managers in the 
DOD,” lends itself perfectly to utilizing the case study method. In order to develop a case 
study based on the events leading up to, during, and after the Executive TANG, the 
researchers will utilize Yin’s six-step model as their primary guide along with Robert 
Stake’s The Art of Case Study Research.  
According to Robert Yin, who is viewed by many as one of the experts in case 
study research, using case studies for research purposes is one of the most challenging of 
all social science endeavors.18 Some view this method as a less than desirable form of 
research typically, due to the possibility that researchers can produce a less than adequate 
product resulting from sloppy research, lack of systematic procedures, or allowing biased 
views to influence the direction of findings and conclusions.19 Despite these challenges, 
the case study method is appropriate when attempting to understand a real-life 
phenomenon in depth.20  
Each and every research design requires conceptual organization, ideas to express 
needed understanding, conceptual bridges from what is already known, cognitive 
structures to guide data gathering, and outlines for presenting interpretations to others.21 
Robert Yin takes this theory a step further and advocates the following six-step linear but 
iterative process for systematically constructing an effective case study: 
1. Plan 
a. Identify research questions 
b. Decide to use the case study method 
                                                 
17 Yin, Case Study Research, 4. 
18 Ibid., 3. 
19 Ibid., 14. 
20 Ibid., 18. 
21 Robert E. Stake, The Art of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage Inc., 1995), 15. 
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c. Understand strengths and limitations of case study research 
2. Design 
a. Define the unit of analysis and case to be studied 
b. Develop theory, propositions, and issues underlying the study 
c. Identify the case study design (single, multiple, holistic) 
d. Define procedures to maintain case study quality 
3. Prepare 
a. Hone skills as a case study investigator 
b. Train for specific case study 
c. Develop case study protocol 
d. Conduct pilot case 
e. Gain approval for human subjects protection 
4. Collect 
a. Follow case study protocol 
b. Use multiple sources of evidence 
c. Create case study database 
d. Maintain chain of evidence 
5. Analyze 
a. Rely on theoretical propositions 
b. Consider any of five analytic techniques 
c. Explore rival explanations 
d. Display data apart from interpretations 
6. Share 
a. Define audience 
b. Compose textual and visual materials 
c. Display enough evidence for reader to reach own conclusions 
d. Review and re-write until done well22 
As mentioned earlier, the major factors that can contribute to a poor case study 
are sloppy research, lack of systematic procedures, and/or allowing biased views to 
influence the direction of findings and conclusions. Following Yin’s six-step process will 
                                                 
22 Yin, Case Study Research, 9–164. 
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ensure the research is neat and systematic. Avoiding personal bias, however, will require 
additional rigor. If a researcher seeks only to do a case study to substantiate a 
preconceived position, the study will be unjustly biased; since case study researchers 
must understand the issues before hand, they are especially prone to this pitfall.23 One 
test to check the level of bias is to assess the degree to which you are open to contrary 
findings—if you cannot accept a conclusion that conflicts your original stance, you will 
unduly bias the case study.24 
An important control measure researchers can heed to protect conclusions from 
undue bias is to collect data from multiple types and numbers of sources.25 The six 
sources of case study evidence include documentation, archival records, interviews, 
direct observations, participant observation, and physical artifacts but as Yin mentions, 
not all six sources are relevant for all case studies.26 While some research techniques may 
rely on a single source of evidence, this technique is not recommended for case study 
research due to the preconceived notion that research may be biased.27 Instead, using 
multiple sources of evidence allows case study researchers to triangulate on converging 
lines of inquiry, thereby lending credibility and validity to conclusions made.28 In the 
Executive TANG case study, researchers will primarily use interviews, direct 
observations, and participant observations to triangulate on key elements.  
While adequate emphasis should be placed on all six steps, the final step of the 
process, the share phase, requires special care as it will yield the final product. This phase 
can be the most demanding on the researchers because it requires conveying significant 
points, painting a complete picture for the reader, considering alternate perspectives, 
displaying sufficient evidence, and writing in an engaging manner in order to “hook the 
                                                 
23 Yin, Case Study Research, 72.  
24 Ibid., 72. 
25 Ibid., 124.  
26 Ibid., 114.  
27 Ibid., 114.  
28 Ibid., 114–116.  
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reader.”29 One often overlooked pitfall in writing the report is lack of conciseness—
according to Robert Stake, author of The Art of Case Study Research, a 20-page case 
study can quickly run to 50 if the researchers do not “ruthlessly winnow and sift.”30 
While the reader should be counted on to do their share of the work to arrive at key 
conclusions, the case study writers must organize the case with the readers in mind.31 
While these requirements may seem daunting, by approaching the final phase with a 
systematic approach similar to the one used in the other five phases of Yin’s six-step 
model, researchers can ensure the quality of their final product.  
Despite the proven effectiveness of the case study method in the instruction of 
some of the most revered members of society, such as lawyers, doctors, and business 
executives, the DOD is woefully behind in employing this method. While the Defense 
Department has grown to utilize guided discussions and other forms of less traditional 
learning, the default method of teaching is still lecture, followed by demonstration, 
followed by practical application, if applicable. The DOD, however, requires more 
recorded case studies in order to apply this effective method within DOD schools. More 
specifically, it requires an increased number of case studies that record organizational 
change as well as technological innovation.  
The previous section was devoted to explaining the case study methodology, as it 
will serve as the basis for the development of the Executive TANG case study. The 
subsequent sections of this chapter are devoted to providing the reader with a conceptual 
understanding of the two primary fields of research that interact in the case: 
organizational change management and design thinking. Organizational change 
management attempts to understand the complex dynamics occurring within 
organizations experiencing change while design thinking is devoted to finding solutions 
to difficult problems by harnessing the creative energy inherent to group dialogue.32 The 
                                                 
29 Yin, Case Study Research, 185–189. 
30 Stake, The Art of Case Study Research, 121. 
31 Ibid., 122.  
32 Tony Golsby-Smith, “The Second Road of Thought,” in Rotman on Design, ed. Roger Martin and 
Karen Christensen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 41–43. 
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dynamic relationship between these two interacting fields provides the conceptual 
foundation for the analysis of the Executive TANG case study. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
1. Introduction 
Understanding and coping with change is a fundamental requirement for any 
organization to be successful over a long period of time. As the factors influencing  
an organization—be they economic market forces, the social attitudes of a constituent 
population, or the weapons systems of potential adversaries—change, organizations must 
navigate a changing world with corresponding adaptations to their internal functions, core 
processes, and relationships. To be successful in these endeavors, organizations and their 
leaders must have a frame of reference for planning and executing change. 
In the sections to follow, the researchers will explore the varying theoretical 
perspectives of change management. From the foundational theorists who emphasized 
rapid, linear, planned change to some contemporary theorists who present a less-
procedurally driven model, the researchers will offer differing frameworks to understand 
the change efforts of the submarine community and the potential future effects of the 
TANG initiative. 
2. Foundational Change Theorists 
a. Kotter’s 8-step Process 
According to John Kotter, one of the foundational theorists in the area of 
organizational change management, there is an inevitable downside to any change effort. 
Some of this downside, however, can be avoided if the most common errors in instituting 
change are known.33 In his book Leading Change, he outlined these common errors that 
must be avoided to increase the likelihood of successful change implementation: not 
establishing a great enough sense of urgency, not creating a powerful enough guiding 
coalition, lacking a vision, under-communicating the vision by a factor of 10, not 
removing obstacles to the vision, not systematically planning for and creating short-term 
                                                 
33 John Kotter, Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 4. 
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wins, declaring victory too soon, and not anchoring changes in the corporation’s 
culture.34 In a less-competitive world, these errors would not be as detrimental as they are 
in today’s more-competitive environment.35 Given the volatility of today’s workplace, 
however, committing these errors can lead to serious consequences such as new strategies 
not being implemented well, acquisitions failing to achieve expected synergies, re-
engineering taking too long and costing too much, uncontrolled downsizing, and quality 
programs failing to deliver expected results.36 
In order to combat the pitfalls listed above and subsequent consequences, Kotter 
developed his renowned 8-step process for implementing organizational change: 
1. Establish a sense of urgency 
2. Create the guiding coalition 
3. Develop a vision and strategy 
4. Communicate the change vision 
5. Empower broad-based action 
6. Generate short-term wins 
7. Consolidate gains and produce more change 
8. Anchor new approaches in the culture37 
This process is Kotter’s prescription for holistic organizational change. It is 
sequential and requires adherence to its step-by-step nature as well as diligence in not 
skipping or rushing steps, as mistakes in one area of the process can cascade to affect the 
outcome of the effort as a whole.38 To provide additional focus and guidance to change 
agents, Kotter divides the eight stages into three conceptual areas. Steps 1 through 4 deal 
with preparing the organization for change. Steps 5 through 7 are the actual 
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35 Ibid., 15.   
36 Ibid., 16.   
37 Ibid., 21.  
38 Ibid., 21. 
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implementation of the change itself. Step 8 is where change takes root and becomes 
lasting.39 
Due to the difficult nature of any change effort, the process was constructed using 
8 steps, understanding that it would be lengthy and taxing for leadership. These 8 steps, 
however, are necessary instead of fewer broader steps because of the emphasis needed on 
proper execution of each critical component of the process. According to Kotter, proper 
implementation of the 8-step model will greatly increase the likelihood of successful 
organizational change. Other foundational theorists, however, have developed less-
prescriptive models for successful implementation of change.  
b. Planned Change: Unfreeze, Change, Refreeze 
First elaborated by Lewin and later advanced by Schein, planned change theory 
attempts to offer a comprehensive theory to explain the execution of an intentional 
change effort. While acknowledging that the emotional responses of individuals involved 
in change efforts are immensely complex, planned change theory nevertheless offers 
three relatively simple, sequential steps that account for the change process from end to 
end: unfreeze, change, and refreeze.40 
Unfreezing involves stimulating the need for change by highlighting the 
inadequacies of the current situation, thereby stimulating a desire for change. This begins 
by disconfirming present behavior in order to challenge the validity of an individual’s 
present worldview. Challenging and disconfirming will necessarily result in some amount 
of anxiety on the part of those now threatened. The degree to which anxiety is present, 
however, is important for the process to continue, as conditions must be sufficiently 
uncomfortable to motivate a genuine desire for change. Once the subjects of the change 
effort are properly motivated through discomfort or fear, it is imperative that change 
agents then provide a psychologically safe environment that is reassuring of individuals’ 
capabilities and efforts to change.41 
                                                 
39 Kotter, Leading Change, 22. 
40 Edgar Schein, Organizational Psychology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 247. 
41 Schein, Organizational Psychology, 247. 
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The change phase involves the installation of new conditions by re-defining 
individuals’ cognitive processes. This is a complicated and often lengthy process during 
which an individual must be shown that new conditions provide for a more positive 
outcome than adherence to previous methods. Either through observation of a respected 
mentor or through “scanning” of the environment for relevant information to confirm the 
validity of the new methodology, the individuals involved in the change process must re-
define the way they perceive their world. For change to truly be effective and long-
lasting, individuals must alter the way they perceive concepts and information related to 
the change at hand. Information that once resulted in a certain response under previous 
conditions must now be processed differently, according to a new mental model that 
meets the requirements of the new situation.42 
Critical to the overall process is the final step of refreezing. It is not sufficient to 
simply induce or foster change through the above methods and not follow through to 
ensure long-term adoption. Relapsing to previous behavior is very common in change 
efforts, due mostly to actions on the part of others that disconfirm the change. This results 
in the same anxiety that sparked the adoption of new behavior. Looking to alleviate this 
anxiety, individuals often seek the comfort of previous conditions, thereby emphasizing 
the importance of the refreeze step.43 
Preventing relapse can be aided by allowing individuals processing change to 
experiment and test methods that may prove to be better suited to their unique 
personalities, yet achieve the same results. Rather than mandating strict adherence to 
certain behaviors or suggesting the imitation of others’ success, change agents should 
allow a certain amount of experimentation and flexibility to permit a tailored solution that 
will ultimately prove more successful and long lasting. When individuals refreeze in this 
manner, conditions are more appropriate for the fundamental shifting of cognitive 
processes that is essential to secure long-lasting change.44 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 248. 
44 Schein, Organizational Psychology, 44. 
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3. Contemporary Change Theory 
a. Rapid Change to High-Impact Elements 
Kotter emphasizes establishing a sense of urgency and creating a broad-based 
coalition of action in steps 1 and 5 of his 8-step process.45 Arguing against the notion that 
rapid change efforts yield superior results, John Amis, Trevor Slack, and C.R. Hinings 
present findings that suggest otherwise.46 
Examining the results of data collected over a 12-year period regarding how 
organizations implemented directed change from an outside actor (specifically, in this 
case, how national sports agencies in Canada implemented government-mandated 
changes to organization structure), Amis et al. conducted a quantitative study in order to 
validate their hypotheses. Amis et al. focused on three aspects of change: pace of change, 
sequence of efforts, and linearity of implementation. Initially, the authors set out to prove 
three hypotheses: “the completion of a radical organizational transition is characterized 
by a rapid change of pace, a change sequence that involves early change to high-impact 
organizational elements, and that elements in an organization undergoing a radical 
transformation will change in a non-linear manner.”47 
The authors’ findings with respect to pace are contrary to the traditional wisdom, 
actually disproving their first hypothesis that rapid change is superior. This view, 
grounded in the notion that rapid change engenders resistance to the change itself rather 
than the actors imposing the change, is designed to shield the change agent from 
protracted, long-lasting battles with powerful, embedded actors. Amis et al. found that 
rapid change alone will not bring about successful results and may actually prove 
detrimental as the shock of wholesale rapid change may paralyze an organization. 
Instead, they suggest targeted change to high-impact functions, implemented rapidly, 
followed by a period of sedation to allow the changes to take hold and the organization to 
                                                 
45 John Kotter and Leonard Schlesinger, “Choosing Strategies for Change,” Harvard Business Review 
86, no. 7 (July–August 2008).  
46 John Amis, Trevor Slack and C.R. Hinings, “The Pace, Sequence, and Linearity of Radical 
Change,” Academy of Management Journal 47, no. 1 (February 2004): 15.  
47 Ibid.  
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adjust to new processes and relationships. The critical element of their findings is geared 
toward the sequence of efforts rather than the pace of implementation. The authors posit 
that the sequence of change, targeting high-impact, important organizational elements 
first, then proceeding to less-impactful functions at the periphery of the organization, 
allows for the establishment of trust among those affected and also signals that changes 
are real and long-lasting, and that required adjustments are not optional. Allowing time 
for these realizations to occur and the required alternative action to develop is essential 
and directly combats the notion that rapid implementation is the panacea to engender 
successful change.48 
Lastly, Amis et al. tackle the linearity of change. Traditional theory holds that 
change is a linear process, occurring at a relatively constant rate and affecting an 
organization in a pre-determined manner. They find that this is not the case. Rather, 
change is occurring within different parts of an organization at different rates and with 
varying success. Characterizing change as “a series of oscillations and reversals,” the 
authors caution against assuming that external change will be easy to accomplish 
according to an implementation plan. Change actors must instead accept the reality that 
unsuccessful attempts will occur along the path of implementation. The ability to 
persevere through these times and accept the possibility that full reversal may occur for 
periods of time is essential to those wishing to alter the most high-impact and valuable 
organizational functions. The work by Amis et al. provides a framework from which to 
view external change efforts. The section to follow presents an alternative view of 
successful change implementation at the hands of internal vice external actors.49 
b. Incremental Change by Embedded Actors 
In their 2006 work entitled Legitimizing a New Role: Small Wins and 
Microprocesses of Change, Trish Reay, Karen Golden-Biddle, and Kathy Germann 
combat the notion that organizational change is solely a function of external events or 
outside actors. They focus their analysis on the concept of actor embedded-ness, which is 
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the degree to which any actor within an organization is embedded within the existing 
organizational culture and social context. Going beyond simple longevity, embedded-
ness implies a visceral understanding of the complex social and interpersonal 
relationships that provide the social contexts that drive the daily actions of those within 
an organization. Through an innate understanding of relationships, highly embedded 
actors may influence change efforts in manners that non-embedded actors may not grasp 
due to their inability to perceive social subtleties that represent the most powerful 
avenues to engender successful, lasting change.50 
An understanding of embedded actors versus non-embedded actors has long been 
a tenet of change theory. Reay et al., however, focus on the opposite side of the 
traditional view of embedded-ness, which holds that the longer an actor has functioned 
within a given organizational culture, the more embedded they become, resulting in an 
inability “to recognize the need for change and take action accordingly.” In other words, 
the traditional view of embedded actors is one of reticence and resistance to change due 
to their comfort within the established social norms of the current culture.51 The authors 
offer an alternative view of embedded-ness as an “opportunity” vice a “constraint,” a 
powerful tool that is capable of profoundly affecting the social and organizational culture 
of a system from within. The authors identify three “micro-processes” by which 
embedded actors may harness the strength of their position within the social construct.52 
(1) Cultivating opportunities for change. Remaining alert and sensing the 
“right time” to seize upon an opportunity presented by the course of normal events to 
advance a change agenda, this process leverages the sensitivity of the embedded actor to 
relationships within the social context. The embedded actor uses his or her innate 
understanding of factors affecting an organization to sense the proper opportunity to 
move efforts forward. These factors may be internal, external, budgetary, or social. 
Critical to the success of the embedded actor is sensitivity to how small factors, beyond 
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the control of the organization itself, pressurize the organizational culture in a manner 
that presents an opportunity to create desired change. “Rather than focusing on one major 
opportunity, [embedded actors] pepper the landscape with many cultivated 
opportunities.”53 
(2) Fitting the role into the prevailing system. Removing system barriers is the 
essential element of this step in the process. Doing so requires an understanding of what 
those barriers are, whether caused by other actors within the system or factors external to 
the organization. Here, the advantage to the embedded actor is an awareness of 
regulatory or policy barriers and, conversely, how to leverage those same avenues to 
codify or entrench the new process within guiding doctrine—thus making the new 
process or role hard to remove later. Further, embedded actors are able to identify 
powerful actors in other parts of the organization who may serve as allies in solidifying 
change through indirect methods. In the authors’ words, embedded actors “know who can 
help them and who will not.”54 
(3) Proving the value of the new role. The final micro process addresses 
proving the value of the proposed change, convincing those who need to be convinced 
and motivating those who already are. Embedded actors are capable of operating with 
“context appropriate” methods to accomplish their goals. Where non-embedded actors 
may choose an inappropriate change strategy out of cultural ignorance, the embedded 
actor understands exactly how to communicate their vision of the future in a manner that 
resonates with others in the organization, increasing the likelihood of gaining allies and 
support. This micro-process requires diligent attention and persistence as resistors are not 
generally easily or quickly convinced to change their views.55 
Contrary to traditional theory, the authors argue that embedded actors can 
improve the likelihood of successful organizational change. By integrating their new 
ideas into the existing organizational culture, they can influence others in subtle, less-
perceptible ways. 
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c. Radical, Continuous Change 
The traditional view of radical change to core processes of an organization is 
heavily biased toward the view that radical change must be introduced quickly and with a 
clear sense of purpose. This view holds that change introduced incrementally or lacking 
clear vision of the end state is doomed to failure as efforts will be mired in resistance 
until they are eventually derailed. Donde Plowman and her team describe a case in which 
radical, fundamental change occurred within an organization as the outcome of 
continuous, small-scale actions that accrued over time to produce large-scale results. In 
this way, change can be both continuous and radical.56 
In order to explain their observations, Plowman et al. rely on complexity theory as 
an analytical framework. They view change agents as singular or small sets of local 
actors acting in parallel but absent central coordination of effort. The interactions of their 
uncoordinated efforts produce a complex organization in which “perpetual novelty” takes 
root.57 Actions by one actor are perpetuated and compounded by the actions of another, 
quite possibly by accident. Over time, the compound effect is capable of producing large-
scale organizational change that is often imperceptible while the smaller changes are 
occurring.58 
The critical theoretical element advanced by their research is that change can 
indeed be both radical and continuous. Continuous implies an opposite view of radical 
change as purely revolutionary in nature—occurring swiftly and with purposeful action. 
Plowman et al. detail conditions in which small, unrelated actions taken at lower levels of 
an organization can unintentionally engender radical change.59 
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d. Small Wins 
As an extension of their research into the importance of actor embedded-ness in 
Legitimizing a New Role: Small Wins and Microprocesses of Change, Trish Reay and her 
fellow researchers describe the power of achieving small wins when attempting to tackle 
large-scale organizational change. In such efforts, where goals are far reaching or cultures 
firmly entrenched, attempting to radically or quickly engender change will be noticeable 
to resistors, likely resulting in change efforts being co-opted by institutionalized 
opponents. Reay et al. found that scaling down expectations and pursuing a strategy of 
small wins, achieved in serial and directly related to both one another and the overall 
goal, will achieve the same results in a manner less likely to be conspicuously 
threatening.60 
Beyond the value of small wins as camouflage, they also offer opportunities to 
motivate and sustain persistent, long-term change. Using a small wins strategy implies a 
long-term change effort focused on systematically and persistently chipping away at 
resistance. This requires dedicated change agents who may find themselves frustrated and 
stymied by the magnitude of the task at hand. Understanding that change agents will need 
motivation to continue, leaders of change must highlight each small win as proof that 
their efforts are valuable and productive. In this way, small wins are self-sustaining in 
that they engender change while simultaneously motivating continued effort by change 
agents.61 
With each small win, the future that once seemed difficult to imagine is made 
ever more concrete. This calcification, however slow and incremental, leverages the 
passage of time, making the past more and more distant and forgettable while ushering in, 
inconspicuously, a new future representing the desired outcome of the change effort.62 
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e. The Leader as Sense-maker 
Many of the themes that have been explored in this section center around the 
notion that new, emergent requirements or changes to organizational context will 
necessarily require a response from leadership. Traditionally, proper responses from 
leadership to change have been envisioned to be of the “command and control” type.63 
That is, the leader develops a vision of the desired end state, maps a strategy to move in 
that direction, and then personally executes the plan with precision and attention to detail. 
While appropriate to some contexts, some theorists have asserted that this application of 
leadership is less appropriate when an organization is faced with change. Louise Grison 
and Mick Beeby state quite pointedly that the true exercise of leadership is actually one 
of sense-making: “If leadership is fundamentally about power and power is about the 
ability to define situations with and for others then the exercise of power becomes the 
exercise of sense-making.”64 
Echoing Grison and Beeby in their case study of radical, continuous change, 
Plowman et al. offer the following: “we saw the important roles that leaders played as 
‘sense-makers’, using the tools of language and symbols to give meaning to the changes 
that were happening in a way that provided coherence to the organization.”65 Through the 
related work of these authors, the emerging role of the leader during organizational 
turmoil has transformed from one of providing direct influence and active control to one 
of interpretation of the realities in which the organization finds itself. This directly 
confronts the traditional understanding of leadership as visionary and directive and 
becomes problematic for those who wish to define leadership as the act of creating or 
controlling the future. Grison and Beeby state that the “power over” paradigm of 
individualistic leadership is ineffective for organizations that are addressing complex 
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problems because it is unnecessarily restrictive and removes options for collaboration and 
participative creativity.66  
This is not to say that there are never times to appropriately employ highly 
directive, authoritarian, or hierarchical leadership styles and methods; it is rather to offer 
that this type of leadership may not be appropriate for organizations that are facing 
emergent challenges to the status quo. During these times, it may be more appropriate for 
the leader to function as a sense-maker, providing insight and guidance to their followers 
rather than tight control. In doing so, the leader frames problems in a manner that also 
invites participation and collaboration to achieve superior results, while simultaneously 
promoting adjustment to new realities on the parts of followers. This view is firmly 
rooted in the belief that good ideas bubble up from below and require leadership to 
contextualize good ideas rather than develop them in a singular fashion. In order to 
accomplish this, leaders must let go of the desire to actively control the future and view 
uncertainty and change as unavoidable opportunities to promote creativity and innovation 
among their constituent teams.67 
4. Conclusion 
The above sections have highlighted the differing views with respect to planning, 
executing, and understanding change efforts and their impact on an organization. As with 
change itself, there is no one correct method to employ that will ensure successful, long-
lasting change as different theorists clearly have different views with respect to what can 
and should be done to achieve a positive outcome. Generally, traditional theorists 
emphasize a procedural, process-driven model that largely focusses upon the actions of a 
single, powerful, visionary change agent who leads change efforts through decisive 
action and aggressive implementation. Alternatively, contemporary theorists offer less-
prescriptive models that focus on the small actions of relatively non-empowered change 
agents. These actors bring lasting organizational change via consistent small-scale action 
that compounds over time to produce large-scale results. In the contemporary theory 
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presented above, leadership is less about singular visionary action to control the future 
and more about interpreting the meaning of current realities. In this manner, sense-
making replaces strategy and bottom-up replaces top-down. A consolidated presentation 








Leaders  Strategists 
 Visionaries 
 Guide change 
 Sense-makers 
 Interpret situation using 
context-appropriate 
language 
Actors  Singular or comprising a 
single, powerful group or 
central coalition 
 Newly arrived, non-
embedded 
 Multiple, comprising broad 
action 
 Embedded within the social
context of the organization 
 May not be coordinated 
Action  Broad, organization-wide 
 Created according to plan 
 Specific, tailored 
 Opportunity driven 
Force  External  Internal or external 
Pace  Rapid  “Fits and starts” 
 May be rapid at times, slow 
and deliberate at others 
Impact  High 
 Affecting core-processes 
 High or low, depending 
 
End-state/Result  Known 
 Derived from vision or 
strategy 
 May be unknown 
Process  Linear 
 Procedural: unfreeze, 
change, re-freeze. 
 Prescriptive: 8-step model 
 Non-linear 
 Incremental 
 May even be meandering 
or regressive at times 






 Often inconspicuous 
Table 1.   Comparison of elements of traditional and contemporary 
organizational change theory 
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While Table 1 is useful to categorize theoretical elements, it does not properly 
connote the true complexity of change once theory is put into practice as organizational 
change initiatives and their associated dynamics are not easily given to simple, condensed 
explanations or one-word solutions. The immense complexity that defines the modern 
world engenders an equally complex environment within today’s organizations. All 
organizations are comprised of human beings performing functions and in this way small 
and large organizations alike are faced with similar challenges when looking to tackle the 
vexing problems that negatively impact their organizations. These are problems rooted in 
the interaction of the human beings that comprise organizations and are such that there 
are no correct answers.68 There are, rather, infinite interpretations and, depending on 
one’s view or opinion, infinite solutions. Renowned design theorist Horst Rittel coined a 
special phrase to define this type of problem: the wicked problem.69 
D. WICKED PROBLEMS  
Hard problems have always surrounded the world of business and academia alike. 
Solving differential equations or determining optimal stocking of a warehouse are 
difficult tasks to conquer. Institutions of higher learning, however, have taught us how to 
analyze hard problems and converge on a solution. Software developers have made 
fortunes designing and selling decision-support tools to assist in solution generation to 
solve hard problems. The problem is: hard problems are not the problem.70 
Instead, the non-linear world in which we must thrive will be dominated by 
wicked problems as we progress into a future plagued by uncertainty and complexity. 
These problems are not just more difficult than hard problems. Wicked problems, first 
identified by mathematician Horst Rittel in the 1960s, are “a class of social system 
problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are 
                                                 
68 Karen Christensen, “Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems,” in Rotman on Design, 
ed. Roger Martin and Karen Christensen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013). 
69 Roger Martin, The Design of Business: Why Design Thinking is the Next Competitive Advantage 
(Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2009), 94.  
70 Ibid.   
 28
many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in 
the whole system are ill-defined and unique in their causes, character, and solution.”71  
Dealing with wicked problems requires a different focus. Instead of focusing on 
the solution, you must devote substantial time to understanding the nature of the problem 
itself.72 A wicked problem has one or more of the following characteristics: 
 The causes of the problem are not just complex but deeply ambiguous; 
you cannot tell why things are happening the way they are and what 
causes them to do so.  
 The problem does not fit neatly into any category you have encountered 
before; it looks and feels entirely unique, so the problem-solving 
approaches you have used in the past do not seem to apply.  
 Each attempt at devising a solution changes the understanding of the 
problem; merely attempting to come to a solution changes the problem 
and how you think about it. 
 There is no clear stopping rule; it is difficult to tell when the problem is 
“solved” and what that solution may look like when you reach it.73 
Wicked problems will dominate the future. Problems like how to end poverty in 
Africa, how to reform our education system, and how to innovate in a traditionally 
hierarchal organization will require a new way of thinking. According to Richard 
Buchanan, “design thinking may be applied to any area of human experience” but is well 
suited to address wicked problems because design thinking is premised upon a lack of 
preconceived solutions: “[the task] for designers is to conceive and plan what does not 
yet exist…”74 This is in contrast to the disciplines of science, which are concerned with 
understanding what already exists—the principles, laws, rules, or structures that are 
embodied in existing subject matters.75 To address wicked problems, understanding what 
already exists will not be enough. Instead, leaders must become designers and foster an  
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environment conducive to “outside of the box thinking” where subordinates can 
discover—if they do not, wicked problems will prevail over the problem solvers of the 
world.  
E. DESIGN THINKING 
1. Introduction 
While change management provides techniques for increasing the chance of 
success when instituting organizational change, something else is needed to actually 
figure out what the change should be. This is where design and design thinking are 
essential. In the 20th century, value creation was primarily derived from converting a 
heuristic into an algorithm.76 Many 20th century companies thrived due to optimization 
efforts in the areas of supply chain management, cost controls, and warehouse control.77 
Similarly, in the DOD, increasing emphasis has been placed on business process 
optimization through efforts like Lean Six Sigma managerial concepts and reliance on 
operations research. Moving forward, however, optimization may not be enough. As a 
business or organization goes through the optimization process, at some point maximum 
effort will only produce marginal gains in performance because you are, in fact, 
approaching a fully optimized state. One senior executive with a major food company 
recently remarked, “In the early 2000s we became the most efficient food company in the 
world, but so have our main competitors. What now?”78 According to Roger Martin, the 
world is on the cusp of a design revolution—competition in business is no longer about 
creating dominance in scale-intensive industries, but rather it is about producing elegant, 
refined products and services in imagination-intensive industries.79  
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2. Foundational Design Theorists 
a. Herbert Simon 
Herbert Simon (1916–2001) was among the founding fathers of several of today’s 
important scientific domains, including artificial intelligence, information processing, 
decision-making, problem-solving, attention economics, organization theory, complex 
systems, and computer simulation of scientific discovery.80 In his book The Sciences of 
The Artificial, Simon wrote:   
Historically and traditionally, it has been the task of the science disciplines 
to teach about natural things: how they are and how they work. It has been 
the task of engineering schools to teach about artificial things: how to 
make artifacts that have desired properties and how to design. [However] 
Engineers are not the only professional designers. Everyone designs who 
devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into 
preferred ones.81 
Out of this excerpt, a simple but foundational definition of design was articulated: 
Design is transformation of existing conditions into preferred ones.82 Also in this book, 
Simon points out the irony of the 20th century; the natural sciences almost completely 
drove out the artificial sciences from professional school curricula. For example, 
engineering schools focused heavily on physics and mathematics, medical schools 
became schools focusing on biological science, and business schools concentrated on 
mathematical optimization.83 The major disparity with this focus on the natural sciences 
is that personnel in fields such as engineering, medicine, business, architecture, and 
painting should not necessarily be concerned with how things are but rather how they 
might be.84 That is to say, someone in one of these fields cannot simply study what 
exists—they must also create something that contributes to the continued advancement of 
that field. In short, they are concerned with design or the science of the artificial. While 
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seeming at odds with one another, the science of the artificial is not meant to replace the 
natural science but rather to complement it.85  
The crux of Simon’s position is very simple: humans have a somewhat limited 
cognitive capacity for reasoning when searching for a solution within a problem space.86 
Though the human intellect is powerful, it begins to falter when faced with seemingly 
boundless options by which to solve a problem. While computers assist in providing 
greater capability, their capacity is still limited.87 According to Simon, the first step in 
any problem-solving episode is representing the problem, and to a large extent, that 
action will reveal the solution hidden within the representation of the problem.88 When 
dealing with wicked problems, it is especially important to heed this principle and focus 
efforts on understanding the nature of the problem itself.  
b. Richard Boland 
While Herbert Simon developed the first basic definition of design, Richard 
Boland was one of the initial authors who wrote literature focusing exclusively on design. 
In his 2004 book Managing as Designing, Boland argued that if leaders adopted a design 
attitude the world of business would be a better place.89 He used the classic inventory 
control problem as a great example of where design thinking could have been beneficial. 
Modeling the inventory process as a buffer between customer demands and company 
production became the default for 30 years, which resulted in the development of 
techniques for calculating reorder points and lot sizes, and minimizing holding costs.90 
The focus on these complex calculations, however, led to being blinded for decades from 
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other ways to minimize inventories such as rethinking the design of production processes, 
relationships with suppliers, and use of information systems that support the company.91  
In his book, Boland identifies what he calls a design attitude. Using this term, he 
refers to the expectations and orientations one brings to a design project.92 A design 
attitude views each effort or project as a chance for invention that includes a questioning 
of basic assumptions and a resolve to leave the world a better place.93 According to 
Boland, designers relish the lack of predetermined outcomes.94 That is to say, designers 
are not focused on optimization but instead focus their efforts on what could be.  
In the introduction to this section on design thinking, the researchers articulated 
that design provides a highway to determine what the change should be while 
organizational change management increases the chances of successful implementation 
of a change. Boland takes this a step further and explains that the tools of traditional 
business planning start with the assumption that incremental growth will produce 
continued acceptable gains in performance.95 What if, however, in the 21st century 
actions of the future can no longer be based on what happened in the past? Boland argues 
that certain tools from design can actually help organizations execute large-scale change 
efforts. More specifically, the design tools of contextual observation, human-centered 
frameworks, and rapid prototyping can be effective in helping businesses manage 
change.96  
As evidenced in the 20th century, when managers focus heavily on quantitative 
and qualitative data, it sometimes becomes difficult for them to actually notice a solution 
to a problem that may be right in front of them.97 This is because the data they are 
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exclusively relying on has typically been stripped of any emotional content.98 Giving 
people the tool of contextual observation, a different way of seeing that reality, however, 
helps them to address the problem.99 For example, if a civilian consultant company was 
hired to explore information flow within an exclusive military organization, it would be 
hard for that team of civilians to truly understand the nature of the problem unless they 
embedded themselves in the everyday life of that community and observed actors in the 
context of their day-to-day routines.  
As more of the problems in the world become wicked in nature, it becomes 
difficult to look specifically at the effort of an individual business unit within an 
organization because more and more problems overlap multiple units. No longer can 
individual sections within a company be optimized to operate independently; they must 
work together seamlessly. According to Boland, designers create frameworks so that they 
can simplify and unify design opportunities in order to conceive possible futures and 
make certain that all parts and pieces are coordinated with one another.100 These human-
centered frameworks reintroduce a holistic viewpoint to an organization and allow them 
to refocus on providing value to the most important component of any organization—
humans (e.g., customers, employees, and other stakeholders).101 
According to Boland, the last design tool that can be applied to organizational 
change is rapid prototyping, which helps people to experience a possible future in 
tangible ways.102 This technique allows a very low-risk way of quickly exploring 
multiple directions before committing resources (both time and material) to the best 
one.103 Rapid prototyping can obviously be used for product development but can also be 
used to model an environment, enact processes and business plans, or even outline 
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information flow within an organization.104 The major benefits to this technique are that 
it provides an opportunity to explore hunches or distant ideas that might in turn give more 
clarity to the problem, it helps organizations to be mindful of the possibilities of creating 
unique solutions, and it also allows for quick convergence and more useful feedback from 
stakeholders.105 
c. Roger Martin 
Roger Martin is revered by some as one of the most instrumental theorists of 
design and design thinking. According to Martin, designers take a mystery and turn it into 
a heuristic, then turn that heuristic into an algorithm, and finally turn that algorithm into 
binary code (if applicable).106 A great example of this transformation is the study of 
gravity: the mystery was the observation of items falling, the heuristic was understanding 
gravity, understanding gravity resulted in the algorithm for the gravity constant 
(9.81 meters/second2), and the algorithm then allowed the programming of binary code 
for aircraft autopilot.107 In the 20th century, value creation was primarily derived from 
converting a heuristic into an algorithm.108 Many 20th century companies thrived due to 
optimizations efforts in the areas of supply chain management, cost controls, and 
warehouse control.109 In the 21st century, however, value is more likely going to be 
derived in a different way.  
In his 2009 book The Design of Business, Martin explains why design thinking is 
the next competitive advantage for businesses. Martin articulates that very few companies 
are able to balance between exploration and exploitation to truly take a design-thinking 
approach.110 Too often companies choose either exploration or exploitation and fail to 
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balance between the two.111 Going back to Boland’s inventory control example, focusing 
on calculating reorder points and lot sizes, and minimizing holding costs, focuses on 
exploitation while rethinking the design of production processes, relationships with 
suppliers, and use of information systems that support the company would focus on 
exploration. The best approach would be to balance between the two.  
In order to capitalize on this next competitive advantage, organizational leaders 
must learn to reconcile between analytic and intuitive thinking.112 The analytic thinking 
model is used to create value by driving out gut-feelings and instincts and instead relies 
on rigorous, quantitative analysis backed by decision-support software, if available.113 
Conversely, intuitive thinking is centered around creativity and innovation.114 The two 
models are both with their strengths and weaknesses and while it seems that they do not 
complement each other, Martin actually proposes that neither analysis nor intuition alone 
is enough.115 Similar to the balance between exploration and exploitation, the most 
successful businesses will balance between analytical mastery and intuitive originality in 
a dynamic interplay called design thinking.116 According to Martin, design thinking is the 
form of thought that enables movement along the knowledge funnel, and the firms that 
master it will gain a nearly inexhaustible, long-term business advantage.117 
The knowledge funnel, as depicted in Figure 1, pictorially shows how leading 
businesses should work to innovate most consistently and successfully. The mystery 
stage can take many forms but at its core it involves exploring an unknown—a medical 
researcher may explore the mystery of a learning disability or a military officer might 
delve into the nuances of information flow. When passing through the heuristic phase, the 
field of inquiry simply gets narrowed down to a manageable size—this stage provides a 
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simplified understanding of the mystery and allows the focusing of effort. That same 
military officer looking into the mystery of information flow might narrow that down to 
information flow on a nuclear submarine in this stage and map out how that submarine is 
actually passing information. The last stage requires converting from a general rule of 
thumb to a fixed formula. In the heuristic stage, a military officer might say information 
flow on a nuclear submarine must be improved but when traversing through the 
algorithm stage, that heuristic should become something more tangible.  
 
Figure 1.  Roger Martin’s knowledge funnel118 
Roger Martin outlines the tools of design thinkers—observation, imagination, and 
configuration.119 In his book, he explains the concepts of deep, careful, open-minded 
observation; honed and practiced imagination skills; and the ability to translate the idea 
into an activity system that will produce the desired outcome—configuration.120 The 
DOD currently lacks in all three of these areas. More specifically, the Defense 
Department has decent observation skills but lacks in the area of open-minded 
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observation. Imagination is strong in an austere deployed environment typically because 
it is sparked by necessity but in a garrison setting service members are usually more 
constrained by standard operating procedures and regulations. And lastly, configuration is 
woefully below standards. At first glance, one might posit that the DOD does a good job 
of obtaining a desired outcome—but this is only part of configuration. The first part is 
translating an idea, which the Defense Department does a poor job of since most unique 
ideas are terminated at conception—long before they ever have a chance at prompting 
change.  
d. Tim Brown 
As an approach, design thinking draws from capacities everyone has but that are 
oftentimes overlooked by more conventional problem-solving practices. Brown and 
Wyatt explain that design thinking is best thought of as a system of overlapping spaces 
rather than a sequence of orderly steps—three spaces consisting of inspiration, ideation, 
and implementation.121 In this system, inspiration is simply the opportunity (problem) 
that catalyzes the search for solutions, ideation is the process of rapidly generating and 
testing ideas, and implementation is the path that leads from the design thinking process 
to actually being incorporated as the solution to the problem.122  
In his 2009 book, Change by Design:  How Design Thinking Transforms 
Organizations and Inspires Innovation, Tim Brown expands on the design thinking 
process, explaining that the process looks like a rhythmic exchange between the 
divergent and convergent phases, with each subsequent iteration less broad and more 
detailed than the previous ones.123 Convergent thinking is a practical way of analyzing 
and choosing among existing alternatives.124 Divergent thinking, however, involves 
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multiplying options to create choices.125 In the divergent phase, new possibilities emerge 
but in the convergent phase you must eliminate options and make choices. Figure 2 
shows the diverge and converge phases—this is the heart of design thinking.126 
 
Figure 2.  Convergent and divergent thinking127 
Brown suggests that developing a culture of innovation akin to that of Google, 
Pixar, or IDEO is essential to fostering an environment conducive to “out of the box” 
type thinking.128 Each of these companies uses the Jamming and Hanging Out paradigm 
outlined by Frank Barrett in his book Yes to the Mess: Surprising Leadership Lessons 
from Jazz.129 In these informal jam sessions, jazz musicians are able to discover as a 
team—where they learn the common groove that will bring people together so they can 
learn from each other and share experiences that could potentially lead to 
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breakthroughs.130 This environment is successful specifically because of its informal, 
unplanned setting that encourages accidental, surprise moments of discovery and 
minimizes defensive routines, which Peter Senge describes as entrenched habits we use 
to protect ourselves from the embarrassment and threat that come with exposing our 
thinking.131 This concept is not unique to the civilian sector. U.S. military service 
members come up with great ideas to solve problems but oftentimes these ideas are 
spurred either in a deployed setting or at an informal gathering of peers. It is incumbent 
on DOD leadership to capture the characteristics of these “solution-generating 
atmospheres” in order to capitalize on the outcome they produce for future competitive 
advantage.  
3. Design Thinking Facilitators: IDEO 
Herbert Simon, Richard Boland, Roger Martin, and Tim Brown have contributed 
immensely to the incorporation of design and design thinking into business. Without an 
advisory agent on the actual techniques required to bring design to business, however, 
their collective theory will only go so far as the reader is willing to read the theory and 
enact it on their own. Some companies, though, have developed their entire existence 
around the concepts developed by these foundational authors. IDEO (pronounced eye-
dee-ohh), headquartered in Silicon Valley, is widely regarded as the foremost design 
thinking firm in the world. Capitalizing on their unique corporate culture and the creative 
talents of their academically diverse workforce, IDEO specializes in assisting 
organizations, both public and private, to innovate their products and improve their 
organizational cultures. Implementing design thinking concepts under the tutelage of 
David Kelley, company founder and tenured Stanford professor, IDEO has helped 
innovate or redesign many of the most common products in modern life, such as the 
toothbrush, the athletic shoe, and most famously, the shopping cart.132 
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Tim Brown, current chief executive officer (CEO) of IDEO, offers the following 
insight: “design thinking is a human-centered approach to innovation…to integrate the 
needs of people, the possibilities of technology, and the requirements” of the customer.133 
In concert with this guiding principle, IDEO offers a six-step process that guides 
innovators through a three-phased conceptual approach. The six steps are: 
1. Define the challenge 
2. Observe people 
3. Form insights 
4. Frame opportunities 
5. Brainstorm ideas 
6. Try experiments134 
By executing these six specific steps, the design thinker is led through the three 
larger, more generalized conceptual areas of “Inspire, Ideate, and Implement”—the 
backbone of the IDEO process. Critical to the execution of design thinking is a culture 
that encourages open discussion and removal of hierarchy in order to foster an 
environment of psychological safety, thereby enabling idea growth. To set this 
environment, IDEO has seven rules that govern interaction during the design process: 
1. Defer judgment 
2. Encourage new ideas 
3. Build on the ideas of others 
4. Stay focused on the topic 
5. Be visual 
6. One conversation at a time 
7. Go for quantity135 
Those who are schooled in the traditional methods of brainstorming or 
requirements-based design may find the above process antithetical to established practice. 
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This is precisely IDEO’s challenge when working with outside entities: breaking the 
accepted wisdom of the current organizational culture to breathe new life, new ideas, and 
new creative energy into products or procedures that are often mundane, uninteresting, or 
proven effective through time. To shatter accepted routines, IDEO innovators harness the 
creative potential inherent in design thinking.136 
To temper the possibility of unbridled creativity resulting in solutions that do not 
actually meet the needs of the customer or consumer, IDEO requires a mandate to 
shepherd the design process. In other words, they require a specific problem question that 
guides the iterative design process, allowing innovators to continually build upon and 
refine their ideas to ensure that they are 1) desirable, 2) viable, and 3) feasible. The area 
of overlap defined by these three concepts represents the “innovative space.” A solution 
that is not in keeping with these three principles is not accepted. In this manner, IDEO 
provides a creative space where thinkers may innovate while remaining simultaneously 
bound by the limits of reality.137 
4. Conclusion 
While change management provides techniques for increasing the chance of 
success when instituting organizational change, design thinking provides an effective 
method to actually figure out what the change should be. While the 20th century was 
focused on optimization efforts to create competitive advantage, those efforts can only be 
effective until you are near optimization—once you reach that point, you can no longer 
rely on that technique to create a business edge. Instead, organizations must focus on the 
creation of elegant, refined products and services that connect with a customer need in a 
new way. In the future, both the corporate sector and the DOD will need to use 
techniques such as design thinking to spark creativity and innovation in order to stay 
ahead of their competitors. To do this, an external consultancy agent such as IDEO may 
be needed to facilitate utilization of the design thinking process.  
                                                 
136 Ibid.  
137 IDEO, “About IDEO.” 
 42
F. LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSION 
Based on the literature review, there is a strong link between the events of the 
Executive TANG Forum and the fields of organizational change management, design, 
and design thinking. Lessons extracted from this case are generalizable to other 
organizations. The literature review and the case research have demonstrated the potential 
of utilizing the principles of design thinking to catalyze technological innovation in the 
submarine community with further application to the greater DOD. 
As a large, complex organization with intricate dynamics, it is of great worth to 
DOD personnel and leaders to understand the conceptual theory of organizational change 
and design thinking. It is equally critical to consider the practical application of theory to 
achieve full understanding of its depth and context. The case presented in the following 
chapter is an example of efforts to apply these theories in a real-world setting. Through 
an analysis of the case presented, the reader will have an opportunity to consider the 
dynamic interaction of design and design thinking as they relate to an organization 





III. THE EXECUTIVE TACTICAL ADVANCEMENTS FOR THE 
NEXT GENERATION (TANG) CASE STUDY 
A. A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A SUBMARINE COMMANDING OFFICER 
The change of command ceremony is a time honored tradition which 
formally restates to the officers and personnel of the command the 
continuity of command. It is a formal ritual conducted before the 
assembled company of the command. The change of command of a naval 
unit activity is nearly unique in the world today; it is a transfer of total 
responsibility, authority and accountability from one individual to 
another.138 
Military command is reserved for the best and brightest officers the military has 
to offer. In the United States Navy, taking charge of a unit as a Commander (O-5) 
requires passing a rigorous command screening process that determines whether an 
officer has what it takes to command a unit filled with the nation’s most critical asset  
—America’s youth. An O-5 level command screening board typically consists of  
15–20 Captains (CAPTs) and is chaired by an Admiral (usually a 1-star Rear 
Admiral).139 During these extensive screening boards, every aspect of a candidate’s 
documented performance is reviewed. While past performance is the primary metric used 
to determine a candidate’s potential to command, those in the service and outside alike 
frequently wonder, what does it really take to command a naval submarine? 
1. The Road to Command 
Prior to screening for a command job, naval submarine officers must pass through 
a series of gates and do well before being considered. Submarine officers begin their 
career as Ensigns (O-1s) and attend Nuclear Power School and Nuclear Prototype School, 
each 6 months in duration. After attending these schools, where attrition can be a frequent 
occurrence, the junior officer (JO) then attends Submarine Basic Course for 3 months 
before boarding his first submarine for his “JO tour,” which will last approximately  
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36 months. During this initial tour, the JO is required to pass his Submarine Personnel 
Qualification Standards (PQS) in order to become a qualified submarine officer. This 
PQS can take up to the entire JO tour to obtain, depending on ship tasking, though that is 
rare and usually takes approximately 18 months.140 
After completion of a successful JO tour, the submarine officer is typically a  
Lieutenant (O-3) and will then likely go on a shore tour of some variety for a period of  
24–30 months. This shore tour, named in this fashion due to the non-deploying nature of 
the jobs in this category, can range from being a student at Naval Postgraduate School or 
teaching at the United States Naval Academy to recruiting duty or possibly even joint 
duty with another service. After completion of this first shore tour, the submarine 
Lieutenant will attend department head school for a period of 6 months, after which he 
will return to sea duty on board a submarine to serve as an actual department head (DH) 
for a period of 36 months. As a DH, the now relatively senior Lieutenant is given his first 
opportunity to be responsible for the training and administration of a large department—
typically 20 to 30 officers and sailors.141 During their DH tour, Lieutenants begin to 
develop the multi-tasking and administrative skills that will be required when they 
become senior officers. From personnel concerns to proper employment of tactics, the 
commanding officer charges his department heads with maintaining their departments in 
a well-trained, combat-ready posture. All the while, DHs maintain their personal tactical 
qualifications and stand watch on the bridge and in the control room, requiring them to 
constantly shift back and forth between tactical and administrative skills. Operating 
simultaneously in both the operational and administrative realms will come to define the 
remainder of their careers. 
After a DH tour, another 36-month period on shore duty is typically next, 
followed by a tour as an executive officer (XO), where the officer serves as second in 
command of a submarine. In order to prepare for this milestone tour, the officer is 
required to attend more specialized training at the Prospective Executive Officer School, 
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a curriculum that spans 3 months of in-depth training.142 The depth of the course is equal 
to the monumental nature of the task ahead, for as an XO the submariner is responsible to 
the CO for manning, training, and equipping the entire submarine and its crew. 
Ultimately, the XO is accountable to the commanding officer for ensuring that the 
submarine and its crew are operating effectively and ready for combat, freeing the 
commanding officer to attend to the details of operational tasking and mission planning, 
such as digesting intelligence related to the crew’s next mission or contemplating how he 
would like to proceed into a dangerous, shallow-water environment. In a typical day, the 
XO can expect to oversee maintenance in the reactor spaces, training of the watch 
sections, and scheduling of the following day’s events, all while receiving, answering, 
and screening communications to the commanding officer from within the submarine 
crew as well as higher echelon command.143 It is a daunting task that requires superior 
task management and the ability to parse large amounts of disparate information, the 
same skills the XO will need to have finely tuned and ready for action by the time he 
assumes command of his own submarine and crew. 
After all is said and done, by the time a submarine officer screens for actual 
command, he will have anywhere from 8 to 11 years of total operational experience 
aboard a submarine and a total of 16 to 17 years of total time in service. With formal 
schools and subsequent performance tests, along with years of underway time in going 
from a newly minted submarine ensign to an XO, one might wonder why there is a need 
for such meticulous screening to get through the next gate and become an actual 
submarine commanding officer. 
According to CAPT (ret.) Glen Niederhauser, former commanding officer of the 
Nuclear Attack Submarine USS San Francisco (SSN-711) as well as the Navy’s 
Submarine Commanders Course,  
Being in command of a submarine is an absolute job. You are completely 
responsible and totally accountable. There is no sharing of the 
responsibility with anyone. If anything goes wrong, you’re going to be the 
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guy that gets fired. You’re held accountable for the performance of your 
men. A lot of people have their fingers in your business and you have to 
make independent decisions day-to-day but you have to pay attention to a 
lot of issues at the same time. A good CO can prioritize across the time 
horizon. You have to make sure that your ship is always ready to do 
whatever mission you’re asked to do.144 
After passing the rigorous command screening process, the future commander 
would then be slated by the Bureau of Naval Personnel to the specific submarine that he 
will command. Before actually taking command though, this officer is required to attend 
Naval Reactors School once again. For a period of approximately 3 months, the future 
CO gets brought back up to speed on the operation of the submarine’s most critical 
asset—the nuclear reactor.145 Instead of the more general nuclear reactor information that 
is taught to newly minted ensigns, however, he learns the complete operation of the 
specific nuclear reactor housed on the submarine that he will actually command. The 
course encompasses design, operation, and radiological controls of the reactor as well as 
the qualifications of the actual operators that will run it. Additionally, the Naval Reactors 
School addresses how to handle questions or inquiries from the press—a critical skill for 
the commander of a warship that completes covert, strategic-level missions and possesses 
an underwater nuclear power facility.146 In addition to the Naval Reactor School, the 
future CO must also pass the Submarine Commander Course, a 3-month course designed 
to hone the tactical skills of the future commander. The specific focus of this course is on 
tactical ship driving, preparing the students to maneuver the submarine safely and 
accomplish assigned missions. During the commander course, the prospective CO will 
learn to move the ship into position and perform various mission sets that would include 
anti-submarine warfare, covert surveillance, attack on a surface ship, mine warfare, and a 
Tomahawk missile strike along with various classified missions.147 Factoring in travel 
time as well as time between schools, the whole CO training pipeline is about 6 months 
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in duration and both the reactor course and the tactical course can be failed, which would 
prohibit the candidate from actually taking command.148 
2. Burden and Isolation 
By the time an officer is assigned to command his own submarine, he has 
had years of experience at sea, in shore duty assignments, and in the 
classroom. The young men who serve at sea under his leadership should 
feel confident that he’s the man to lead them into battle or on a safe and 
successful peacetime mission. The Captain of the submarine, with his 
“unmatched burden of isolation,” is the individual to whom all look for 
guidance. The Captain sets the tone and everything flows from his 
example and leadership style—he’s the man.149 
As the Skipper of a submarine, you are the most experienced officer on board the 
ship and therefore are expected to personally make critical decisions throughout the day 
while the submarine is underway.150 Because of this fact, the Navy designed the physical 
layout of the submarine to facilitate centralized decision making. For example, the CO’s 
stateroom, where the commander sleeps, is located only a few feet from the control room 
where the key functions of the ship are exercised.151 
As one could imagine, being in command of a submarine is a hectic job. One 
retired submarine commander remarked, “Even when you’re free, you’re busy. As the 
CO, there are always issues coming up—everything from training and personnel to 
maintenance and logistics.”152 On the other hand, being a CO can also be a lonely job. As 
the CO, you have no peers onboard the submarine. The chief of the boat (COB) is 
typically in your age group but represents the enlisted ranks and therefore the relationship 
with the COB must remain strictly professional. The second most senior officer, the XO, 
is usually 5 years younger than the CO, the department heads are usually a few years 
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younger than the XO, and the junior officers are usually in their early twenties.153 An 
example of a typical submarine command structure can be found in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  Command structure onboard a typical submarine154 
While the hierarchy above helps with administration and management of the 
submarine’s crew and equipment, the CO is still the individual that is solely responsible 
for everything his unit does or fails to do. On any given day, he can be found prioritizing 
the purchase of repair parts for critical systems onboard, making decisions about 
navigation and weapon system qualifications, leading the preparation for a naval reactor 
examination, ensuring training is going on while underway, and actually leading the 
completion of real-world tactical missions.155 A CO must be able to synthesize a slew of 
inputs and make decisions across a broad range of sub-specialties.156 According to CAPT 
(ret.) Glen Niederhauser, “A CO that can only do one thing at a time will not succeed. If 
                                                 
153 Glen Niederhauser, interview by Robert Featherstone, November 21, 2013. 
154 Ibid.  
155 Ibid.   
156 Glen Niederhauser, interview by Robert Featherstone, November 21, 2013. 
 49
he’s doing maintenance in port and not thinking about tactical training required for 
getting underway, he’ll fall behind. And on top of everything, he’s dealing with a slew of 
personnel problems.”157  
The constant information pull from higher commands can also be a source of 
stress for the CO. While active top-down management has long been a part of submarine 
culture, it has only been exacerbated by technology.158 According to Andy Leal, a retired 
career submarine officer, “Before e-mail, a submarine left for 3 months on a deployment 
and the commander’s boss had to trust that it was going to do good things. Now shortly 
after leaving port, the CO has probably already received multiple e-mails from the 
Commodore.”159 In addition to dealing with information pull from higher echelons and a 
slew of administration and management issues, possibly the most potentially lethal job of 
the CO is managing his awareness of all the surface and sub-surface vessels (contacts) 
near his submarine. A lapse in attention or situational awareness with respect to what else 
is operating near the submarine could spell disaster for both ship and crew.  
3. The Control Room and Bridge 
On a submarine, a “contact” is anything that could potentially cause harm to the 
submarine. This could be a fishing net, an underwater sea mount, an enemy submarine, a 
commercial merchant ship, or literally anything that could cause damage to the 
submarine. As a result, managing the contact picture is a top priority for the CO of any 
underway submarine. To assist him with this, he has a qualified officer-of-the-deck 
(OOD). The OOD, typically a Lieutenant, is responsible for overseeing command and 
control. In this capacity, he reports directly to the CO for safe navigation and general 
operation of the ship. The OOD typically stands watch in the control room, where the 
ship is driven from while submerged or at periscope depth. It is the focal point for tactical 
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information. Approximately 12 to 15 personnel stand watch directly supporting the OOD. 
The major watch sections and watch standers include:160 
 Ship’s Control Party 
 Diving Officer of the Watch–Responsible for maintaining 
whatever the ordered depth is for the submarine.  
 Helmsman–Controls the ship’s movement along the horizontal 
plane (left and right) (Figure 4). 
 Planesman–Controls the ship’s movement along the vertical plane 
(up and down) (Figure 4). 
 Chief of the Watch–Moves variable ballast on and off the ship to 
maintain or adjust depth. Also, adjusts variable ballast between 
forward and aft tanks to maintain even keel. He also takes reports 
from other forward watch standers throughout the submarine 
(including machinery room watch, torpedo room watch, and roving 
watch standers). He is the hub of all the forward watch standers.  
 
Figure 4.  The Helmsman and Planesman aboard the USS Toledo (SSN-769)161  
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 Aft Watch  
 Quartermaster–The navigation guy. He plots the ships’ position, 
projects ship’s future position, and makes sure the submarine is 
remaining in its assigned waters and where the Captain says he 
wants the ship to be.  
 Tactical Watch Standers 
 Sonar Watch Standers–four or five on watch at any one time 
separated usually by a curtain or a door (except for Virginia class 
submarines where they are in the control room). They look at sonar 
screens and make reports on new contacts that are gained or lost 
(Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5.  Sonar operators aboard the USS Toledo162 
 Combat Systems Operators 
 Fire Control Technicians of the Watch–two of them. Take sonar 
information and information from other sensors (visual, radar, 
electronic support measures), fuse it all together, and make a target 
track that contains bearing, range, course, speed, and closest point 
of approach to the submarine–for every contact.  
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 Contact Manager/Contact Coordinator: Takes all information 
contributed by the Combat Systems Operators and reports to the 
OOD. He interprets all this information, reports to OOD in a 
streamlined fashion, and makes recommendations on how to drive 
the ship.163 
In addition to the above watch standers, when the submarine is at periscope depth 
or surface depth the following additional watch standers report to the OOD: 
 Electronic System Operator–Reports any contacts that are being made by 
radar systems. Physically separated from control room.  
 Radio Man of the Watch–Controls all communications circuits. Physically 
separated from control room.164 
When submerged or at periscope depth, the OOD stands watch in the control 
room. When the submarine surfaces, however, the OOD relocates himself to the bridge 
where he can physically see the environment around the submarine. A lookout will 
accompany him to the bridge to assist in visually identifying any objects that could cause 
harm to the submarine on the surface. When on the bridge, the OOD is physically 
disconnected from control room—his only means of communication is via an audio 
circuit (voice only)—a hand-held microphone and loudspeaker on each end along with a 
basic sound-powered phone handset.165 Figure 6 shows a typical bridge on a nuclear 
submarine.  
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Figure 6.  CO, OOD, and lookout on the bridge of the  
USS Helena (SSN-725)166  
4. Reports to the Commanding Officer 
The OOD, whether on the bridge or in the control room, assists the CO in 
maintaining situational awareness of the contact picture around the submarine as well as 
all critical functional areas of the ship. Per the captain’s standing orders there are set 
situations in which he requires reports from the OOD. Usually, these standing orders 
include any contact inside of 16,000 yards, a second report before the contact comes 
within 8,000 yards, and a third report if the contact will close to within 4,000 yards of the 
submarine. This is for every single contact. He will get those reports usually one at a 
time.  
If the CO is not physically in the control room, which he usually is not, he 
receives verbal contact reports via an audio circuit. The only exception to this is if he is in 
the wardroom or his stateroom where there are display repeaters capable of replicating 
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information from any of the ship’s control room systems. If, however, he is in the engine 
room overseeing maintenance activities, on the crew’s mess observing training, or 
possibly just walking around the ship keeping up with the crew, he would only receive 
verbal reports. Being able to see the data associated with a contact report when he is 
anywhere on the submarine would be ideal, but current submarine technology only 
enables audio reports.167 
To help with information digestion, contact reports from the OOD are 
standardized. The standard report goes back decades in the submarine community and 
begins with the submarine’s current course, speed and depth (if submerged) and is then 
structured using the acronym “TD-BRAD” which stands for: Target, Designation, 
Bearing, Range, Angle on the bow, and bearing Drift.168 An example of a contact report 
could be:  
Captain, officer-of-the-deck, I am on course 000, 12 knots, have a new 
Visual Contact, Designated Victor 23, Bearing 205, Range 16,000 yards, 
Angle on the Bow is Port 30, Contact is on the left drawing left. My 
intentions are to maintain course and speed.169 
In plain language, this report is saying that the watch-section has detected another 
contact, which the OOD has named “Victor 23” as a way to keep track of it amongst the 
pool of other contacts being tracked (this pool could be anywhere from a few contacts to 
upwards of 50). This particular contact is 16,000 yards from the submarine at a bearing of 
205 degrees with an angle on the bow of Port 30, meaning that the submarine is on the 
port side (left side) of the contact, 30 degrees aft (to the rear) of the bow.170 The OOD’s 
intentions are to continue on current heading and speed. In response to this report, the CO 
would have to give direction such as “Very well, maintain course and speed” or "Very 
well, I'm going to take a look [possibly at control room displays or through the 
periscope].” Before giving this direction, the CO must weigh the impact of this contact in 
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relation to the other contacts currently in range of the submarine taking into account the 
submarine’s current course, speed, depth, and mission.  
Without an integrated picture that he can look at unless he is physically in the 
control room, his stateroom or the wardroom, the CO needs to be able to integrate all that 
information and keep track of all those different contact reports over time in his head 
while keeping in mind where the ship needs to travel to complete the mission. He’s trying 
to balance the ship’s planned track with these contact reports as they come in and figure 
out any potential problems and determine what he’s going to need to do to address those 
problems. He also has to decide when the contact situation is so convoluted that he needs 
to be physically in the control room to see it—or possibly on the bridge if the submarine 
is surfaced. All the screens that are built in the combat systems are below decks in the 
control room, but to visually look at the whole tactical picture if the submarine is 
surfaced, he has to place himself on the bridge with the OOD and the lookout. While the 
periscope is in the control room, the CO can only see roughly 30 degrees at a time 
through the periscope field of vision. While this may seem sufficient, it would be similar 
to watching a baseball game through a drinking straw; one would never be able to see all 
players on the field at the same time—the straw would have to be physically traversed to 
see different players. Most submariners state that having a better visual picture below 
deck in the control room would be ideal.171 
Of note, there are some situations that come up where the CO positions himself in 
the control room and the OOD positions himself on the bridge. When the control room 
watch standers log a new contact, they report that to the OOD who is on the bridge, who 
then provides a contact report to the CO in the control room.172 In this situation, the 
report originates in the control room (where the CO happens to be physically located at 
the time), is then passed to the OOD on the bridge, who then passes it back to the CO 
(who is still physically located in the control room).  
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5. Constantly Making Risk Decisions 
Operations on an underway submarine are 24/7—there is no downtime when a 
submarine is traversing the waterways of the world conducting tactical missions. Because 
of this, one of the hardest aspects of being a commanding officer is managing personal 
time to ensure you remain well rested in order to make sound and timely decisions. To 
maintain situational awareness and decision-making ability even while resting, the CO 
has a speaker in his stateroom that is connected to the control room—this speaker 
remains on even when he is sleeping.173 The XO can also help with this as he stands 
watch as the command duty officer, a fill in of sorts for the CO, to allow him the ability 
to get some rest. With a good XO, the CO is able to put some constraints on the decisions 
that the XO is allowed and not allowed to make which permits him to get rest when 
needed. Unfortunately, however, this is not always possible—sleep deprivation is 
common amongst commanding officers.174 
The CO needs to be able to place himself in a position to receive input and 
personally make decisions when the risk is high and allow subordinates to operate with 
his guidance when the risk is low, permitting himself to get much-deserved rest. During a 
typical 60-day underway period, however, it is not uncommon for the CO to go 48 hours 
without any sleep—and during intense missions this may happen multiple times.175 
In the context of risk decisions, one might ask “how does the CO determine the 
level of risk?” During a cruise, a submarine is generally on the surface, at periscope 
depth, or submerged and with each of these operating configurations comes different risk 
factors that contribute to the CO’s risk decision. Arguably the least risk for a submarine 
occurs when it is submerged. When submerged below the surface with the ocean floor 
thousands of feet beneath the submarine, there is minimal risk—you’re not going to run 
into anything on the surface, you’re not going to collide with the bottom, and contacts are 
minimal. Although collision with an underwater obstacle, such as a reef or sea mount, is 
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possible the chances are very unlikely given the relatively low stress on sensors when 
submerged and the overall infrequent occurrence of these obstacles. At periscope depth 
(also referred to as communications depth because the submarine can actually 
communicate with the outside world), however, the risk is typically much higher than 
being submerged. In this scenario, the only piece of the submarine above the surface of 
the water is the periscope. At periscope depth, however, the submarine is close enough to 
the surface that fishing lines or nets can snag it and also large merchant vessels could 
have propeller draft that would be deep enough to possibly affect the submarines’ course 
and depth. As mentioned earlier, while the periscope itself helps to visually see contacts, 
it can only see 30 degrees at a time, a greatly limiting design constraint acknowledged by 
most submariners.176 
Similar to the risk at periscope depth, when the submarine is surfaced the risk can 
also be very high. In this environment, the number of contacts at any one time can easily 
exceed 50—and collision with any one of those contacts could be catastrophic to the 
submarine. Because of this, the OOD and lookout physically stand on the bridge to 
visually see contacts, typically accompanied by the CO. While on the bridge, they are 
connected to the control room solely through an audio circuit (voice only). The surfaced 
scenario can be especially dangerous in low visibility (either at night or due to weather). 
In this environment it becomes very difficult for the submarine to visually see threats—
the ship’s safety relies almost exclusively on radar operators using very basic radar 
technology to plot contacts on a rudimentary display which then have to be sighted 
visually by the bridge team. In this scenario, sonar capabilities are highly degraded due to 
the high noise level associated with operating on the surface and therefore become a 
lower-priority sensor compared to radar and visual sighting.177 Being surfaced can pose 
especially high risk because submarines do not look very big to other ships, are designed 
specifically to not be detected, and cannot maneuver quickly. Merchant vessels operating 
in the same waters rely on basic radar technology and visual cues to detect other vessels. 
With only part of the relatively small submarine on the surface of the water, visual 
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detection is very unlikely, especially at night or during bad weather. A very bad situation 
could be something as simple as the submarine operating on the surface and there are so 
many contacts that the radar and sonar operators become overwhelmed and the CO, 
OOD, and lookout fail to visually see a super tanker bearing down on the submarine at 18 
knots. This would be a very bad day for the crew. A significant proportion of submarine 
collisions occur when the submarine is on the surface.178 
When the risk is high and the CO places himself in a position to receive input and 
personally make a decision, whether the submarine is submerged, at periscope depth, or 
on the surface, the environment is stressful. A bad decision by a commander could result 
in collision with an obstacle, being snagged in a fisherman’s lines, or even colliding with 
another submarine or surface ship. On September 5, 2005 the nuclear submarine USS 
Philadelphia (SSN-690) collided with a Turkish merchant ship, the Yaso Aysen, off the 
coast of Bahrain. The collision occurred at about 2 a.m. and was the second time the USS 
Philadelphia had been involved in a collision. The two ships were entangled by the 
collision and took over an hour to separate. Reports after the collision indicated that the 
Yaso Aysen approached the USS Philadelphia from the submarine’s port (left) side and 
overrode the submarine, damaging the screw and rudder, the sailplanes, and a periscope, 
as well as denting the hull. The dent in Philadelphia’s hull required no small force and 
likely indicated that the Yaso Aysen did not slacken her speed prior to impact—
demonstrating that the merchant vessel did not see the submarine until it actually 
collided.179 A Navy investigation found that the commanding officer of the USS 
Philadelphia put the submarine in a hazardous situation. As a result, he received a letter 
of reprimand and was subsequently relieved of command and replaced with a new 
commanding officer.180 
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To illustrate this hectic information environment that a CO must deal with to 
make risk decisions, the following testimony from Commodore Vern Parks, DEVRON-
12 Commander, explains what a typical day underway as the CO of a submarine might be 
like: 
We go out there and submerge beneath the surface of the ocean and unlike 
the surface guys, we’re blind. We don’t see with eyes unless we’re at 
periscope depth. When you submerge you’ve got to actively seek out the 
information that you need to understand the contact picture around you 
and understand the tactical environment. And to that end, the systems that 
we have developed have produced an enormous amount of information. If 
you’re not practiced and able to prioritize, you can quickly become 
overloaded with the amount of information that’s being thrown at you 
from all different directions. The guys that progress up to CO have proven 
that they can handle that high bandwidth and that they can prioritize 
adequately to be able to get the mission done while maintaining focus on 
safety and security. So, there’s a lot of pieces to that and your typical CO 
on a submarine has got a constant bombardment of information through 
reports and analysis and every minute of the day he is making a risk 
assessment of where the ship is, what the ship is doing, what drills are 
running, what evolutions are running, what contacts are around, how he 
wants to get the mission done, and at all times he’s still got to worry about 
security. In a typical day, try to picture yourself at periscope depth in a 
hostile area. Let’s just say within visual range you have 30 contacts. That 
would not be unreasonable and collision with any of those contacts could 
be catastrophic. In fact, that would be low in some places that we would 
be asked to conduct operations. And you have to manage that while you’re 
also managing the rest of the entire ship, as well as responsibility for the 
nuclear reactor that’s powering your vessel.181 
6. Keeping Up with the Crew 
The tough days are when things don’t go as planned. One of my most 
challenging days from a leadership standpoint was Thanksgiving Day. I 
was celebrating the holiday at home with my family and I got a phone call 
that one of my sailors was found unresponsive and in a coma while he was 
home with his family. Finding out that any member of the crew is hurt is 
very hard to deal with—as the CO my crew feels like my family, these guys 
feel like my own kids. Add that responsibility to having to manage all the 
sections on the boat while the requirements levied on the boat typically far 
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exceed the capability, you have 26 hours of work to do in 24 hours, you 
have to prioritize but it’s tough to manage it all sometimes.182 
—Commander (CDR) Steven Mongold  
In addition to the many inputs that have already been mentioned, the CO must 
also figure out how to understand the status of the crew in terms of physical, mental, and 
emotional health, which all contribute to morale. As they are the heart and soul of the 
submarine, the general health of the crew could ultimately determine mission success or 
failure. Their morale can be affected by things like rumors of a deployment extension, 
perceived supervisor favoritism, recent poor performance of the ship or watch section, or 
simply feeling homesick. As a result, keeping up with the crew is one of the most 
important tasks of the CO, and as it happens to be, the least standardized. On a good ship, 
the CO and the chief of the boat (COB) have a very good relationship—the COB 
manages the enlisted personnel problems and keeps the CO informed. Free flow of 
information between these two senior individuals, one the senior officer and the other the 
senior enlisted man, is critical to maintaining the health of the crew and a well-
functioning organization aboard the submarine.183 
The CO may also utilize the senior corpsman onboard to keep up with the health 
of the crew. Since the corpsman represents the medical expertise on the ship, he sees the 
sailors all day long for their medical ailments and can provide the CO with an accurate 
pulse of how they are doing. Additionally, the corpsman’s office is typically located right 
on the chow line—because of this sailors will frequently drop in and talk to him. Thus, 
the corpsman is able to hear what the members of the crew are saying (informally) and 
can stay pretty well connected with the overall physical and emotional health of the 
crew.184  
In addition to collecting information from the COB and corpsman, the CO also 
learns by simply walking around the ship. While difficult at times due to the rapid pace of 
operations, getting out and about helps the CO learn firsthand how the crew is doing and 
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also relays to the sailors that he cares for their well-being. By doing this, over time a 
good CO develops a good sense of feeling how the crew is doing; according to CDR 
Steven Mongold, “It’s kind of like a sixth sense. Observing basic interactions as crew 
members pass each other in the passage ways or in the chow lines gives you a good 
indication of how everyone is doing. With enough experience, when you board a 
submarine you can almost taste the atmosphere and feel it if you know what you’re 
looking for.”185 Over time, a good CO also discovers the guys to stay in tune with to stay 
engaged with the crew—which is totally personality driven, not rank specific. Sampling 
across a broad spectrum, while maintaining a friendly approachable relationship is key. 
You have to ask them not only about what is going on with their job for the day but also 
about other things going on in their life and get to know them and judge their response—
not only what they say but how they say it.186 
B. SUBMARINE CULTURE 
The CO of a submarine must actively lead an eclectic crew of some of the 
brightest and best-trained sailors in the U.S. Navy. Comprised of “7% of the Navy’s 
people operating 25% of the Navy’s combatant [ships],” the U.S. Navy Submarine Force 
has a rich 112-year history of service to the nation.187 Coming of age operating small 
diesel-electric submarines during WWII, the submarine force converted to nuclear power 
in 1955 with the launch of the USS Nautilus (SSN-571). The famous quote of the 
Nautilus’ commanding officer, “Underway on nuclear power,” ushered in new strategic 
opportunities and a new culture centered on nuclear safety. The innovative submarine 
culture of WWII that resulted in countless tactical successes and legendary tales of 
bravery was replaced very quickly by a more procedurally focused engineering culture 
that still exists today.188 
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The nuclear submarine community is undeniably successful at their primary 
mission: waging war and conducting peacetime operations while safely operating the 
submarine and the reactor. Currently, the submarine force consists of 71 commissioned 
submarines, of which 14 are Ohio-class strategic-missile submarines called “SSBNs” that 
carry nuclear inter-continental ballistic missiles as part of the nuclear deterrence arsenal. 
Four are converted Ohio-class submarines called “SSGNs,” adapted to specialize in 
striking land targets from the sea; they carry Tomahawk cruise missiles and special 
operations forces. The remainder of the submarine fleet consists of “SSN” fast attack 
submarines of the Los-Angeles, Seawolf, and Virginia classes, primarily used to track 
adversary submarines and conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
missions.189 More detailed information and specifications on each of the U.S. Navy 
submarine types and classes can be found in Appendix A. 
Though missions and tactics vary widely among the different types of boats, the 
one constant spanning the breadth of the fleet is an “obsession with safety.”190 Some may 
deem this focus on safety as completely appropriate given that the crew of a submarine is 
responsible for operating a nuclear power plant under the surface of the ocean, even 
while conducting stressful and possibly lethal tactical missions. As a matter of fact, of the 
hundreds of nuclear submarines that have served in the fleet in the 58 years of the nuclear 
propulsion era, only two have been lost. Paul Bierly and J.C. Spender speculate that the 
first of those mishaps, the USS Thresher (SSN-593), was intentionally exacerbated by the 
crew in the name of safety. They posit that there was a potential for the crew to be saved 
had the reactor been left operational. Nuclear safety doctrine and established cultural 
practice, however, dictated that the reactor be shut down to prevent further disaster, 
dooming the crew to be lost at sea. This is illustrative of the prominence placed on 
nuclear safety above all else—even the lives of the crew. The uncontestable success of 
nuclear procedures has engendered a sort of “cultism” around procedural compliance.191 
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Those who are most successful in the nuclear submarine community are those that live its 
cultural values of safety: an intense respect for procedure and practice combined with a 
healthy skepticism toward practices that appear to deviate from established norms.192 
This behavior has resulted in some observers labelling submarine culture as risk-
averse. In the words of Lieutenant Commander Mark McGuirk, a current submarine XO 
and nuclear engineer, nuclear submarine culture trains its officers to “search for 
prefabricated answers to complex problems.”193 As he writes in Proceedings, McGuirk 
believes established nuclear submarine culture is currently at odds with innovation. 
Though the force adapts and changes with time and technology in order to remain on the 
cutting edge, it nevertheless values practices and procedures that have withstood the test 
of time. Because of this, large-scale shifts in procedures and processes that fundamentally 
alter the force are atypical. McGuirk offers that the first step in changing this is to 
encourage independent thinking among operators but cautions that this may not be easy: 
“Expect them to be confused; they have probably not been required to innovate during 
their careers to date.”194 
C. INTRODUCING NEW SUBMARINE TECHNOLOGY: THE ARCI, APB, 
AND TI PROCESSES 
I personally think our old requirements-based way of doing business is old 
and clunky…there are reasons they have to do some of that…BUT, I think 
we’ve got to have the [commercial-off-the-shelf technology] piece in play. 
I think if we don’t, we’re going to miss a lot of technology opportunity 
and we’re going to be shooting behind the rabbit. That’s what you don’t 
want to do. We need to be in front of issues and be flexible enough to grab 
technology now.195  
—Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON, ret.) Rick West 
To meet the pressing need to continually update submarine technology, there are 
numerous processes that feed updated technology to the fleet, some focused on nuclear 
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propulsion and some on weapons technology, while others handle damage control and 
other areas of the submarine. Each of these technology update and acquisition functions 
is managed by a program office within the Navy Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). 
NAVSEA is responsible for designing, building, and maintaining the Navy’s fleet of 
ships and submarines. They partner with private contractors, university labs, other 
government agencies, and Navy research and development facilities to provide continual 
upgrades and improvements to the full spectrum of submarine technology.196 
One of those NAVSEA offices, the Undersea Systems Program Office (IWS 5), is 
part of Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS), and is 
responsible for developing new submarine tactical system technology. Within IWS 5, 
IWS 5A works in concert with the Submarine Acoustics Program Office (PMS 401) of 
PEO Submarines on the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) program. ARCI is 
designed to leverage rapid insertion of commercial technology to achieve processing 
advances and manage obsolescence while continually improving submarine sonar. IWS 
5A's role is to rapidly develop, test and implement software applications to run on the 
tactical systems.197 This groundbreaking approach to technology insertion was developed 
in response to significant challenges in the acoustic detection abilities of the submarine 
fleet during the mid-1990s. ARCI broke the mold of traditional requirements-based 
acquisitions by harnessing the availability of relatively inexpensive commercial 
processing technology to rapidly enhance acoustic and sonar capability.198  
Technology developed through the ARCI process is introduced to the fleet via 
two separate yet highly inter-dependent processes: Advanced Processing Build (APB) 
and Technology Insertion (TI). APB delivers software-only upgrades to the fleet each 
odd-numbered year; for example, there were APBs delivered in 2011 and 2013. Where 
APB handles software, TI deals with the hardware and the associated software to support 
the new TI. TIs are conducted each even-numbered year, 2014, 2016, etc. Through the 
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interaction of the APB and TI processes, U.S. submarines are given an acoustic upgrade 
each year with technology primarily sourced from commercial industry. Not without its 
initial critics or occasional stumbles along the way, ARCI is successful in providing the 
fleet with continual system enhancement. As a testament to the success of the program 
and the benefit of open architecture in promoting flexible acquisition strategies, the Chief 
of Naval Operations authored a memo citing ARCI as the example to emulate when 
instituting open architecture in the fleet.199 Figure 7 gives a graphic representation of the 
ARCI business model. 
 
 
Figure 7.  The ARCI business model200 
In order to know what must be produced in upcoming APBs and TIs, IWS 5A 
relies upon fleet (customer) input collected via input from the Submarine Tactical 
Requirements Group (STRG). Every other year, the STRG identifies and prioritizes those 
tactical capabilities they believe are important for the next APB build. This list is 
provided to the Director Submarine Warfare Division (OPNAV N97) via the Type 
Commander, Commander Submarine Force. OPNAV N97, in turn, develops a 
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requirements document directing IWS 5A to develop the requests of the STRG. In the 
words of the Commander, Submarine Development Squadron TWELVE and current 
Chairman of the group, Commodore Vern Parks, “Big picture, the Submarine Tactical 
Requirements Group is the fleet voice to the requirements folks in the submarine  
force as it was envisioned, and up until even today the fleet voice for articulating  
the capabilities—the capabilities that we, the fleet, would like to see in our tactical 
systems.”201 
Input from the fleet is critical to the ARCI process as without it, engineers and 
developers would be without guidance as to what actually needs to be addressed. Lacking 
this input, developers would simply be guessing as to where to direct their efforts. Even 
with input from the STRG, however, developers working on behalf of IWS 5A were still 
left to develop to the dry requirements and metrics contained within the annual 
requirements memos. Though the products fielded in each APB and TI were certainly 
capable, there was a sense by some that they lacked operator-centric context, especially 
as the generation of operators using the technology changed over the years. Developers 
who were accustomed to designing systems to be used by operators who did not grow up 
as technically-literate and comfortable with advanced technology began to receive 
feedback that the technology aboard submarines was not resonating with today’s 
digitally-native users.202 Sure, users could be trained to use the systems as designed but 
to some community insiders that missed the point: systems can and should be designed to 
be as intuitive as possible to promote ease of adoption and overall user efficacy.203 An 
example relayed by LCDR Thomas Hall in his previous research on innovation in the 
submarine fleet illustrates this well: 
Lieutenant Josh Hausbach was at sea familiarizing himself with a new 
console and trying to figure out which button would bring up a geographic 
plotting (geo-plot), or mapping, of the boat and other contacts being 
tracked by the watch team. There was a little button at the bottom, and it’s 
got a ‘G’ on it. I’m sitting there, and I’m clicking on it, and I’m like “Why 
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is the geo-plot not coming up?” Cause I see a ‘G,’ and I think geo-plot. 
And finally after sitting there and pushing it for 30 or 40 times, I notice up 
at the top that it says ‘frame grab,’ and it has a date-time stamp on it. And 
it’s right now. I click it again, and it changes. “Oh, that’s the take a picture 
button!” So, through this process of feeding back to the APB folks, the 
very next software iteration Andy Leal went to the engineers, and took his 
phone. “Do you see this camera button on here? Turn this ‘G’ into the 
iPhone camera button.” And now, if you want to take a picture…you push 
the camera button.204 
This is one example among many but it serves to demonstrate the challenge of 
fielding system upgrades that will be well received by the fleet operators who must use 
these systems under real-world conditions. What makes sense to the developer in the lab 
often does not translate well to the fleet. In the above example, the fleet user is asking for 
a graphical user interface that replicates what he has grown accustomed to using over 
time. While he undoubtedly learned to use the “G” function through trial and error, the 
fact that it took 30-40 attempts represents the crux of the divide between laboratory 
developer and fleet user. Speaking to this conceptual gap, former MCPON West offers 
his thoughts: 
So many times big Navy rolls programs or things out and they miss the 
key link…and that is Fleet [user] buy-in and the ability to execute…You 
know that if you have to push more than five or six buttons, typically, you 
lose some of the kids these days.205 
1. APL 
Home to some of the top minds in the engineering and physical sciences, the 
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (APL) was chartered in 1942 as a “not-
for-profit center for engineering and research and development” to advance military 
technology during World War II. After the war, APL developed a unique niche as a 
critical bridge between government and industry. Due to their non-profit and non-
competitive status, APL works in concert with top industry technology and defense firms 
to allow government agencies access to unbiased, non-competitive input from academic 
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and industry leaders. APL currently conducts research and development on behalf of all 
branches of the U.S. military and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA).206 
With sponsorship from IWS 5A, APL leads the Operator/Machine Interface 
Working Group (OMIWG). This group is tasked with enhancing the display and interface 
systems that allow operators to interact with mission systems aboard the submarine. In 
doing so, they look to enhance and improve the user-friendliness, intuitive operation, and 
ability to quickly ascertain information displayed to operators. Their products are 
designed for inclusion in future ARCI APBs and TIs.207 In this role, APL and the 
OMIWG is one of several organizations that IWS 5A relies on to carry out the multi-
organization peer review process that proposed APB technology undergoes. 
Taking input from fleet users, the OMIWG works directly with private industry 
counterparts to introduce new technology concepts into the ARCI process. Through 
interaction with fleet users, industry, and IWS 5A, the OMIWG provides a critical 
communications bridge—permitting two-way communication between APB process 
stakeholders.208 
Injecting fleet input directly into the development process would go far in closing 
the gap between developer and user. Gaining such input, however, will require creativity 
and leaders in the right places willing to break with the ways of the past and try 
something a bit out of the ordinary. 
D. THE CATALYST FOR CHANGE  
In 2010, Naval Submarine Forces received a new commander, a visionary by the 
name of Vice Admiral (VADM) John Richardson. Prior to serving as Commander of 
Naval Submarine Forces, Richardson served as Commodore of Submarine Development 
Squadron 12; Commander, Submarine Group 8; Commander, Submarine Allied Naval 
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Forces South; Deputy Commander, U.S. 6th Fleet; Chief of Staff, U.S. Naval Forces 
Europe and U.S. Naval Forces Africa.209 As the Commander of Submarine Development 
Group 12 (DEVRON-12), he was responsible for supporting the Navy’s vision of the 
future by developing and evaluating submarine tactics and disseminating those tactics to 
the operating forces.210 As mentioned earlier, the Commander of DEVRON-12 also 
serves as the chairman, Submarine Tactical Requirements Group (STRG), which is 
charged with providing operational insight by identifying and consolidating fleet tactical 
needs and prioritizing them for software developers.211 In 2006, VADM Richardson 
articulated his view of the major challenge facing the Naval Submarine Community: the 
expansion of sensors to cover the breadth of the electromagnetic and acoustic spectra, and 
the addition of off-board sensors, has led to an avalanche of information on the watch 
team.212 Richardson viewed improved information management, including the use of 
intuitive interfaces, as a means to begin addressing this predicament. 
In April of 2010, a former submarine junior officer by the name of Josh Smith 
drafted a white paper intended to promote a different way of approaching innovation 
within the submarine community. Titled the “Junior Officer Watch Team Innovation 
Conference,” Smith envisioned a symposium of sorts that would harness the open-
mindedness and creativity of more junior officers and sailors in the fleet.213 He argued 
that the current up-and-coming submariners were used to interacting with iPhones, 
Facebook, Twitter, SMS, XBOX360, iMac, iPAD, and a laundry list of other commercial 
products.214 If the Navy could combine this intuitive interaction experience with the 
junior submariners’ recent operational experiences, these junior members of the 
submarine community would make ideal candidates for explaining to the development 
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community how the submarine Navy could leverage today’s technologies to become 
more effective.215 In his own words: 
There needs to be a way to tap into [the] wealth of RECENT tactical 
experience to obtain ideas for training, technology, task flows, system 
deficiencies, lessons learned, (emphasis added) and other concepts from 
[the junior officers’] perspective. These officers of the deck are more 
influenced by commercial technology than any generation of junior 
officers before them.216 
Smith introduced the idea to fellow colleagues at APL as well as Navy contacts he 
remained in touch with after his departure from the Navy’s submarine force. The white 
paper was met with some skepticism though—some were all for it but others were a little 
more reserved, acknowledging the idea’s merit but wondering how it could ever actually 
be put into action.217 Without adequate traction, Josh’s vision for submarine community 
innovation would die on the vine. Fortunately, by July 2010 IWS 5A had been briefed on 
the concept in Smith’s paper, embraced it, and set aside funds in its budget to support the 
planning and execution of Smith’s vision.218 
During this time period, VADM Richardson continued to press for the application 
of intuitive commercial interfaces in submarine design. In a February 2011 meeting with 
IWS 5A and DEVRON-12, Richardson shared a recent experience in which, after about 3 
hours of familiarization, he was able to use Google Earth to manage the Navy’s relief 
effort in Haiti, and contrasted that with the 3-week training required for the Navy’s 
Voyage Management System. At this same meeting, IWS 5A introduced Smith’s idea of 
holding a Junior Officer Watch Team Innovation Conference. The idea was met with 
great enthusiasm by Commodore Bill Merz, current DEVRON-12 Commander, as well 
as Mr. Scott Dilisio, executive assistant to VADM Richardson. In May 2011, the idea 
became official when Commodore Merz from DEVRON-12 and Mr. Pete Scala from 
IWS 5A agreed to jointly host the event. The staffs of these two agencies immediately 
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began discussions on a plan of action and milestones for hosting this revolutionary 
collaborative workshop.219 
By July 2011, Commodore Merz had settled on a new name for the conference—
Tactical Advancements for the Next Generation (TANG), honoring the legendary World 
War II U.S. submarine USS Tang (SS-306). Of note during the event planning, APL’s 
director arranged a meeting with Eric Haseltine, former Walt Disney imagineer and 
executive, who recommended involving IDEO, a design and innovation consulting firm 
headquartered in Palo Alto, California, in the event.220 Finally, in November of 2011, 
IWS 5A and DEVRON-12 executed this historic mission. Partnered with the Applied 
Physics Lab and IDEO, the Navy’s submarine community set out to develop innovative 
solutions to existing technological inefficiencies. The TANG, envisioned by Josh Smith 
and put in motion by Mr. Scala and Commodore Merz, maintained the same primary 
mission that Smith had originally proposed–a workshop of sorts that would harness the 
open-mindedness and creativity of more junior officers and sailors in the fleet. In total,  
27 junior officers, Sonar Technicians, and Fire Controlmen from across the Navy’s 
submarine community were invited to San Diego, CA to participate in the first ever 
TANG Forum.221 At the end of the 3-day TANG event, a few key concepts emerged: 
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 TANG Forum Common Object Oriented Layered Geo. The TANG 
participants envisioned a single system that would layer information and 
provide data-rich icons with radial menus borrowed from the gaming 
industry (Figure 8).222 
 
Figure 8.  TANG Forum Common Object Oriented Layered Geo  
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 TANG Forum Data Mobility: Go-Anywhere Tablet (GAT). The 
TANG Forum’s image of a Go-Anywhere Tablet would allow an operator 
to release himself from his work station console and allow him the 
freedom to move throughout the boat while maintaining continued access 
to information and displays (Figure 9).223 
 
Figure 9.  TANG Forum Data Mobility: Go-Anywhere Tablet (GAT) 
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 TANG Forum Proficiency and Training Tracking System. One of the 
most time-consuming functions in the military is the hours of necessary 
qualification training. One of the most frustrating occurrences is when a 
military member completes a duty cycle performing a specific job and 
then must report for training on the very task he had spent the past 8 hours 
performing. The TANG Forum developed a system that would allow them 
to accrue points for completing training modules or guided work flows or 
for successfully carrying out certain real-world missions. The operator 
would also achieve similar “experience points” for other qualifications 
throughout his career. Being able to take credit for completing different 
tasks on duty would immerse the operator in an environment that created a 
system where operators would truly “train like they fight” (Figure 10).224 
 
Figure 10.  TANG Forum Proficiency and Training Tracking System 
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 TANG Forum Predator Display: The ideas for displays that emerged 
from the TANG Forum married the needs of the operator to the needs of 
the decision maker. In a groundbreaking discovery unearthed by the 
TANG Forum, the simple idea of presenting data in an intuitive radial 
format emerged in the Predator Display. This concept was so compelling 
that by January 2012 developers from IWS 5A would take the conceptual 
idea from its literal origins as a pizza box prototype to a physical construct 
running real sonar data in Step 2 testing (Figure 11).225 
 
Figure 11.  TANG Forum Predator Display 
Thanks to the visions of VADM Richardson and Josh Smith; countless months of 
work done by members of DEVRON-12, IWS 5A, APL, and IDEO to actually plan and 
execute the event; and the open-mindedness and creativity of the participants, the first 
ever TANG Forum was a huge success. New innovative ideas had been derived and a 
new process of brainstorming utilized—and since some of these ideas transitioned from 
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concept to a tangible form actually progressing through the acquisition pipeline, the 
forum methodology was validated. Future technological improvements through the APB 
upgrades would include some of these TANG ideas.226 Why stop there?  
When the idea of hosting a collaborative brainstorming session was first pitched, 
Commodore Merz, the Commander DEVRON-12, was immediately excited about the 
idea but wanted to consider opening the target audience to include some command-level 
submariners. Josh Smith and Scott Tupper, who served as Commodore Merz’s executive 
director for the Submarine Tactical Requirements Group, felt that inviting more senior 
commanding officers might inhibit creativity from the junior participants in the forum. 
After voicing these concerns, Commodore Merz agreed to keep the first TANG to strictly 
junior personnel.227 
In November of 2011, shortly after the success of the initial TANG, Commodore 
Merz reminded Tupper and Smith that the sub community still needed to address the 
needs of the Commander.228 Just 6 months later in May of 2012, Commodore Merz 
relinquished command to Commodore Parks. Shortly after taking command, Commodore 
Parks was briefed on the idea to conduct another TANG Forum, but this time with current 
and post-command submariners to address the information needs of a submarine 
commander. Commodore Parks, with intimate knowledge of how successful the original 
TANG had been and a thorough understanding of the value in having a place where 
submariners could come up with new ideas, jumped all over the idea of doing a TANG 
for mid-level submarine leadership. He understood that brainstorming with more senior 
officers would meet a current need in the submarine community.229 This next event 
would be called the Executive TANG.230 
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After the DEVRON-12 staffed planned the necessary details, Commodore Parks 
officially pitched the idea of conducting an Executive TANG to VADM Richardson via 
e-mail on 9 August 2012. In this e-mail, the Commodore explained: 
The inaugural TANG was of great benefit and continuing to use this 
process will bring a large return on the investment to the Submarine 
Force…Our goal will be to use the experience and vision of our serving 
pre-, current and post-COs with an eye toward leveraging their perspective 
on how to access and interact with Command-level information...we are 
looking to develop ways to free the commanding officer from the 
cognitive load associated with operator tasks and instead facilitate risk vs. 
gain determination, pattern recognition, managing uncertainty and keeping 
the CO “above the fray.”231 
In short time, Richardson agreed to conduct an Executive TANG. Just 2 weeks 
after pitching the idea to VADM Richardson, Commodore Parks e-mailed the staff of 
DEVRON-12 letting them know the Executive TANG was a go. On 7 September 2012, 
VADM Richardson relinquished command Naval Submarine Forces to VADM 
Connor.232 After the Naval Submarine Forces command turnover, Richardson was to be 
promoted to 4-star Admiral and take command as Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion.233 
VADM Connor would now oversee the execution of the Executive TANG. Shortly 
following the Change of Command, letters went out to all squadron Commodores and 
group commanders from VADM Connor soliciting nominees.234 Unfortunately, due to 
sequestration delays, a notice to postpone the Executive TANG went out in February of 
2013.  
On 21 June 2013, after sequestration delays had been worked out, Commodore 
Parks e-mailed VADM Connor proposing the idea to conduct the Executive TANG in 
September at Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. VADM Connor concurred 
immediately.235 
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On 3 July 2013, VADM Connor released a message formally soliciting support 
for the first-ever Executive session of the Tactical Advancements for the Next 
Generation. In this message, the Admiral requested each Squadron nominate one 
commanding officer or post-Command Deputy to DEVRON-12 to participate in the first-
of-its-kind innovation event aimed at developing new tools to support the submarine 
commanding officer. 
As the deadline for nominations neared, only five names had been submitted to 
the DEVRON-12 Staff. After a friendly reminder from Commodore Parks, the remaining 
names were submitted—in a period of 1 week, the list of nominees went from 5 to 33.236 
The Executive TANG participant roster was complete.  
E. IDEO 
A key component to the success of the first TANG was outside instruction on the 
design thinking process. IDEO, headquartered in Silicon Valley, is internationally 
regarded as one of the foremost design thinking firms in the world. Capitalizing on their 
unique corporate culture and the creative talents of their academically diverse workforce, 
IDEO specializes in assisting organizations, both public and private, to innovate their 
products and improve their organizational cultures. Implementing design thinking 
concepts, IDEO has helped innovate or redesign many of the most common products in 
modern life, such as the toothbrush, the athletic shoe, and most famously, the shopping 
cart.237 Tim Brown, current CEO of IDEO, offers the following insight: “design thinking 
is a human-centered approach to innovation…to integrate the needs of people, the 
possibilities of technology, and the requirements [of the customer].”238 
Understanding that they had a tough challenge ahead of them in terms of 
introducing design thinking and participative collaboration to the submarine force, Smith 
of APL met with IDEO to investigate the possibility of their assistance at the outset of 
planning for the initial TANG in 2011. Once on board with the TANG project, IDEO 
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brought both their expertise and unique approach to design to the effort to innovate in the 
submarine community. From the inception of the TANG initiative, IDEO has been asked 
to guide embedded fleet users through the design thinking process.239 
In order to arrive at the most innovative solutions possible, IDEO rejects the 
notion of traditional funnel-based idea generation where a great many ideas are reduced 
to a few remaining ideas via a funnel-like process of idea filtering. In the words of Dave 
Blakely, Executive TANG project lead at IDEO, 
Years ago, innovation was taught using the funnel model, which is now 
obsolete and has been rejected…I might start with 20 or 30 or 100 
different ideas and I would boil those down to 10, with analysis and 
prototyping and testing. And then I’d boil it down to three and then sort of 
inexorably, the single best idea comes out the other end of the funnel, 
right? You’re funneling down…240 
According to Blakely, the flaw with the funnel method is the assumption that 
innovation is linear. Rather, he believes innovation is circuitous and does not follow a 
prescribed pattern or planned flow. Attempting to capture innovative efforts in a linear 
fashion may prove convenient for those interested in “tracking” such efforts but it is not 
effective at capturing the true meandering nature of design. In place of the funnel method, 
IDEO uses a method they refer to as generate and refine (the “double bubble” 
represented in Figure 12), which is grounded in the notion that innovation is a process of 
alternating divergence and convergence of both thought and action. IDEO describes their 
design thinking process in three brief steps: 
1. Understand the users and context of the system being designed 
2. Use this knowledge to generate a diversity of potential solutions at a low 
level of resolution 
3. Explore the solution directions that show the greatest promise and 
feasibility241 
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Figure 12.  IDEO design thinking methodology 
The IDEO process begins with a problem or challenge statement from which 
direction in conducting initial research is derived. IDEO believes strongly in the value of 
conducting deep research into the way products or systems that are being examined for 
redesign are currently being used. At the outset of every design effort, they conduct a 
process of user research consisting of user interviews and observation sessions, expert 
interviews from associated scientific or engineering fields, and even analogous research 
in which the experiences of subjects from dramatically different fields but with similar 
needs are examined in order to shed fresh light on the problem statement at hand. For 
example, in the lead up to Executive TANG, IDEO conducted interviews with emergency 
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room doctors to gain insight into the challenges they face, believing that those challenges 
were comparable to the ones faced by submarine COs.242 
Once user cases are examined, interviews conducted and analogous situations 
analyzed, the next step in the process is to develop insights that can be related in brief, 
yet powerful statements. This process follows the diverge/converge model as well. IDEO 
facilitators and clients develop insights to describe the problem contained within the 
challenge statement. This represents the process of the first bubble—generate. All 
insights are then considered by the group and synthesized into insights that deliver the 
greatest meaning. This is the refinement process of the second bubble. By developing 
insights using the collaborative process and the value-additive effects of the generate and 
refine process, the insights that result are more powerful and relatable to the audience of 
participants.243 
Once insights are synthesized and settled upon, the task is then to develop “how 
might we…” questions (HMWs) that address the fundamental elements of the insights. 
Using the same generate and refine process, potential HMWs are brainstormed, 
synthesized, and ultimately selected. The HMWs are critical to the presentation of the 
problem to participants as they frame the problem in a manner that invites creative 
response—they provide the point of departure for participants to begin to exercise their 
creative processes in direct response to the question of “how might we do something?”244 
Once the participative design activities are under way and contributors are 
attempting to answer the HMWs, the generate and refine process begins anew but in a 
larger and more visceral context. At this point, participants are invited to brainstorm 
potential solutions in a highly participative and energetic manner. According to IDEO, 
the goals of brainstorming are: “To generate a lot of ideas in a little time; to get different 
perspectives; and to build excitement.” In order to maximize the effectiveness of a 
brainstorming session, IDEO has developed “The 7 Rules of Effective Brainstorming,” 
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reflected in Figure 13. Through this process of “semi-structured” idea generation, new, 
creative, different, or innovative potential solutions are offered to the group for 
consideration during the subsequent processes of selection and refinement reflected in the 
second “bubble” of the process.245 
 
Figure 13.  IDEO’s 7 Rules of Effective Brainstorming246 
Essential to the IDEO process is a focus on rapid, low-resolution prototyping to 
enhance further creativity and refinement. Dave Blakely remarks on the value of this step 
and its placement in the diverge/converge methodology: 
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Having diverged and created many, many brainstorm ideas, now we’re 
going to converge down and we’re going to use prototyping, right? 
Simple, low-fidelity prototyping to actually give us a hands-on and 
visceral appreciation of what this particular tool might look like.247 
The goal of this diverge and converge, generate and refine process is to gain input 
from multiple sources then focus collective energy to ensure superior creative output. The 
process is repeated incrementally until the desired end-state or output is reached. It is not 
the goal of prototyping to generate a complete, finished product. Rather, the goal is to 
provide innovative ideas that can be further refined by engineers into a buildable product. 
Prototyping, in this case, serves to enhance creativity while grounding the concepts in 
reality.248 Figure 14 shows this concept. 
 
Figure 14.  IDEO’s spectrum of prototypes249 
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F. OPENING THE APERTURE 
1. Buzz from the First TANG 
With the Executive TANG roster set, attention turned to determining what the 
invitees were in for. Most participants were aware, at least to some degree, of the initial 
TANG and its results, as they permeated the fleet, were almost all positive. “[When] the 
feedback from the sailors came out, it was very positive. They all wanted to attend after 
that,” said Commander Kurt Balagna, serving on the staff of DEVRON-12 at the time of 
the initial TANG.250 
There appeared to be a buzz from TANG that was fueling excitement for the 
upcoming Executive TANG, even at the top levels of Navy leadership. Former Master 
Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (ret.) Rick West tells of his reaction to learning about 
TANG: 
As MCPON, I had heard about the [TANG] initiative. It was really just in 
the early stages, so I really didn’t have a good awareness [of it]…What I 
wanted to do was see how I could assist. As MCPON I had the ability to 
reach out to many personnel and had done so previously to determine what 
changes we could make to be more efficient and reduce redundancy…I 
was surprised at the input…when I found out more about TANG I saw 
some parallel efforts. Embracing the power of technology and applying it 
in a quick efficient manner through direct feedback or input is the 
cornerstone of TANG. Hopefully leadership will embrace this initiative…I 
never want to fight a fair fight…we’ve got to arm our Warriors with the 
education, skills and technology to remain at the top...251 
One facilitator remarked enthusiastically to Josh Smith upon being invited to join 
the Executive TANG team, “This is really interesting, I’m finally part of the club, I’m 
finally inside the inner circle, TANG is this mysterious thing that people hear about and 
now I get to experience it.”252 Commander Steve Mongold, CO of the attack submarine 
USS Montpelier (SSN-765), echoed those sentiments. He recounted his feelings upon 
learning of his nomination to attend the Forum: 
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I was like, yeah, that’s something I’m very interested in participating in… 
I’m very interested in innovation and the techniques being employed to 
innovate, because part of my leadership challenge in my position right 
now is innovation and getting people to see a problem and attack it with 
non-traditional approaches. Or at least broaden their thinking to attack 
it.253 
Commodore Parks summed it up: “It was incredible the response from [the first] 
TANG and that information was rolled into prototypes rapidly…and two years later it is 
now being tested at sea and used in our systems.”254 
Based upon the highly successful outcome of the first TANG, excitement for the 
possibilities of Executive TANG was definitely present among participants, facilitators, 
and sponsors alike. Though the first TANG had been a resounding success, the group 
attending Executive TANG was of a decidedly different composition—senior officers in 
command and leadership positions vice junior operators of systems. 
2. Malleability Challenge 
The success of TANG had proven that IDEO’s methods could indeed be 
employed to promote creative and innovative solutions.255 What was not known was how 
well senior leadership would respond to IDEO’s methods. Firmly entrenched within the 
strict standards that permeate submarine culture, would this group of leaders be as open-
minded to the IDEO process as the junior personnel had been? How well would the 
facilitators be able to penetrate the entrenched views and methods of the group? Scott 
Tupper of the DEVRON-12 staff described his initial reaction to the idea: “When we first 
started talking about [the IDEO process], ‘Hey, this is their brainstorming process we’re 
going to use and we’re going to have them build things out of this foam core and tape, 
and this is what we’re going to do…’ When I heard that I said, ‘You know, we’re never 
going to get submariners to do this. We’re just not.”256  
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While leadership had endorsed the concept of a command-focused TANG, 
fulfilling the original vision of Commodore Merz, this was no guarantee that the IDEO 
method would resonate. IDEO’s Dave Blakely summarized his initial concerns during an 
interview in early September 2013, just prior to the commencement of Executive TANG: 
We’re talking about…a justifiably proud set of individuals here and, if 
there’s anything we’ve found at IDEO, it’s that people don’t react to 
systems or workshops or products or services the way you expect them 
to…I don’t want to get into a dynamic where the folks that are attending 
and auditing are either being overly critical or over judgmental of early 
and embryonic ideas that come out. Because a lot of ideas, when they’re in 
early stages, you know, they haven’t been refined yet. And it’s real easy to 
say, well, “That’s clearly not feasible. You couldn’t possibly do that.” I 
want to make sure that innovation doesn’t get squelched by people who 
might mean well, but who aren’t exactly “down” with the program. So 
that’s one of my worries.257 
Though there was concern on the part of IDEO and their associated facilitators, 
top submarine leadership appeared to not share those concerns. Commodore Parks of 
DEVRON-12 was decidedly optimistic as to the abilities of senior leaders to suspend 
assumptions and participate actively in the IDEO process. The Commodore believed that 
the characteristics enabling these officers to be successful in command, under the 
demands of combat, would be the same characteristics that would add enthusiasm and 
richness to the collaborative process: “I actually went in thinking that we would have  
27 individual sets of ideas that would never be able to overlap because of the type-A 
nature of our leaders, which is, in most forums that we operate in, absolutely what you 
need to be able to get the right robust debate…”258 
IDEO, understanding the learning value of prototyping, knew they needed a 
prototype of the Executive TANG Forum itself—a “dry run” to flesh out how the process 
would go. They knew they needed a “risk mitigation prototype” to instill confidence that 
the IDEO process would indeed be effective and well-received by this relatively unique 
group of leaders.259 
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G. THE GROTON EVENT 
In the weeks leading up to Executive TANG, IDEO and APL faced an atypical 
challenge. Due to the high-visibility nature of Executive TANG, it became evident that 
the facilitators needed to know how to best affect success.260 In other words, they needed 
to conduct a dry run. How does IDEO prototype an interactive workshop? “These 
methods are pretty scalable,” says Dave Blakely, so the team’s solution was to simply 
scale down the scope of Executive TANG into a single 8-hour event.261 
As with product design, the goal for this prototype is identical: learn about the 
interactive behavior of a group of senior submariners as they participate in the IDEO 
design process to glean new insights and further refine the process. Dave Blakely on the 
need for a prototype event: “We just wanted to breathe easy walking into Hawaii…I 
don’t like it when people say, oh, it’s going to be fine. Because people who have done 
anything in their lives never say that. They know all the things that can go wrong. And 
they’re always worried about everything.”262 
With those thoughts in mind, the “pilot workshop” kicked off in July 2013, 
offering an “opportunity to test the agenda and HMWs and preview executive level 
concepts” with nine hand-selected participants.263 In a 1-day session, the Executive 
TANG Facilitation Team executed a scaled-down design thinking forum, from end to 
end, with results that far exceeded expectations. During an IDEO design thinking event, 
initial prototyping involves the use of poster board, colored markers, pipe cleaners, twist 
ties, and sticky notes to engender a visceral and multi-dimensional understanding of the 
product under design. The goal of prototyping is to learn more about a particular design 
from which further insights may be gleaned and further refinement affected. 
Guided by a set of problem questions similar to those that were under 
consideration for the Executive TANG Forum, the nine participants embarked on the 
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challenge of design thinking. CDR Kurt Balagna, one of the hand-selected participants, 
acknowledged that while the group rose to the occasion, it was not without a certain 
amount of skepticism: 
Oh, yeah, the group embraced [the process]. But it was [with]...the normal 
skepticism, I would tend to see. I mean, I was skeptical when I first heard 
about it...the culmination point was just going through a whole day and 
looking back…looking at how much we accomplished in 1 day. It really 
took that, because going through the first half of the pilot, it was like, what 
are we doing? What are we doing here? Where are we going next?264 
Though there may have been pockets of skepticism present, the quality of the 
concepts produced by the group proved to be of such value that Dave Blakely re-
characterized the event as a “mini-visualization,” accounting for his belief that the 
designs produced were equivalent to the quality envisioned for the full Executive TANG 
Forum.265 This was quite an accomplishment for a single-day’s work. Though the intent 
was to mitigate risk through trial and learn in the process—the tangible end results of the 
Groton event were “three damn good ideas”:266 
 Central Automated Navy Objective Lessons-learned Inventory 
(CANOLI)–Geographically enabled lessons-learned library that offers 
commanding officers access to relevant lessons-learned for a particular 
geographic area. The data is sourced from the full submarine fleet and 
shared among all crews. 
 Decision Support–Fused data system offering suggested courses of action 
to commanding officers for further consideration and comparison. Courses 
of action are developed using historical data, current intelligence, target 
plot, and threat conditions. 
 Lessons-Learned Creation Suite–A quad plot combines rich media into a 
single file consisting of a narration video, fusion plot, common broadband, 
and all relevant data files. Allows a CO to record and play back an 
incident, positive or negative, and narrate it. The contents are easily 
formatted into an audio or video report using a simple template to enable 
sharing of lessons learned between submarines and crewmembers.267 
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APL’s Josh Smith was extremely enthusiastic as the pilot workshop came to a 
close. “It let me know that they would take to [accept] the process,” said Smith, 
“especially the fact that IDEO was teaching them the process. They liked that…they were 
passionate about [the process].”268 This observation is representative of the intangible 
result of the Groton event. Though concerns about participant malleability and process 
resistance were both well-founded and prudent, the Groton event demonstrated that those 
concerns were not insurmountable—that senior submariners were indeed capable of 
participating actively in the IDEO process, in spite of it running contrary to many of the 
long-standing tenets of submarine culture. The senior submariners learned from IDEO a 
new process, IDEO learned from the senior submariners that their facilitation methods 
were on the right track—the initial set of problem questions had resonated with the group 
and once they were set on course the submariners rose to the challenge of design 
thinking. By no means were IDEO’s concerns alleviated altogether—but they had been 
lessened. IDEO knew they needed to remain attentive to framing the problems in a 
manner that would engage this unique group. They would need to invite process 
participation and creative dialogue. The Groton event had demonstrated the capabilities 
of senior submariners to suspend assumptions. With that in mind, the facilitators could 
now focus more on creating the most fertile creative climate possible and less on worries 
about participant resistance. 
H. FINAL PREPARATIONS AND INSIGHT SYNTHESIS 
Feeling less concerned about the willingness of their target audience and having 
just had a real-world demonstration of their initial set of problem questions, it was once 
again time for the facilitators to converge and execute a process of refinement. Through 
the course of numerous group telephone calls during late August and early September, 
what began as draft insights and potential HMWs slowly solidified into the final slate of 
insights and questions for the Executive TANG Forum.  
Prior to the pilot workshop in Groton, IDEO and APL had considered presenting 
11 insights broken down into three topical groups: 1) Leadership, 2) Systems, and 3) Data 
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and Information.269 After facilitating the pilot workshop in Groton and through a series 
of in-depth discussions between the facilitators, the three initial topical groups were 
reduced to two—“Systems and Information Flow” and “Command.” During the same 
process, the total number of insights was pared from 11 to nine.270 The “Systems and 
Information Flow” group contained insights targeted specifically at the technological 
systems and actual flow of information on the submarine that are both intended to enable 
the CO to make well-informed decisions but in actuality hinder him in some ways. For 
example, tactical systems used by Sonar Watch Standers and Fire Control Technicians 
have advanced greatly over the years yet if the CO is out and about on the submarine he 
still receives strictly audio contact reports and must synthesize that information in his 
head. Also, there is no automated system or standardized method for keeping up with the 
crew, undoubtedly one of the most important jobs of the CO. The insights contained 
within the ‘Command’ group were meant to summarize some key points about the burden 
of command such as empowering subordinates by promoting two-way communication 
and being able to manage the slew of on- and off-ship demands. These demands include 
nuclear reactor inspections, ship maintenance, ensuring sailors are trained on all systems 
prior to deployment, managing the ship’s money and prioritizing spending needs, crew 
medical problems, personnel family readiness problems, managing a tight operational 
schedule ensuring adequate time off for the crew, and the list goes on and on. The final 
list of insights was:271 
Systems and Information Flow: 
 To support CO effectiveness, the design of communication and 
administrative systems and protocols must keep pace with the design of 
tactical systems. 
 Integrating disparate systems, streamlining interfaces, and providing 
configurability will be critical to ongoing system development. 
 Commanders are interested in the idea of a “Submarine Cloud,” where all 
information is populated and shared, as a tool to unify the experience of 
interacting with disparate onboard systems. 
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 Information on the boat often lives locally rather than centrally, which can 
hamper collaboration and the ability to create a shared mental model. 
Command: 
 Enabling the agency of others is crucial to commanders’ work. Two-way 
communication facilitates agency and a top-down only flow is not 
sufficient. 
 COs are challenged to sustain energy and focus among the entire crew, 
across both routine and extreme times. 
 COs experience tension in managing conflicting on- and off-ship 
demands. 
 COs are tasked with providing leadership and sound decision making 
within a context of high ambiguity, synthesizing inputs from a multitude 
of sources (visual data, verbal communication, the “pulse” of the crew, e-
mail).  
 There are opportunities to more fully leverage information both onboard 
and across the fleet (such as lessons learned). 
Insights are only half of the necessary input for a design workshop. While insights 
are by nature powerful statements capable of resonating deeply with a target audience, 
they lack a critical ingredient—a challenge to designers. The HMWs are specifically 
designed to fill this void, to challenge the design thinker to address the needs contained 
within the insights. 
Once the facilitators had synthesized the new list of insights, the final step was to 
craft the proper set of HMWs. The task was not only to challenge the participants to think 
deeply and creatively but also to do so in a manner reflecting the many insights that were 
the foundation of the event. Through another series of in-depth dialogues, the facilitators 
focused on precise phrasing and semantic detail to craft the set of HMWs most reflective 
of the insights—remaining careful not to foreshadow solutions within the questions. The 
final list of HMWs (shown in Figure 15) was:272 
 How might we capture lessons learned and improve feedback? 
 How might we measure the tactical performance of the crew on a day-to-
day basis? 
 How might we leverage information flow up the chain of command? 
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 How might we better coordinate competing operational priorities? 
 How might we keep tactical interfaces simple and standardized? 
 
Figure 15.  Final Executive TANG HMW questions on brainstorming board273 
As the first week of September drew to a close, the facilitators knew they had 
come a long way from the initial stages of research, when the problems to be grappled 
with at the Forum were loosely defined. Now that the insights were set and the HMWs 
finalized, it was time to let the design thinking process unfold. Everyone involved knew 
how much had gone into preparing for the event but it remained to be seen what the 
outcome would be. The question still remained: how would this group of senior officers 
respond to the design thinking process?  
I. THE EXECUTIVE TANG FORUM 
1. Day One–Registration and Tech Expo 
On Monday September 9, the Executive TANG Forum commenced. The 
facilitation team, staffed largely by members from APL and IDEO, arrived around 10 in 
the morning to finish setup in the main sharing room and breakout areas. Later that 
morning, representatives from Microsoft, Google, Adobe, Metron, In-Depth, and 
Monterey Technology arranged kiosks for the “Tech Expo” which would bring 
participants up to speed on some of the latest technologies these companies had to 
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offer—the overall goal of this was to inspire participants, not to sell them products.274 
Figure 16 shows one of the signs erected by the Forum facilitators in the Tech Expo 
Area.  
 
Figure 16.  Tech Expo challenge question 
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As Forum participants arrived, they were greeted by facilitators dressed in 
Hawaiian shirts and casual chinos. Upon registration, participants were assigned to one of 
three teams: Barb, Tang, or Wahoo. Each participant was given a name tag containing 
their first name in large bold font, their team name, and their whole name (first and last) 
in small text. As participants registered, they were allowed to mingle with other 
participants and explore the Tech Expo until the event officially kicked off at 1700. 
During this open time, the majority of participants who meandered to the Tech Expo 
consolidated at the APB-13 booth—Microsoft, Google, Adobe, Metron, In-Depth 
Engineering, and Monterey Technology received minimal attention.  
The Forum participants represented mid-level leadership in the Navy’s prestigious 
submarine community. Individuals ranged from Lieutenant Commander (O-4) to Captain 
(O-6) representing anywhere from 14 to more than 22 years of naval service. Because of 
this, most participants knew each other but at the minimum at least knew of each other.275 
During the mingle period before the official start of the Forum, one participant remarked 
“It’s basically like a reunion in here right now—we have like a 6-year spread of guys 
here that all pretty much know each other.”276 
At approximately 1700, registration was over and the event officially began with 
remarks from the DEVRON-12 Commander, Commodore Parks. During this intro, he 
presented Josh Smith from APL as well as the rest of the facilitators and placed special 
emphasis on the crew from IDEO, headed up by Dave Blakely. Dave Blakely then 
followed with a quick explanation of technical innovation with focus on tech push versus 
tech pull, which set the stage for introductions from each of the Tech Expo vendors. 
These vendors were expected to “present what is new and cool but were not supposed to 
revert to a simple sales pitch.”277 The Tech Expo vendors provided quick speeches 
(approximately 5 minutes in duration) covering the most important points of their 
products. Of note, when the Executive TANG preparation and planning first commenced, 
these briefs were planned to last 15 minutes each. Josh Smith and his facilitation crew, 
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however, learned that using a pecha kucha, or a 5-minute high-level brief, was the way to 
go.278 According to Josh, this type of brief was well received at the previous TANG 
because “if you let a presenter go for an hour, you’ll lose them and we need to keep the 
energy up.”279 Of note, participants seemed energized in response to the representative 
from In-Depth Engineering who energetically briefed an automated torpedo warning 
system, a touch enabled geographic display, and a new electronic intelligence analysis 
display. Google also captivated the audience with a demonstration of their cutting edge 
Google Glass.  
At approximately 1900, the intro briefs were complete and Josh Smith gave 
closing remarks to the group releasing the participants to head back to their hotels to get 
some much-deserved rest prior to the start of Day Two when most of the heavy lifting 
would start (many participants had traveled from California and as far as Groton, 
Connecticut to attend the event). At 1930, despite exhaustion and hunger, most of the 
participants were still at the Forum mingling with each other as well as the Tech Expo 
representatives. Figure 17 shows some of the Forum participants interacting with the 
representative from Monterey Technology. 
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Figure 17.  Monterey Technology Tech Expo booth 
2. Day Two–The First Full Day 
The second day of the Forum began at 0730 with a buffet-style breakfast. During 
breakfast, participants continued to interact with each other as well as the facilitators and 
observers. During this time, when asked about the event one participant commented 
“Everyone seems positive about the experience. I was an XO during TANG 1 so I had to 
send one of my guys—he came back with nothing but good things to say about the 
experience so I was excited to come to this one.”280 Another participant remarked “On 
the boat, I’m always like ‘hey even if you don’t like the system, it’s what we have so get 
good at using it.’ I was excited when I got invited to come here so I can maybe affect 
systems of the future.”281 
After breakfast, Rear Admiral Sawyer, Commander of Submarine Forces U.S. 
Pacific Fleet, delivered opening remarks to the group. During these remarks, the Admiral 
relayed to the participants that each of them was hand selected to participate in the Forum 
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and expressed that his expectations were high for the event. He ended his remarks with 
emphasis on the importance of diversity of ideas and backgrounds and announced that a 
golf event was being held Thursday morning–—and that all Forum participants were 
invited. Although not scheduled in the events for the Forum, Josh Smith and the 
facilitation team quickly adjusted the weeks’ events to make room for the Admiral’s golf 
outing.  
a. Introduction to the Process 
Immediately following Rear Admiral Sawyer’s remarks, IDEO facilitator Dave 
Blakely delivered an introduction to Design Thinking where he explained that design 
thinking is all about alternating cycles of convergence and divergence and expressed to 
the group that innovation is creation resulting from study and experimentation. Figure 18 
shows this introduction. He also emphasized that design thinking is a learnable skill. This 
class was followed by a discussion led by IDEO’s Dan Soltzberg on the importance of 
insights in the IDEO design thinking process with time spent on the actual insights for the 
Executive TANG Forum and how those insights were developed.  
 
Figure 18.  Dave Blakely instructing the Executive TANG Forum  
in the sharing room 
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b. Overcoming Barriers 
After participants received instruction on design thinking and insight 
development, they were sent away to the three breakout groups—Barb, Tang, and 
Wahoo. Each team was assigned at least one facilitator from IDEO and one or two 
facilitators from APL or other agencies supporting the Forum (e.g., Lockheed Martin). 
Upon reaching the breakout rooms for the first time, participants were greeted by pre-
arranged rooms laid out with IDEO’s tools for design thinking—sticky notes, large white 
boards, construction materials, etc. (Figure 19).  
 
Figure 19.  Team Barb breakout room 
Upon settling in to the breakout rooms, the facilitators set the stage for the 
development of HMWs based off the IDEO-prepared insights for the Forum. In Figure 
19, IDEO’s Dan Soltzberg is leading Team Barb in their first development of problem 
questions (HMWs). This was followed by group divergence so that each participant could 
personally develop a few HMWs. As the first exercise of the Forum, some participants 
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seemed confused at first; one team member remarked “What is the overall goal?—maybe 
I’m the only one who doesn’t understand.”282 
After spending about 15 minutes developing descriptive problem questions, the 
next step in the days’ events was an interview exercise (Figure 20). During this exercise, 
each team would be split in half and then half of each team would rotate to another team 
to conduct the exercise—for example, half of Team Barb would switch with half of team 
Wahoo and members of the two teams would interview each other. According to one of 
the facilitators, the purpose of the interview exercise was to serve as an ice breaker of 
sorts and also give everyone a chance to practice active listening skills and develop a 
deeper sense of user empathy. As noted by IDEO, “the most powerful inspiration for 
innovation is the empathy that comes from authentic appreciation of the needs of 
stakeholders.”283 Just as IDEO gains empathy to inspire their own innovative energies, 
they believe in offering the same opportunity to participant designers. The interview 
exercise offers a chance for end users to add depth to their empathetic appreciation of 
others who are beholden to ineffective processes or systems. In this case, submarine 
officers looked over the insight syntheses given to them by IDEO and interviewed one 
another about their thoughts and perceptions. The goal of this portion of the process is to 
add depth to participants’ understanding of the needs that they are about to address.284 
Though the goal of the exercise may have been empathetic appreciation, the 
exercise was met with some skepticism by participants. Just prior to the start of the 
exercise, one of the members of Team Wahoo remarked “Wow, there’s nothing awkward 
about any of this.”285 At the Groton “pilot workshop” event, attendees also conducted an 
interview exercise, but the general consensus was that this exercise was disconnected and 
did not bear any fruit from the perspective of the participant.286 The facilitators of the 
Executive TANG, however, decided to conduct the exercise anyway, due to their belief 
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that participants must develop the critical emotion of user empathy. They must 
understand the feelings of users who are troubled by the inadequacies of the information 
display capabilities contained within their current systems. After the interview exercise 
was over and the groups resumed their original composition, one Team Barb member 
sarcastically remarked, “We can conclude the conference—I solved it.”287  
 
Figure 20.  Participants from different teams interview one another  
to gain user empathy. 
Once the interview exercise concluded, each group took time to continue 
development of problem areas of interest followed by a group explanation and download 
where each team member explained how they came up with their suggestions and 
physically attached their sticky notes to the idea clustering board. Figure 21 shows one of 
the initial idea boards after the first round of brainstorming on participant-developed 
problem questions.  
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Figure 21.  Suggested problem areas for inquiry 
Figure 21 includes an eclectic mix of participant developed problem areas: 
 “Alarms”—representing the participant’s desire to include automatic 
triggers that would alert the CO when a threshold has been exceeded.  
 “Latency of Data”—data that arrives too late (high latency) could be 
useless to the CO in a situation that is rapidly evolving.  
 “Crew Performance”—the performance of the crew will directly affect the 
overall performance of the submarine.  
 “Important Info Gets Priority”—in an environment saturated with 
information, the CO must be able to determine which information matters 
and what does not.  
 “Truth versus Estimate”—as information becomes more accurate, it gets 
closer to the truth. Being able to distinguish the accuracy of information to 
determine its validity is crucial.  
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 “Capture Knowledge over Time”—as the situation picture constantly 
changes on an operational submarine, it is important to be able to 
reference past data to conduct trend analysis in an effort to better forecast 
future events. 
Given the seniority and experience of individuals in the groups, some participants 
had as many as 10 ideas to share during this download session, which resulted in time 
elapsing without all team members being afforded the opportunity to share their ideas. At 
the Team Tang explanation and download session, only four of the eight officers in the 
group were able to share their ideas. Participants then went back to the main sharing 
room where they received a class on brainstorming by Dave Blakely. After this class and 
an overall exhausting morning, learning and applying IDEO’s techniques for design 
thinking, it was apparent that everyone was ready for a much-deserved mental break over 
lunch.  
c. Lunch 
After 4 hours of arduous and unfamiliar work, everyone was ready for lunch. 
Unfortunately, due to schedule changes and logistical challenges, the Forum facilitation 
team found out at the last minute that lunch would be about an hour late. To fill the time 
gap, IDEO Partner David Haygood gave a few very brief presentations on recent IDEO 
efforts. Once that was complete, Forum attendees were allowed to socialize with each 
other and wait for lunch to arrive. As time went on, participants began to grow more and 
more restless while some facilitators also showed frustration in the schedule snafu. 
Approximately 45 minutes later, lunch arrived and all was right again at the Executive 
TANG Forum.  
d. First Attempt 
After lunch, the groups went back to their break out rooms to develop “how might 
we” questions addressing previously mentioned problem areas. After a period of 
divergence to develop the HMWs, the group converged again to review and vote on the 
HMWs that were previously generated. To vote on HMWs, participants used small 
circular stickers to visually express their interest in the problem question. The voting 
process took approximately 20 to 30 minutes, depending on the group, and resulted in the 
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convergence on a smaller group of HMWs for each team. Figure 22 shows the HMW 
board after Forum participants completed voting.  
 
Figure 22.  One of the HMW voting boards 
Certain HMWs received high attention as they were easily and directly relatable 
to current needs of the commanding officer—each encompassing multiple problem areas 
developed earlier in the process. For example, the problem areas “Truth versus Estimate” 
and “Important Info Gets Priority” were addressed by asking, “How might we promote 
simplicity without compromising content?” Other key problem areas, “Capture 
Knowledge over Time” and “Latency of Data,” were merged into a different problem 
question: “HMW capture and promulgate consistent and constant data across platforms 
and timeframes, making it easily editable by all and searchable.” These questions address 
the importance of prioritizing information and distinguishing between various levels of 
accuracy (truth); and continuously collecting data as the submarine progresses through its 
mission, ensuring that it is distributed in a timely fashion.  
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After convergence on a few HMWs, next on the agenda was a practice solution-
generation brainstorming session. First employed at the Groton event, the practice 
brainstorming sessions were intended to be focused on an area unrelated to the submarine 
community that could be understood by all participants. One group decided to do their 
brainstorming session around “How might we sell a boat?” Tony Patron, IDEO facilitator 
for Team Tang, realized his team was still somewhat discouraged after the lunch episode, 
decided to ask if the team would like to brainstorm “how might we have fixed the lunch 
crisis?” This HMW was met with instantaneous enthusiasm and seemed to unite the 
group behind a common issue. It also served to demonstrate the broad applicability of 
IDEO’s brainstorming techniques.  
After the practice brainstorming session, each group conducted follow-on 
brainstorming sessions focused on previously voted upon HMWs. Each group seemed to 
grow increasingly comfortable with the brainstorming process as the session went on. 
The groups then divided up to focus on rapid prototyping physical representations of their 
ideas that emerged from the brainstorming session.  
e. Share Back 
At the end of Day Two, the first full day of the Forum, the groups re-assembled in 
the group sharing room to conduct “share backs.” Facilitated by Josh Smith, the goal of 
this event was for each group to give a quick 1-minute brief of each of the ideas that 
would serve as a wrap-up of the day’s events and help the participants see how far 
everyone had come through just 1 day of brainstorming and rapid prototyping. For 
example, one group gave a quick 1-minute brief about their idea to design a system that 
would monitor the status of the entire submarine to include equipment status and crew 
proficiency—this system would also be scalable for application to multiple echelons 
within the submarine community. According to Andy Leal, facilitator for Team Tang, 
these first group presentations are helpful in focusing all the groups because the 
participants actually see the other groups presenting different ideas.288 Josh wrapped up 
the day’s events and gave praise to the group on a job well done. 
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f. Pivot Meeting 
According to one of the facilitators who had participated in all preceding TANG 
events, hot washes at the end of every day are very important to redirect group efforts if 
necessary—at the end of day one during the first TANG event, the Commodore had to do 
a big re-direct because one of the groups went “deep down a rabbit hole, in the wrong 
direction.”289 In a similar fashion to previous TANG events, when the participants were 
released for the day, the facilitators rallied at the front of the group sharing room to have 
a staff huddle and discuss the days’ events.  
At the hot wash, there was some concern that most of the ideas that were 
presented during the share back were already being worked on in the submarine 
community. After a few minutes of debate, Josh calmed the group by explaining that a 
pivot at this stage of the Forum was completely acceptable and in fact they had done that 
at previous TANGs. The group discussed whether it would be best to tell the Forum 
participants specifically what they wanted explored or figure out a way to guide the 
process somewhat or continue to allow completely unhindered creativity. The pivot 
meeting adjourned with the conclusion that Commodore Parks and/or Mr. Pete Scala 
from IWS 5 would address the group at the start of the next day—but with no fidelity on 
the actual nature of the remarks.  
3. Day Three–Back to Work 
a. Commodore Parks’ Remarks 
Day Three began with a working breakfast immediately followed by opening 
remarks from the Commander of DEVRON-12. Commodore Parks began by introducing 
Procurement Management System (PMS) representatives in attendance as it will be their 
offices who will implement the concepts developed at the Forum. He pointed out Captain 
Bradford Neff representing the Submarine Acoustic Systems Program Office (PMS 401), 
Captain John Zimmerman from the Submarine Combat System Program Office (PMS 
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425), and Captain Steve Debus from the Submarine Sensor Systems Program Office 
(PMS 435). Figure 23 shows the interaction between these PMS representatives and IWS: 
 
Figure 23.  Interaction between PMS and IWS offices290 
Introducing these acquisition professionals set the stage for his guidance on the 
way ahead for the Forum: 
The vast majority of these things are currently being worked [for future 
APBs]. I want you to identify exactly what you want to see in those 
systems. Peel back the onion a bit. Also, look at training for systems and 
think about the widget that we don’t have and open the aperture. What’s 
next? That’s the real question.291 
b. Refinement, Development, and Concept Review 
After Commodore Parks’ remarks, groups went back to their breakout rooms to 
review concepts from Day Two and conduct further brainstorming. While some groups 
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got right to work, others were somewhat slow to get started, as evidenced by sidebar 
conversations unrelated to the Forum, the taking of outside phone calls, and/or lingering 
in the coffee area. Facilitators took a more active role during Day Three to keep 
participation motivation as high as possible. At about mid-day, the Forum was re-
assembled in the main sharing room for design reviews. During these reviews each group 
presented a more detailed version of their idea from Day Two, including a physical 
prototype. Also, each concept was identified by a formal name—some names used were 
Battlefield Operational Management Board (BOMB) and Section Health & Integration 
Program (SHIP). The main purpose of this concept review session was for each concept 
to be briefed to the group in about 5–7 minutes and allow for group feedback (Figure 24).  
 
Figure 24.  Participants briefing during the concept review session  
In Figure 24, three participants are briefing their concept to the larger group. In 
the brief, the submarine officer holding the microphone is explaining the nuances of the 
developed concept while the other officers simply hold the prototype. At this stage of the 
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process, the goal is simply to explain the concept using the prototype to elicit further 
feedback. 
After the first concept was briefed, the group was afforded the opportunity to 
provide constructive criticism. Initially, feedback being provided by the group was 
minimal. After a substantial lull, however, a participant jokingly broke the ice saying 
“Like a good nuke, I hate change but I really like what you did with this.”292 After this 
comment, the group chuckled and appeared to relax. This small action seemingly resulted 
in reducing the level of personal restraint in the room, increasing feedback for all 
remaining teams presenting their ideas.  
After concept reviews and lunch, most groups seemed to suffer from a drop-off in 
productivity—when they all went back to their breakout rooms, the energy level was 
definitely not as high as it had been.293 According to Scott Tupper, a veteran of previous 
TANGs, there is usually a dip during the afternoon of the second full day of work—
typically because participants get somewhat lost on where to go next.294 In an attempt to 
breathe some new life into the group, Josh Smith decided to inject some of the Tech Expo 
personnel as well as some submarine junior officers from NS Pearl Harbor into each of 
the breakout groups (Figures 25 and 26).295 The Tech Expo representatives were well 
received across the board as they brought unique subject matter expertise and experience 
to the brainstorming sessions.  
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Figure 25.  A representative from Monterey Technology demonstrates the use of 
a mission planning tool to members of Team Wahoo as a way to spark 
some creativity into their brainstorming session.  
While the Tech Expo personnel were well received by all groups, the junior 
officers were met with mixed emotions. These junior officers, mostly Lieutenants and 
Lieutenants Junior Grade, are the very officers that would typically stand watch on the 
submarine under the command of an O-5 or O-6 just like those conducting the 
brainstorming and prototyping at this Forum. Because of this, some of the breakout 
groups welcomed the JOs while others wanted nothing to do with them. According to 
Andy Leal, facilitator for Team Tang, incorporating the Tech Expo and junior officer 
personnel into the breakout groups was a good move: 
It was fun and great at the same time. The junior officer personnel didn’t 
know who they were talking to [since Forum participants were in relaxed 
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civilian clothes with name tags that highlighted first names] so they spoke 
frankly. The TANG group initially had the look of ‘who do you think you 
are.’ But they became more open minded once they started receiving good 
feedback.296 
 
Figure 26.  Two Commanders (O-5s) from Team Tang brief their COSTAR 
concept to junior officers to get a different perspective. 
c. RADM Sawyer Visit 
On the morning of the third day, Josh Smith received word that the Commander 
of Submarine Forces Pacific, Rear Admiral (RADM) Sawyer, would drop by the Forum 
in the afternoon for an in-progress review of sorts. A walk through each of the breakout 
groups would be conducted to show the Admiral just what was being done. After word 
was received by each of the teams, each group then designated a briefer and began 
preparing what would be shared with the Admiral.  
Early in the afternoon, RADM Sawyer arrived at the Forum and was escorted by 
Josh to each of the breakout rooms. At each room, the Admiral was met by energetic 
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team participants for a brief on each of the concepts they were developing. Each of these 
briefs lasted approximately 5 minutes. The motivation level at each of these briefings was 
much higher than expected after the previous lull in the day’s energy levels. All in all, the 
visit by RADM Sawyer lasted just over 1 hour.  
4. Day Four–A Shortened Final Day  
Immediately after the start of the Forum, Josh and the facilitation team had to 
make schedule changes due to the unforeseen golf outing. Scheduled for 1130 on the 
fourth day of the Forum by RADM Sawyer’s staff, this golf event would serve as a fun 
social event immediately following the hard work completed at the Forum. Day Four was 
originally planned to end at 1430. 
When participants arrived the morning of Day Four, they were given just over an 
hour to refine their concepts for the final presentations. The final presentations of all 
concepts would be skits where participants on each of the teams would actually act out 
the concept in a few different scenarios. The larger group would then be allowed to once 
again provide feedback. 
a. Skits and Group Feedback 
Team Tang was the first group to brief their concepts during the final skits. Of 
note, skits were not part of the original timeline of events at the Executive TANG. 
Originally participants were expected to simply brief their concept. As a way to promote 
ownership of the concepts and breathe extra life into the concept development, however, 
Josh Smith and the facilitation team decided to require the groups to actually act out their 
concept in multiple scenarios. The Commanding Officer Safety and Tactical Automated 
Reporting System, or COSTAR, was the first concept acted out. Commander Kurt 
Balagna, the junior member of Team Tang, energetically led his team in demonstrating 
the idea. The COSTAR concept was designed to allow the CO to be anywhere aboard the 
submarine and continuously capture information over time as quickly as it could be 
delivered to him. Furthermore, the system addressed the participants’ desire to have pre-
programmed alarms set that would alert the CO when certain conditions necessitated his 
direct involvement (Figure 27).  
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Figure 27.  Team Tang acting out the final skit for the COSTAR concept 
In Figure 27, the team simulated a commanding officer sleeping when an alarm 
alerts the CO to a report coming in from the OOD via a tablet, informing the CO of a new 
contact being negotiated by the crew. Next, the group acted out a scenario in which the 
CO was running on a treadmill and received another report from the OOD via the same 
mobile tablet. As the participants simulated running on a treadmill by actually running 
place on the stage, the rest of the group initially chuckled at the clumsy nature of the task 
at hand but then became more involved in the concept as they immersed themselves in 
the on-stage action.  
After the skit was complete, the rest of the Forum was allowed to provide 
feedback to the Team Tang COSTAR group. The participants were asked to form their 
feedback in one of four categories—I like, I wish, What If, and I’m Concerned. For 
example, if someone in the Forum wanted to see another capability added to COSTAR, 




Figure 28.  COSTAR concept board 
The Concept Board includes the following: 
 “I like the ability to have SA [Situational Awareness] anywhere.” 
 “I Wish it would make an automatic 1MC [ship wide public address] call 
“send the CO to the Conn” when certain tripwires [conditions] are met.” 
 “I am concerned about officer development”—this concern stems from the 
fact that with the CO possessing a mobile tablet, the junior officer would 
no longer be physically face-to-face with the CO. Also, the CO is always 
available to make a decision, depriving the JO from the opportunity to 
develop his own decision-making abilities.  
A few more concepts were briefed after COSTAR before skits were temporarily 
halted in anticipation of RADM Sawyer arriving at the Forum for a final appearance. The 
admiral arrived and gave final remarks to the group where he focused on the value of 
thinking outside the box as well as receiving feedback from others—two key skills that 
were demonstrated at the Forum. He thanked the group for their hard work and then had a 
separate behind-closed-doors conversation with the IDEO facilitators before departing 
the Forum.  
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After the admiral left, the remaining concepts were briefed in skit fashion. Based 
off feedback from the concept review session the day before, the Tang Group added a 
concept called AIM or Attack in a Minute which would serve as an automatic and 
dynamic torpedo preset calculation engine. The other major change from the previous 
concept review session was that two concepts from two different teams were merged into one 
super concept. During the previous concept reviews, Team Barb presented a concept they 
called Wardroom Horizontal Integrated Planner (WHIP) while Team Wahoo presented 
Submarine Operations Navigation Integrated Console (SONIC). After these groups 
presented their individual ideas during the concept review sharing session, they realized 
the concepts had significant overlap and could be merged into a single overarching 
concept. While not planned or standard in TANG Forums, facilitators encouraged this 
pivot from the norm and allowed these two groups to merge and develop a super concept 
representing the design efforts of both Team Barb and Team Wahoo. During final skits, a 
single combined concept was briefed as SONIC-WHIP—a touch-enabled horizontal 
planning table permitting layered presentation of operator-selectable information. 
In all, eight conceptual skits (described in Appendix B) were performed by the 
Executive TANG participants, each uniquely addressing the identified needs of those 
who had developed the concept. The eight proposed solutions spanned the range of the 
problem space, some addressing technical solutions to tactical problems, others 
attempting to provide greater detail on personnel, training, and readiness concerns. 
In one example, Team Wahoo tackled the problem of lessons-learned documents 
not being distributed or accessible in a user-friendly manner by proposing a system they 
called “SUBIPEDIA.” In contrast to the current method of distributing lessons-learned or 
after-action reports using naval message traffic (similar to official email), which are often 
dense and difficult to understand, SUBIPEDIA offers a Wiki-style system in which fleet 
user input is collected and categorized under easily understood concept headings and 
populated across the entire submarine fleet. The system would permit access to 
unclassified as well as classified information through a single source that offers 
comprehensive information on a given topic that has also been vetted or “crowd sourced” 
through a social-media-style helpfulness rating method. Suppose a commanding officer 
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needed to bring the submarine into a port with which he is unfamiliar, he could reference 
SUBIPEDIA for all observations, advice, and lessons-learned from the commanding 
officers who have gone before him. This would also include ratings from his peers on 
which pieces of information are particularly useful, important, or impactful. 
SUBIPEDIA, therefore, offers the CO a wealth of useful information while reducing the 
amount of time he must devote to multi-source research. Furthermore, by relying on the 
experience and knowledge of his peers, he is tacitly harnessing the collective wisdom of 
the entire fleet of commanding officers. 
While SUBIPEDIA addressed concerns related to information sharing and the 
identification of what is critical knowledge for the CO to have at his disposal, Team Tang 
designed a system that automatically computes the position of a sonar contact using 
advanced sonic algorithms. Automated Solution Development (A.S.D.) would develop 
position solutions and present those to the human sonar operators who would then 
evaluate the computer’s estimate and either accept it or alter it. A.S.D. would ease the 
workload on sonar and sensor operators in detecting and correlating contacts, freeing 
more of their mental energy to assist the CO in developing and tackling the overall 
complexities of the mission. With more energy devoted to focusing on the handful of 
contacts that really matter, leaving the computer to handle the less-important or farther-
off contacts, the watch team becomes more effective at keeping the submarine safe while 
conducting operations. The result is a commensurate easing of the mental workload on 
the CO, helping him to better execute his mission.297 
b. Participant After Action 
After skits were complete, Dave Blakely from IDEO congratulated the group on a 
job well done during the Forum and asked for feedback on the orchestration of the 
workshop. A participant from Team Tang immediately spoke up stating that he liked the 
process but that a summary of technologies currently being worked would have been 
helpful at the start of the Forum. Multiple participants then followed his lead stating that 
they wished they had been provided with the brainstorming process in advance—a “read 
                                                 
297 IDEO, Executive TANG Forum. 
 116
ahead” of sorts. After a few minutes discussing a possible “read ahead” option for future 
TANGs, the following insights were provided by other participants: 
I really like the process but my concern is cost. I wish we could build 
expertise in the Navy to use the [design thinking] process.  
Whoever got the idea to help the sub-community, I applaud you. Can we 
expand this to other areas on the sub? 
I recommend getting a bunch of enlisted guys together to try to make life 
in port better.  
c. Commodore Parks’ Closing Remarks 
Despite being at the end of a demanding Forum where more senior officers had 
been introduced to a new way of generating solutions to complex problems, the morale 
and energy seemed quite high at the end. With the last skits finished and IDEO done 
conducting a casual hot wash, Commodore Parks provided the following closing remarks: 
Thanks to IDEO; the how might we process continues. We take these 
ideas and hot wash them and produce products for the next APBs–APB 15 
through 17. This is part of a larger fleet input process. More specifically, 
the input process that is generated from the Submarine Tactical 
Requirements Group, I’m the chair on that. Early on, we focused on 
operational planning and safety. By the end, a few groups were focused on 
combat. Thank you for doing that. This is what we do. We are warfighters 
first.298 
d. Facilitator Synthesis Meeting 
After the hot wash and closing remarks, participants were released from the 
Forum to attend the Admiral’s golf outing. With the Tech Expo personnel breaking down 
their displays and the clean-up crew going through all Forum spaces, all members of the 
facilitation team gathered together to immediately begin development of the official 
Executive TANG output documents. Goals for the synthesis meeting included: 
 Final text for IDEO concept presentation 
 Image sketches for IDEO presentation 
 Storyboards 
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 Capture nature of the concepts 
 Document write-up 
Led by Dave Blakely from IDEO, the team pressed forward in a collaborative 
session and hammered out the details for each of the goals. The team spent the remainder 
of the day Thursday and the entire day Friday finalizing products so they could be briefed 
to all stakeholders. 
J. EXECUTIVE TANG OUTPUTS 
Upon concluding the Forum and returning to the mainland, IDEO and the team of 
facilitators still had the tough task of crafting a brief containing the outcomes of the 
event. Not only did they need to capture the essence of the concepts developed by the 
participants, they also needed to describe, for those not in attendance, what had occurred 
during those four busy days. With notes in hand from the synthesis meetings, another 
round of collaborative phone calls commenced. During these calls, descriptions and 
drawings of the concepts developed during the Forum were fine-tuned, taking care to 
ensure that they remained true to the desires of the groups that had created them. 
The team’s task was deeper than simply providing a brief description of the 
concepts with a few accompanying bullet points. Their task was not only to describe but 
to contextualize the use of the concepts to the briefing audience through well-thought-out 
drawings—just as the skits had contextualized each concept for the audience at the 
Forum. To accomplish this, IDEO’s team of graphic artists developed initial drawings 
that were then circulated among the group of facilitators. Once digested by the group, 
critique and feedback were provided in order to refine them, ensuring they were indeed 
true reflections of the concepts.299 
An example of the descriptive treatment given to one of the concepts, the 
“C.O.S.T.A.R.” or Commanding Officer Safety and Tactical Automated Reporting 
System, is provided in Figure 29. It is important to note that the visualization is not 
focused solely on the technology but also includes a depiction of an operator employing 
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the technology—providing the critical human-centered element that is the hallmark of 
design thinking.300 
 
Figure 29.  Conceptual Description and Visualization of the COSTAR 
Concept301 
As the facilitators reflected on the 11 concepts, some overarching conceptual 
themes emerged. Taken in sum, the outputs of the Forum appeared to express a desire for 
reduced workload through automating, which would enable the operators to focus less on 
system manipulation and more on solving the tactical problem; flexible data visualization 
and layered information, which would allow for system customization based off mission 
requirements; a single system with integrated information from multiple sources in order 
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to reduce the amount of information melding that the human would have to do; 
knowledge sharing and the quick distribution of lessons learned to improve future 
performance based on past experiences of the collective; ship and crew status information 
to better support decision making and risk assessment; and multi-touch tables, wireless 
connectivity, and mobile devices to leverage the most-current commercially available 
technology to improve display and dissemination of information. These overarching 
conceptual themes appeared in the participant-developed concepts satisfying the overall 
goal of the Forum—improving command effectiveness.302 
With the concepts properly visualized and the overarching conceptual themes 
identified, it was time to brief the stakeholders of the TANG and ARCI processes—the 
same stakeholders of the submarine, acquisition, and leadership communities who had 
supported Executive TANG and were awaiting the outcome. To some degree, this 
marked the end of the design thinking process and the cycles of divergence and 
convergence. Though design thinking and the process of collaborative innovation 
garnered most of the attention surrounding the events of Executive TANG, the mission of 
the Forum remained unchanged: to innovate new technology to aid commanding officers 
in the execution of their duties. At this transitional point, the future of the concepts 
developed at the Executive TANG now lay in the hands of those within the established 
research, development, and acquisition communities. For the Executive TANG concepts 
to have a future in the fleet, they must be integrated into the existing APB and TI 
processes. 
K. THE ROAD AHEAD 
“In a year and a half to two years, you will see [the concepts developed at 
Executive TANG] being used in the fleet and rolled into the next Advanced Processing 
Build—which will be ’15—and in the fleet in two years’,” stated Commodore Parks 
during an interview following Executive TANG. His confidence in the outcome of the 
event and the future of the technology was evident as he believed Executive TANG had 
met the mark—fulfilling the mission to innovate concepts that can be built using today’s 
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available technology. “I think we…ended up with a [group of products] that [is] well 
within our technological means,” says CDR Steven Mongold, CO of the USS Montpelier. 
There is a long process ahead in transforming concepts that currently exist only as 
artists’ renderings into black boxes ready for deployment. Beginning with Commodore 
Parks and the Submarine Tactical Requirements group that he chairs, the concepts will 
enter a period of review by senior leadership—as is standard practice for all technologies 
under development within the ARCI process. Fundamentally, that is what the results of 
the Executive TANG are: inputs to the rapid-COTS insertion program that have been 
sourced directly from the minds of the end users. 
Regardless of the genesis of the input, whether from industry or from the 
Executive TANG Forum, the process of moving an idea from the conceptual phase to the 
waterfront begins with the STRG lending credence to the technology as both useful and 
necessary to the fleet of the future. Commodore Parks on the STRG’s role in moving 
these technologies forward: 
There is an active, I would say, daily interaction between the members of 
the STRG and the program managers who develop and field our software 
and our hardware on our combat systems, and that’s not an exaggeration. 
So, we’re joined at the hip in that process and it’s been very successful. 
We, as the developers, seek out industry to be able to make what we need, 
those proposals get proffered to the STRG for fleet input…the STRG will 
provide feedback, ‘Yes, this meets our desires and this is what we’re 
looking for in the fleet,’ or, ‘Hey, yeah, that’s close, but, you know, we’re 
really targeting this. What can you do for us here?’…The STRG, I think, 
is very strong in its opinion that we will clearly articulate the gaps that we 
want to close and clearly articulate the desired capability we want and 
then the rest of the organization…will decide on the priorities and what we 
can and cannot do from a modernization standpoint.303 
As the Commodore alludes, though the Submarine Tactical Requirements Group 
plays a critical role in acting as the mouthpiece for the needs of the fleet, it is not solely 
their determinations that result in procurement. Rather, it requires the agreement of 
multiple areas within the larger Submarine Force, and, ultimately, the acquisition 
professionals at Naval Sea Systems Command who have a mandate to produce actionable 
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enhancements for the fleet. Scott Tupper, who interacts regularly with the acquisitions 
community in his capacity on the staff of DEVRON-12, offers the following, “For [Pete 
Scala of NAVSEA], if we do this event that he paid to sponsor and he comes out the back 
end and he doesn’t have anything that he can go build, well, that’s a problem for him and 
that becomes a problem for us, because now we’ve lost the ability to do future events.”304 
Fortunately, Scott Tupper’s concerns appear alleviated, at least for now, as the 
reaction to the Executive TANG concepts has largely been positive. Andy Leal of 
Lockheed Martin enthusiastically predicts success for a few of the Executive TANG 
concepts, “I am pretty sure [acquisitions] is going to latch on and put out Automated 
Solutions Development…because that is definitely where [they] have a lot of people with 
a lot of expertise…I would hope that [they] could take that A.I.M. concept and run with it 
because that was really easy to implement and there was a lot of people excited about 
that.”305 
1. The Future  
As the Executive TANG concepts are making their way through the acquisitions 
process, decisions will soon be made as to which will make the cut to be included in 
future APBs and TIs. For the stakeholders and facilitators who created the TANG 
initiative, consideration can now be given to focusing on the future and to what extent 
design thinking may become a part of the submarine culture. A few months after the 
Forum was complete, one participant offered his thoughts: 
There is certainly value in exposing people to this process. Around the 
nuclear community, the nature of our training is so procedurally driven it 
can inhibit innovation. This is added value in the community—spreading 
better brainstorming and innovation techniques to the larger Navy. What 
the TANG Forum teaches is valuable but the Forums themselves aren’t 
hitting the mark—they need to cast a wider net to spread these techniques 
throughout the fleet.306 
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This quote is descriptive of a central theme that was often repeated after the 
Forum concluded. There is strong desire among many for design thinking to become part 
of the daily operation of the Submarine Force. To be used as another tool among many to 
solve the small, seemingly mundane problems that vex even the most experienced 
submariners. Scott Tupper understands this desire, suggesting that one of the ancillary 
benefits of continuing to sponsor design thinking events like Executive TANG is the 
continued education of submarine force personnel to the power of alternative problem 
solving methods: 
[The] value in first TANG was they tapped the right audience to address 
sonar problems and then sent 27 sailors back to the fleet caring more about 
the submarine community and solving problems therein. For Exec-TANG 
we introduced a bunch of senior submariners to a new process for solving 
problems. The IDEO process of brainstorming and prototyping leads to 
better solutions to problems. This is a huge side benefit of the Exec-
TANG—teaching a bunch of senior guys a new way to solve problems.307 
It would appear that word is indeed spreading, right to the top of the Force. Less 
than 2 months after the conclusion of Executive TANG, Josh Smith relayed the following 
account of a submarine CO’s interaction with the Commander of the Submarine Force: 
Admiral Richardson [spoke] to CDR Steve Mongold of the 
Montpelier…[when he] took a tour of his boat and Admiral Richardson 
asked, ‘Hey, so I heard you just got back from Executive TANG, I want 
you to send me an e-mail with your perspective of what that was like.’ So, 
the sheer fact that those types of discussions are…happening, yeah, it’s 
great to have that and it’s great to get more people exposed to this and 
excited about it.308 
Through positive exposure at the top echelons of Navy leadership, it seems the 
future is bright for the TANG initiative and the role of design thinking in the fleet. 
Participants and facilitators echo those sentiments: 
CDR Kurt Balagna: 
The knowledge is out there. I think it’s definitely a fruitful thing and I 
think TANGs will continue in different forms, like the Commodore 
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mentioned, I think this will be a continual process to evolve a certain area 
of the submarine and beyond.309 
MCPON (ret.) Rick West: 
I thought it was a very interactive event—360-degree interactive. From the 
lowest individual that attended both the TANG and Executive TANG, 
their voice was heard and their input was considered just the same as the 
most senior…that creates synergy and buy-in. I think that’s powerful.310 
Andy Leal: 
I definitely think it was worthwhile because it is important to capture the 
perspective of the guys that have just reached command or been in 
command because you always hope that those are the ones that can step 
back just a little bit from the [knob] turning and so forth or the grunt work 
down at the deck plates to figure out what the big picture is going to be. I 
think some of the concepts that really came out emphasized that.311 
The Executive TANG and its preceding Forums offered the Submarine Force an 
opportunity to try its hand at a completely new, paradigm-shattering method of 
technological innovation. A method focused on the needs and desires of the end user and 
centered on human interaction vice the dictated requirements that dominate other arenas.  
TANG facilitators of the future have a challenging task in front of them, 
engendering the creative response of the Navy’s greatest asset—its people. Regardless of 
rank, experience, background, or education level, TANG Forums and design thinking 
offer a method by which input from the average fleet operator and commander can be 
injected directly into the developmental process. “What I’m seeing [with] TANG is a 
shift in the mindset of how we do business,” says MCPON West, “I think when you have 
something that can really make such a positive change in such a quick way it should 
really be pushed as a way to operate. I know you have to be careful…but I think it makes 
such a positive impact at the operational level. [These] are the cool ways, which our 
sailors will embrace, of bringing innovation to the forefront and continue to move the 
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Navy forward.” He further adds, “It is my hope that we don’t just let TANG be a ‘flash in 
the pan’…hopefully we will not drag this thing [the current acquisition life cycle] out for 
three, four, five years. Technology is moving…our Navy is moving…”312 
While the future of the concepts from Executive TANG may be uncertain, the 
realities of the ever-changing world in which the U.S. Submarine Force must operate 
remain constant. As the Force looks toward the future, assessing new threats and 
adversaries, events such as the Executive TANG Forum appear to have a found a place in 
the ongoing process of innovation.  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the Executive TANG case study will be analyzed through the 
lenses of organizational change management and design thinking. Parallels will be 
articulated between characteristics of the TANG initiative (both Original and Executive 
TANG Forums) and both traditional and contemporary views of change management. 
This holistic analysis will lead to conclusions regarding the benefits of utilizing a 
participative, design thinking process to implement change within the DOD.  
B. CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
The Executive TANG case study presents a palpable opportunity to study 
organizational change management. This change effort is especially useful as it takes 
place in the DOD setting, an environment that is greatly lacking documented change 
efforts relating to technological innovation. Furthermore, the Executive TANG Forum 
provides a unique occasion in which to apply concepts of both traditional and 
contemporary change theory to both the micro-level change effort, conduct of the 
Executive TANG, and macro-level change effort, bringing design thinking to the 
submarine force.  
1. The Leader as a Sense-maker 
As discussed in the literature review, new requirements or changes to 
organizational context will always require action from leadership. Traditionally, proper 
action taken by leadership has been envisioned to be of the direct control variety. This 
would typically include the leader developing a vision of the desired end state, mapping a 
strategy to move in that direction, then personally executing the plan with precision and 
attention to detail. In the hierarchically-structured, machine bureaucracy that describes 
the submarine community and the military in general, these highly directive, authoritarian 
leadership styles and methods are typically rewarded as a leader is generally expected to 
exert direct command and control over the members of his unit. After all, the change of 
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command between commanding officers is a transfer of total responsibility, authority 
and accountability from one individual to another. The CO is responsible for everything 
that happens or fails to happen within their unit—the easiest way to manage that, 
traditionally, has been to exert direct control. 
This type of leadership, however, may not be appropriate for organizations that 
are facing emergent challenges to the status quo. During these times, it may be more 
appropriate for the leader to function as a sense-maker, providing insight and guidance to 
their followers rather than tight control. This view is firmly rooted in the belief that good 
ideas bubble up from below and require leadership to contextualize good ideas rather 
than develop them in a singular fashion. It also allows organizations to take advantage of 
many viewpoints and/or ideas within an organization instead of just one. In order to 
accomplish this, leaders must let go of the desire to actively control the future and learn 
to view uncertainty and change as unavoidable opportunities to promote creativity and 
innovation among their team members.313 
The idea to conduct the Original TANG, with junior officers and enlisted men, 
came from a white paper written by Josh Smith. In response to this revolutionary idea, 
Commodore Merz, then the commanding officer of DEVRON-12, immediately 
acknowledged the goodness in Smith’s idea, but wanted to include more senior officers to 
get a broader perspective. Smith, however, articulated his reasons for wanting to do the 
Original TANG with more junior personnel and Commodore Merz accepted this. In this 
situation, Commodore Merz, instead of acting in the traditional “Do as I say” 
authoritarian leadership sense, instead acted as a sense-maker, providing insight and 
suggestion rather than tight control.  
After the success of the Original TANG, Smith and his facilitation team expressed 
desire to conduct a follow-on TANG in short order. Upon hearing this, Commodore Merz 
acknowledged that it was a successful event and was of the same opinion as Smith—
DEVRON-12 should facilitate another TANG. Merz recommended that the follow-on 
TANG use current and post-command submarine commanding officers to explore 
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command-related issues. Josh Smith and the staff of DEVRON-12 agreed—the Executive 
TANG was born.  
Shortly after inception of the Executive TANG, Commodore Merz turned over to 
Commodore Parks. As the new commanding officer of DEVRON-12, Commodore Parks 
excelled as a sense-maker as well. During the planning and execution of Executive 
TANG, Parks allowed Josh Smith, the staff of DEVRON-12, and the team from IDEO to 
lead the all efforts. In response, he made sense of those efforts and used the power  
of language to give support to them. During the actual conduct of the Forum, Josh  
Smith and IDEO made multiple improvisational pivots to alter the events of Forum  
(e.g., inserting Tech Expo personnel into brainstorming, using junior officers to provide 
constructive feedback to participants, having participants act out skits in multiple 
scenarios for each of their concepts, and so on). During these rapid changes, Commodore 
Parks was able to trust the abilities of the Forum facilitators and instead of exerting 
control over them, allowed them room to maneuver. He then provided overall meaning to 
the situation by using context-appropriate language during his multiple addresses to the 
Forum—publically supporting the actions of Josh Smith and the Executive TANG 
facilitation team.  
2. Change Agent as an Embedded Actor and External Force  
Traditional change theory holds the notion that organizational change must be 
prompted by an external force, usually in the form of an external actor. Whether the 
organization is a large bank or a unit within the DOD, successful large-scale 
organizational change is almost always prompted by a new actor coming to the 
organization. Despite this traditional view, some contemporary change theorists such as 
Trish Reay, Karen Golden-Biddle, and Kathy Germann combat this notion, and instead 
posit that change can be prompted by an embedded actor within an organization.  
The change agent with respect to the TANG Forum (both the Original TANG and 
the Executive TANG) is undoubtedly Josh Smith. His role, however, can be viewed as 
both an embedded actor and an external force. Smith attended the U.S. Naval Academy 
and then served as a junior officer in the prestigious nuclear submarine community, 
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earning the rank of Lieutenant before exiting military service for a job with the Johns 
Hopkins Applied Physics Lab. Upon reaching his new position, Josh published his white 
paper. The idea to do the Original TANG came from an external force in that Josh Smith 
was outside of the Navy when he published the paper. One could also view him, 
however, as an embedded actor given the short time between exiting military service and 
when the paper was published, as well as the intimate knowledge of the submarine 
community and issues within that was required to have the insight to actually write a 
credible white paper. In essence, Smith timed his effort perfectly. He was able to 
capitalize on his ephemeral knowledge of the nuclear submarine community by quickly 
writing and publishing his white paper shortly after exiting the service while also being 
part of a separate, external organization that was not directly under the control of 
submarine community leadership.  
3. Progression of Change Efforts  
a. Pace 
With regard to pace of change, the TANG initiative as a whole falls more in line 
with contemporary change theory. John Kotter argued that the number one error in 
implementing organizational change is not developing a great enough sense of 
urgency.314 Traditional theory recommends rapid action in order to gain momentum and 
overcome any possible resistors to change. Some contemporary change theorists such as 
John Amis, Trevor Slack, and C.R. Hinings, however, suggest that rapid change alone 
will not bring about successful results and may actually prove detrimental as the shock of 
wholesale rapid change may paralyze an organization. Instead, they suggest targeted 
change to high-impact functions, implemented rapidly, followed by a period of sedation 
to allow the changes to take hold and the organization to adjust to new processes and 
relationships.315  
When looked at holistically, the TANG initiative falls in line with the findings of 
Amis et al.—rapid change to high-impact functions followed by a slow-down period for 
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change to solidify—a model of “fits and starts.” Prior to the Original TANG, Josh Smith 
articulated to Commodore Merz that the first TANG needed to be completed with junior 
personnel, a high-impact group of actors within the submarine community that actually 
performs the work on a submarine. When the original TANG was commencing, the pace 
of change was rapid. After the event finished, however, the pace slowed down as the 
products of the workshop progressed through the defense acquisition pipeline. During 
this slower period, a few small-scale examples emerged throughout the submarine fleet of 
junior sailors using design thinking to solve real-world problems aboard the ship. Almost 
two years after the completion of the Original TANG, the Executive TANG commenced 
(Original TANG completed in November of 2011, Executive TANG commenced in 
September of 2013)—this started another rapid period of change where mid-level leaders 
in the submarine community actively learned a new process for solving problems and 
aggressively developed new technological solutions to improve command effectiveness. 
After completion of the Executive TANG, another sedation period followed, once again 
allowing for ideas to meander through the defense acquisition system. Overall, a holistic 
look at the macro-level change effort through micro-level TANGs suggests alignment 
with contemporary change theory—pace of change does not occur rapidly but rather in a 
fashion of “fits and starts.”  
b. Sequence and Linearity 
Traditional change theory holds that change is a linear process, occurring at 
relatively constant rate and affecting an organization in a pre-determined manner. The 
sequence is also very procedural—Lewin’s “Unfreeze, Change, Refreeze” model as well 
as Kotter’s 8-step archetype both support the traditional views of sequence and linearity. 
Other contemporary change theorists, however, posit that change is occurring within 
different parts of an organization at different rates and with varying success—change is 
non-linear and incremental. 
The TANG initiative falls more in line with the contemporary view of sequence 
and linearity. After the execution of the Original TANG, examples began almost 
immediately popping up around the fleet of sailors using design thinking to solve real 
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world problems. Five months after the completion of the Executive TANG, however, the 
researchers were unable to identify any tangible evidence of the design thinking process 
being utilized by Forum participants. Furthermore, the follow-on action to the Executive 
TANG was not defined prior to the actual commencement of the workshop. After the 
Executive TANG concluded and participants were allowed to provide feedback on the 
forum, one participant suggested to “get a bunch of enlisted guys together to try to make 
life in port better.” In response to this suggestion, Josh Smith and Commodore Parks 
expressed interest in exploring this topic for the next TANG, supporting the notion that 
there is no set procedural plan in terms of the overall change effort. Instead, the 
submarine community appears to be meandering through a macro-level change effort, 
leaving plenty of room to adjust their actions along the way, suggesting a lack of linearity 
and an unknown sequence.  
c. Small Wins 
Both traditional change theory and contemporary change theory recognize the 
importance of realizing the cumulative effect of small wins. These small wins offer 
opportunities to motivate and sustain persistent, long-term change. During this long-term 
change, small wins can be small enough to commence without attracting the attention of 
powerful resistors but large enough to create momentum for change agents.  
The TANG initiative has achieved at least three small wins to date. The successful 
completion of the Original TANG was the first small win, where change agents targeted a 
relatively small group of junior officers and enlisted personnel. This effort allowed the 
agents to harness the creativity of young people while also proving the TANG concept 
with a captive audience. The execution of the Executive TANG was another small win 
within the macro-level change effort as mid-level officers were targeted. This specific 
effort allowed focus on higher-level issues while increasing the amount of buy-in for the 
overall effort, as field grade officers from more than 20 different submarines/shore 
commands were represented. In between these two major TANGs was another small win 
that has not received as much publicity. A separate TANG occurred in between Original 
TANG and Executive TANG called the Australia TANG. During this effort, submariners 
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in the Australian Navy participated in a TANG-like event focusing on the needs of the 
Australian submarine fleet. This effort gave the TANG initiative some international 
exposure and another small win. While no one knows if the TANG initiative will lead to 
macro-level organizational change in the submarine community or the U.S. Navy as a 
whole, both traditional and contemporary change theory emphasize the importance of 
small wins in the greater change effort.  
4. Overcoming Skeptics 
During one of the Executive TANG Forum group feedback sessions, one of the 
participants jokingly remarked “Like a good nuke, I hate change but I really like what 
you did with this.” While this individual made this remark in jest, undoubtedly one of the 
major barriers that a change effort must overcome is possible resistors. According to Paul 
Lawrence, in his article How to Deal with Resistance to Change, resistance may take a 
number of forms including persistent reduction in output, increase in the number of 
“quits,” and/or request for transfer, chronic quarrels, sullen hostility, wildcat or 
slowdown strikes, and the expression of a lot of pseudo-logical reasons why the change 
will not work.316 While many of these are not applicable to a military organization due to 
cultural emphasis on discipline and chain of command, the expression of why the change 
will not work, especially behind closed doors, would likely occur and could derail a 
change effort if it gained enough support.  
During the initial stages of the Executive TANG Forum, multiple participants 
expressed initial skepticism to the processes used and a defensive posture towards 
perceived threats to established procedures within the submarine community. While most 
of these occurrences could be viewed as healthy skepticism, there were a few individuals, 
mostly those that represented the more senior pool of officers at the Forum, who seemed 
outright resistant at first—demonstrated by sarcastic remarks about the process being 
taught or through the putting down of participants energetically attempting to learn and 
contribute. This resistance and aforementioned skepticism, however, was overcome 
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through the team momentum formed in each of the groups—accomplished by expert 
facilitators skilled in managing complex group dynamics.  
When approaching resistance to the TANG initiative as a whole, it can be 
assumed that there are pockets of resistance within the submarine and acquisitions 
communities. Individuals within these communities may be embedded in the successes of 
the current requirements-based development process. Overcoming this resistance may be 
achieved as the TANG initiative progresses, further exposing community leaders to the 
design process. As design thinking is socialized among key stakeholders, the value of 
resistant opinions will likely diminish. Moreover, as the technologies developed through 
the TANG process become accepted within the fleet, the validity of design as a 
developmental process will be indisputable. 
5. Implications of Change Management 
After studying the planning and execution of the Executive TANG Forum in 
addition to the overall TANG initiative, parallels have been drawn to both traditional and 
contemporary theories of change. In terms of leadership, the key leader actions of the 
TANG initiative fall mainly in-line with contemporary change theory, which views the 
leader as a sense-maker, using context-appropriate language to give sense to situations. 
When exclusively exploring the primary change agent, Josh Smith, however, his change 
force can be viewed as both external and embedded given his external place outside the 
submarine community and his embedded knowledge from recent years spent in the 
community. When exploring pace, sequence, and linearity, the characteristics of the 
overall TANG initiative fall in line with contemporary theory, which states that change 
happens through a mix of rapid and slow pace, and in a non-linear and incremental 
manner instead of a procedural way. Despite these alignments with contemporary theory, 
one of the most important aspects of the TANG change initiative, the accumulation of 
small wins, aligns with both traditional and contemporary change theory in which each 
emphasize the importance of this action to overcome sources of resistance and ensure the 
long-term success of a change effort. 
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Regardless of the theory that explains the actions within the TANG initiative, the 
Executive TANG case study serves to highlight many important aspects of change. 
Capturing the details of this change initiative will contribute to the DOD’s seemingly 
under-developed rolodex of case studies, enabling Defense leadership to learn from this 
event to aid in future technological change implementations. 
C. DESIGN THINKING 
The previous section summarized the relationship between the Executive TANG 
case study and various theories of change management. As articulated in the literature 
review, however, change management only increases the chances of successfully 
implementing a change effort; it does not help in determining what the change should be. 
This is where design thinking is necessary. In this section, the relationship between the 
Executive TANG case study and design thinking will be explored.  
1. A Truly Wicked Problem 
Exploring command-level issues in the submarine force is without question a 
wicked problem. The catalyst (problem) driving the Executive TANG Forum satisfied 
multiple criteria required for a problem to be designated wicked, when only one criterion 
would have been sufficient. First and foremost, the overarching problem addressed at the 
Executive TANG Forum, improving command effectiveness, is complex and deeply 
ambiguous. Since there is no tangible measurement tool used for determining how well a 
CO is doing, the effectiveness of anyone in that job is subjective and vague. Furthermore, 
this task of improving effectiveness of the command is far reaching and could include 
exploring the enablement of subordinates, effective information sharing, streamlining 
processes for dealing with the crew, optimally synthesizing inputs from multiple 
disparate systems, making sound and timely decisions, leveraging new technologies, and 
the list goes on and on. Since the CO is ultimately responsible for anything that happens 
or fails to happen under his watch, improving the effectiveness of his command is truly 
complex and ambiguous.  
The wicked nature of this problem is exacerbated by the seemingly long list of 
stakeholders, another criterion of a wicked problem. When looking at improving 
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submarine command effectiveness, the unit responsible for training the submarine fleet, 
DEVRON-12, is a key stakeholder along with all of the acquisition professionals who 
manage the procurement and upgrading of all systems onboard the submarine—this 
includes the head for Integrated Warfare Systems 5 (IWS 5), the Submarine Acoustic 
Systems Program Office (PMS 401), the Submarine Combat System Program Office 
(PMS 425), and the Submarine Sensor Systems Program Office (PMS 435). In addition 
to these acquisition professionals, the Commander of Submarine Forces and the Director 
of Naval Nuclear Propulsion also have a stake in the Executive TANG. Taking into 
account all of the opinions, ideas, and agendas of these powerful stakeholders makes 
improving command effectiveness much more difficult than it may seem at the surface.  
2. Contextual Observation 
Contextual observation is nothing more than actually seeing what you are 
exploring within its natural habitat (context). When individuals focus exclusively on 
quantitative and sometimes qualitative data, a problem that has plagued the last 20 years 
due to drastic improvement in computing power/capability, it can become very difficult 
to notice a solution to a problem that might be right in front of them because the data has 
no emotional content—it is just data.317 Giving people the tool of contextual observation, 
a different way of seeing that reality, however, helps them to address the problem.318 
When IDEO was initially hired to facilitate the Executive TANG Forum, one of 
the first actions they completed was their ethnographic user research, consisting primarily 
of user interviews and observation sessions. A major component to this task was actually 
riding a submarine to explore what command is all about. For the civilian designers at 
IDEO to truly understand the nature of this wicked problem they needed to embed 
themselves in the everyday life of that community and observe actors in the context of 
their day-to-day routines. Had they not done this and instead strictly relied on pre-
existing data, it would have been very difficult to make an emotional connection with the 
problem at hand, a critical part to approaching a problem with a design thinking mindset.  
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3. Rapid Prototyping 
Participants at the Executive TANG Forum utilized rapid prototyping to develop 
solutions to the overarching problem addressed at the forum. While the challenge of 
improving command effectiveness is complex and ambiguous, by rapidly constructing 
physical representations of an idea, participants were able to explore hunches or distant 
ideas that helped to advance their understanding of the problem and be mindful of lots of 
possibilities. All the while, minimal resources were actually committed to the effort (both 
time and material) while participants explored. Rapid prototyping also helped participants 
receive stake holder feedback while constructing the tangible representations of their 
ideas.  
The DOD uses the systems engineering process to guide the design and 
management of complex engineering projects. This process focuses on work-processes, 
optimization methods, and risk management tools. One of the major drawbacks to the 
systems engineering process is the large expenditure of time and money. Given that the 
DOD is entering an interwar period plagued with decreased procurement dollars, 
adopting a rapid prototyping mindset across the Defense Department would benefit the 
force in both tangible (money and time) as well as intangible ways (improvement of 
problem solving skills and increase of creative capacity).  
4. Balance between Exploration and Exploitation  
The DOD, much like various industries in the corporate world, has focused 
heavily on exploitation, the action of making use of and benefitting from existing 
resources. Every tangible item, however, can only be exploited so far—once you reach a 
certain point, exploration must take place to generate new resources or ideas. The most 
successful organizations are able to balance between exploitation and exploration. 
Similar to the inventory control problem where optimally a warehouse would focus on 
calculating reorder points, lot sizes, and minimizing holding costs (exploitation) while 
also rethinking the design of production processes, relationships with suppliers, and use 
of information systems (exploration), the DOD must also balance between the two.  
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The Executive TANG Forum focused heavily on exploration. While existing 
technologies such as iPads and multi-touch displays were exploited to a certain degree, 
much of the activity was in the area of exploring new ways to make the CO more 
effective. Over a relatively short period of time (three full days), eight concepts were 
developed, each uniquely addressing the identified needs of those who had developed the 
concept. The eight proposed solutions spanned the range of the problem space, some 
addressing technical solutions to tactical problems, others attempting to provide greater 
detail on personnel, training, and readiness concerns. The creation of these ideas was due 
to the Forum’s heavy focus on what currently does not exist (exploration) while in some 
cases exploiting key technologies already in existence to support the developing concept, 
achieving a nice balance between exploration and exploitation.  
5. Converge and Diverge 
Design thinking is an iterative process of convergence and divergence. In the U.S. 
military in general and the Navy’s submarine force specifically, convergence around a 
single idea and/or leader is usually greatly emphasized over divergence to generate new 
ideas. The Executive TANG Forum, however, focused equally on both activities as 
participants meandered through the problem. At the Forum, participants:  
 Diverged to develop problem questions (HMWs) that could deconstruct 
the overall problem (improving command effectiveness) 
 Converged to vote on the best HMWs 
 Diverged to begin brainstorming possible solutions to the HMWs 
 Converged to share concepts from brainstorming 
 Diverged to begin rapid prototyping  
 Converged to complete concept reviews and receive group feedback on 
prototypes 
 Diverged to continue refinement and development of concepts 
 Converged to perform final group share-back in skit form. 
This iterative process of divergence to develop and explore and convergence to 
vote and decide may seem too time consuming and repetitive to the outsider. Using this 
process, however, allowed Executive TANG participants to focus specifically on the 
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generation of new ideas during the divergence phase, an area often overlooked in military 
planning—which typically involves a set amount of time to frame the problem (identify 
constraints and restraints, planning assumptions, outlining enemy and friendly 
capabilities, etc.) followed by generation of courses of action, and then subsequent “war 
gaming” of those actions. Some criticize this process because groups of planners tend to 
move to solution generation (course of action development) too quickly without 
adequately understanding the problem. Realizing that time is always a constraint, moving 
to an iterative process may help alleviate this—instead of flowing from one step to 
another in a linear manner, groups could alternate between convergence and divergence 
without fear of having to go back to explore emerging nuances, as would be expected in a 
truly iterative process.  
6. Implications of Design Thinking 
The Executive TANG case study provides an excellent source of material for 
exploring the benefits of design thinking in the DOD. Improving command effectiveness 
is truly a wicked problem, a type of problem set that will continue to dominate the 
problem-solving space. While this may seem daunting at first, having a tool like the 
Executive TANG case study will enable DOD leaders to learn about the tools of 
contextual observation and rapid prototyping that can help to address wicked problems. 
Furthermore, understanding the balance between exploitation and exploration will help 
leaders realize adequate focus must be placed on creating what does not exist while being 
mindful of exploiting what currently does—and the use of alternating cycles of 
convergence and divergence can facilitate the military planning process.  
D. INTRODUCING INNOVATION 
The Executive TANG case study demonstrates the complementary nature of 
organizational change management and design thinking. While change management 
increases the chances of successful execution of a change effort, design thinking provides 
a method to determine what the change should be, an essential activity in an organization 
seeking to innovate. While some may think design thinking is inapplicable to the military 
due to emphasis on rank, chain of command and discipline, the human-centered nature of 
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design allows its application to any human activity. Design thinking is more apt to create 
a solution that is more widely accepted given the participative nature of the methodology.  
Upon analysis of the Executive TANG Forum Case Study, the following 
methodology is provided summarizing the introduction of innovation, embodied by the 
TANG initiative, into the hierarchical organization of the U.S. Navy’s Submarine Force:  
 An actor external to the organization develops an idea to address an 
innovative gap. 
 In order to have credibility, the external actor should possess intimate 
knowledge of the organization requiring change.  
 The articulation of the change effort, either verbal or written, must then 
reach a key organizational stake holder. Ideally, the stake holder would 
have a track record of demonstrating a willingness to take provocative 
action.  
 Begin implementing the overall change initiative among a non-
indoctrinated audience (junior personnel). Upon completion, encourage 
follow-on action by participants through engagement with other members 
of the organization. 
 After achieving a small win through initial small-scale implementation, 
allow leaders to use the power of language to make sense of the change 
effort to the greater organization.  
 Ensure the output of the change initiative is validated through use and 
acceptance, demonstrating the change’s value. 
 Harness the sedation period while buzz forms around the greater change 
effort.  
 Begin planning the next stage of the change initiative, which should 
ideally engage higher-level individuals within the organization. 
 Upon achieving the second small win, harness the sedation period while 
buzz forms on a larger scale as higher-level individuals spread the word.  
 Plan additional events to continue advancing the effort to the greater 
organization.  
E. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the Executive TANG case study was analyzed through the lenses 
of organizational change management and design thinking. Parallels were articulated 
between characteristics of the TANG initiative and both traditional and contemporary 
views of change management. The complementary nature of design thinking as an 
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adjunct to change management was articulated as design thinking provides the method 
for determining what the change should be while change management increases the 
chance of successful implementation. The benefits of utilizing a participative, design 
thinking process to implement change within the DOD include a focus on the actual 
needs of end users to enhance usability and adoption, increased creativity with decreased 
expenditures (time and money) through rapid prototyping, as well as the introduction of 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This research offers a glimpse into the specific events surrounding the Executive 
TANG Forum as a demonstration of design thinking in action. The events are 
representative of an alternative method of problem solving that may prove increasingly 
important as the DOD begins to grapple with innovation under highly-impactful fiscal 
constraints. As the resources of the past tighten and affect the processes of the future, 
organizations will be forced to adapt and change. Traditional paradigms of change 
management emphasize decisive leadership—the visionary guidance of an experienced 
leader who has been endowed with “the answers” obtained through vast experience. This 
paradigm is a perfect fit for the type of machine bureaucracies that flourished during the 
20th century but may not offer the best possible results for a modern organization 
comprised of educated, creative professionals.  
This case study also presents an alternative to traditional views of change 
management. In this manner, design thinking is both an aide to conceptual development 
and a method of introducing change. With its focus on form as well as function, design 
thinking offers a collaborative method by which technology and the processes it enables 
can be enhanced to provide a superior user experience that fundamentally alters 
established practice. During the Executive TANG Forum, highly experienced senior 
leaders within the submarine community collaborated to develop innovative concepts that 
exploit technology while exploring improvements to their core processes. Their efforts go 
deeper than simply making better or more capable technology, as the fundamental 
problem before the Forum was improving command effectiveness. In this manner, the use 
of design thinking was as much about producing new technology as it was about 
producing new processes—altering the traditional practices of the commanding officer 
and bringing change to the Submarine Force. 
Further, this case examines an organization experimenting with new cultural 
values. The Executive TANG represents an attempt by some within the Submarine Force 
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to expand the toolkit available to leaders as they attempt to solve the problems impacting 
their daily lives and missions. The design thinking process brings to bear on a problem 
the full creative power of the collective while simultaneously emphasizing that the best 
ideas are the result of insights gained through user experience. Traditional hierarchical 
practice tends to over-emphasize the value of the ideas generated by senior leadership at 
the expense of those generated by end-users. Initiatives such as TANG may potentially 
bridge the gap between the desires of leadership and the needs of the end user, promoting 
active involvement in the development process by users and improving adoption rates 
once new technology is introduced. 
The long-lasting goal of this research is production of a real-world case study that 
may be used to analyze the design method as an alternative to the traditional 
requirements-based development process. Though the requirements-based process has its 
merits it also erects significant barriers to the free-flow of creativity in the development 
of new technology. Just as contemporary change theory emphasizes the value of ideas 
that “bubble up” from below, so too should the emphasis on design thinking as a valuable 
enhancement to the process of developing technology within the DOD. Senior leadership, 
acquisitions professionals, scientists, engineers, and visionaries all undoubtedly have 
fantastic ideas. End-users do as well. Understanding the value of harnessing the creative 
power of the diverse input from all fields, including the average user, will greatly 
enhance the ability of DOD to develop technology that enables their personnel to achieve 
greater success.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As this research comes to a close, the authors are aware of two similar design 
thinking efforts underway or in the planning stages. The first is a continuation of the 
TANG series as it expands into the Navy’s surface ship fleet. Tentatively called the 
“Surface TANG,” this event holds the potential for researchers to continue to develop an 
understanding of the applicability of design thinking in DOD settings while examining its 
use among a whole new community with different cultural values than the submarine 
community examined herein. An analysis of the cultural similarities and differences 
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between the submarine and surface communities as they relate to willingness to employ 
design methods may yield greater understanding as to the dynamics of design in a 
military organization and what elements of the process resonate with the military 
designer. 
The second design-related area of inquiry is also found in the Navy’s surface 
fleet. There is an ongoing design and mutual collaboration initiative being conducted 
aboard the USS Benfold (DDG-65) that has garnered positive attention from leadership. 
Developed from the idea of a junior officer aboard the ship and with sponsorship from 
the commanding officer, the Benfold holds periodical innovation events in which 
command personnel are asked to develop innovative solutions to the problems that plague 
them. Studying this initiative may offer another opportunity to observe the actions of 
change agents and leadership in creating an environment in which alternative problem 
solving methods could flourish.  
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U.S. Navy Fact Sheet 
Attack Submarines - SSN 
Description 
Attack submarines are designed to seek and destroy enemy submarines and surface ships; 
project power ashore with Tomahawk cruise missiles and Special Operation Forces; carry 
out Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions; support battle group 
operations; and engage in mine warfare. 
Background 
With the number of foreign diesel-electric/air-independent propulsion submarines increasing 
yearly, the United States Submarine Force relies on its technological superiority and the 
speed, endurance, mobility, stealth, and payload afforded by nuclear power to retain its 
preeminence in the undersea battlespace. 
 
The Navy has three classes of SSNs in service. Los Angeles (SSN 688)-class submarines are 
the backbone of the submarine force with 41 now in commission. Thirty Los Angeles-class 
SSNs are equipped with 12 Vertical Launch System tubes for firing Tomahawk cruise 
missiles. 
 
The Navy also has three Seawolf-class submarines. Commissioned on July 19, 1997, USS 
Seawolf (SSN 21) is exceptionally quiet, fast, well-armed, and equipped with advanced 
sensors. Though lacking Vertical Launch Systems, the Seawolf class has eight torpedo tubes 
and can hold up to 50 weapons in its torpedo room. The third ship of the class, USS Jimmy 
Carter (SSN 23), has a 100-foot hull extension called the multi-mission platform. This hull 
section provides for additional payloads to accommodate advanced technology used to carry 
out classified research and development and for enhanced warfighting capabilities. 
 
The Navy is now building the next-generation attack submarine, the Virginia (SSN 774) 
class. The Virginia class has several innovations that significantly enhance its warfighting 
capabilities with an emphasis on littoral operations. Virginia class SSNs have a fly-by-wire 
ship control system that provides improved shallow-water ship handling. The class has 
special features to support special operation forces including a reconfigurable torpedo room 
that can accommodate a large number of special operation forces and all their equipment 
for prolonged deployments and future off-board payloads. The class also has a large lock-
in/lock-out chamber for divers. In Virginia-class SSNs, traditional periscopes have been 
supplanted by two photonics masts that host visible and infrared digital cameras atop 
telescoping arms. With the removal of the barrel periscopes, the ship’s control room has 
been moved down one deck and away from the hull’s curvature, affording it more room and 
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an improved layout that provides the commanding officer with enhanced situational 
awareness. Additionally, through the extensive use of modular construction, open 
architecture, and commercial off-the-shelf components, the Virginia class is designed to 
remain state of the practice for its entire operational life through the rapid introduction of 
new systems and payloads. 
 
As part of the Virginia-class’ third, or Block III, contract, the Navy redesigned 
approximately 20 percent of the ship to reduce their acquisition costs. Most of the changes 
are found in the bow where the traditional, air-backed sonar sphere has been replaced with 
a water-backed Large Aperture Bow (LAB) array which reduces acquisition and life-cycle 
costs while providing enhanced passive detection capabilities. The new bow also replaces 
the 12 individual Vertical Launch System (VLS) tubes with two 87-inch Virginia Payload 
Tubes (VPTs), each capable of launching six Tomahawk cruise missiles. The VPTs simplify 
construction, reduce acquisition costs, and provide for more payload flexibility than the 
smaller VLS tubes due to their added volume. 
  
Point Of Contact 
Office of Corporate Communication (00D) 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
Washington, D.C. 20362 
 
  
General Characteristics, Virginia class 
Builder: General Dynamics Electric Boat Division and Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc. - 
Newport News Shipbuilding 
Date Deployed: USS Virginia commissioned October 3, 2004 
Propulsion: One nuclear reactor, one shaft 
Length: 377 feet (114.8 meters) 
Beam: 33 feet (10.0584 meters) 
Displacement: Approximately 7,800 tons (7,925 metric tons) submerged 
Speed: 25+ knots (28+ miles per hour, 46.3+ kph) 
Crew: 132: 15 officers; 117 enlisted 





USS Virginia (SSN 774), Portsmouth, NH 
USS Texas (SSN 775), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Hawaii (SSN 776), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS North Carolina (SSN 777), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS New Hampshire (SSN 778), Groton, CT 
USS New Mexico (SSN 779), Groton, CT 
USS Missouri (SSN 780), Groton, CT 
USS California (SSN 781), Groton, CT 
USS Mississippi (SSN 782), Groton, CT 
USS Minnesota (SSN 783), Norfolk, VA 
North Dakota (SSN 784), No homeport - Construction began March 2009. Christened 2 
November 2013. 
John Warner (SSN 785), No homeport - Construction began March 2010 
Illinois (SSN 786) - Construction began in March 2011. 
Washington (SSN 787) - No homeport, construction began in September 2011 
Colorado (SSN 788) - No homeport, construction began in March 2012. 
Indiana (SSN 789) - No homeport, construction began September 2012. 
South Dakota (SSN 790) - Under contract. 
Delaware (SSN 791) - Under contract. 
  
General Characteristics, Seawolf class 
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Builder: General Dynamics Electric Boat Division 
Date Deployed: USS Seawolf commissioned July 19, 1997 
Propulsion: One nuclear reactor, one shaft 
Length: SSNs 21 and 22: 353 feet (107.6 meters) 
SSN 23: 453 feet (138.07 meters) 
Beam: 40 feet (12.2 meters) 
Displacement: SSNs 21 and 22: 9,138 tons (9,284 metric tons) submerged; 
SSN 23: 12,158 tons (12,353 metric tons) submerged 
Speed: 25+ knots (28+ miles per hour, 46.3+ kph) 
Crew: 140: 14 Officers; 126 Enlisted 
Armament: Tomahawk missiles, MK48 torpedoes, eight torpedo tubes 
Ships: 
USS Seawolf (SSN 21), Bangor, WA 
USS Connecticut (SSN 22), Bangor, WA 
USS Jimmy Carter (SSN 23), Bangor, WA 
  
General Characteristics, Los Angeles class 
Builder: Newport News Shipbuilding Co.; General Dynamics Electric Boat Division 
Date Deployed: Nov 13, 1976 (USS Los Angeles) 
Propulsion: One nuclear reactor, one shaft 
Length: 360 feet (109.73 meters) 
Beam: 33 feet (10.06 meters) 
Displacement: Approximately 6,900 tons (7011 metric tons) submerged 
Speed: 25+ knots (28+ miles per hour, 46.3 +kph) 
Crew: 16 Officers; 127 Enlisted 
Armament: Tomahawk missiles, VLS tubes (SSN 719 and later), MK48 torpedoes, four 
torpedo tubes 
Ships: 
USS Los Angeles (SSN 688), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Philadelphia (SSN 690), Groton, CT 
USS Memphis (SSN 691), Portsmouth, NH 
USS Bremerton (SSN 698), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Jacksonville (SSN 699), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Dallas (SSN 700), Groton, CT 
USS La Jolla (SSN 701), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS City of Corpus Christi (SSN 705), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Albuquerque (SSN 706), San Diego, CA 
USS Portsmouth (SSN 707), San Diego, CA 
USS Minneapolis-St. Paul (SSN 708), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Hyman G. Rickover (SSN 709), Norfolk, VA 
USS Augusta (SSN 710) - Decommissioned February 11, 2009 
USS San Francisco (SSN 711), San Diego, CA 
USS Houston (SSN 713), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Norfolk (SSN 714), Norfolk, VA 
USS Buffalo (SSN 715), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Salt Lake City (SSN 716), San Diego, CA 
USS Olympia (SSN 717), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Honolulu (SSN 718), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Providence (SSN 719), Groton, CT 
USS Pittsburgh (SSN 720), Groton, CT 
USS Chicago (SSN 721), Guam 
USS Key West (SSN 722), Guam 
USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723), Guam 
USS Louisville (SSN 724), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Helena (SSN 725), Norfolk, VA 
USS Newport News (SSN 750), Norfolk, VA 
USS San Juan (SSN 751), Groton, CT 
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USS Pasadena (SSN 752), San Diego, CA 
USS Albany (SSN 753), Norfolk, VA 
USS Topeka (SSN 754), Portsmouth, NH 
USS Miami (SSN 755), Portsmouth, NH - Commenced inactivation September 27, 2013 
USS Scranton (SSN 756), Norfolk, VA 
USS Alexandria (SSN 757), Portsmouth, NH 
USS Asheville (SSN 758), San Diego, CA 
USS Jefferson City (SSN 759), San Diego, CA 
USS Annapolis (SSN 760), Groton, CT 
USS Springfield (SSN 761), Groton, CT 
USS Columbus (SSN 762), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Santa Fe (SSN 763), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Boise (SSN 764), Norfolk, VA 
USS Montpelier (SSN 765), Norfolk, VA 
USS Charlotte (SSN 766), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Hampton (SSN 767), San Diego, CA 
USS Hartford (SSN 768), Groton, CT 
USS Toledo (SSN 769), Groton, CT 
USS Tucson (SSN 770), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Columbia (SSN 771), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Greeneville (SSN 772), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Cheyenne (SSN 773), Pearl Harbor, HI 
  





Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines - SSBN 
Description 
Since the 1960s, strategic deterrence has been the SSBN’s sole mission, providing the 
United States with its most survivable and enduring nuclear strike capability. 
Features 
The Navy’s ballistic missile submarines, often referred to as “boomers,” serve as an 
undetectable launch platform for intercontinental missiles. They are designed specifically for 
stealth and the precise delivery of nuclear warheads.  
 
The 14 Ohio-class SSBNs can carry up to 24 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) 
with multiple independently-targeted warheads. Under the New Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty, however, each submarine will have four of its missile tubes permanently 
deactivated in the coming years. The SSBN’s strategic weapon is the Trident II D5 missile, 
which provides increased range and accuracy over the now out-of-service Trident I C4 
missile.  
 
SSBNs are specifically designed for extended deterrent patrols. To decrease the amount of 
time required for replenishment and maintenance, Ohio-class submarines have three large-
diameter logistics hatches that allow sailors to rapidly transfer supply pallets, equipment 
replacement modules and machinery components thereby increasing their operational 
availability.  
 
The Ohio-class design allows the submarines to operate for 15 or more years between 
major overhauls. On average, the submarines spend 77 days at sea followed by 35 days in-
port for maintenance. Each SSBN has two crews, Blue and Gold, which alternate manning 
the submarines and taking them on patrol. This maximizes the SSBN’s strategic availability, 
reduces the number of submarines required to meet strategic requirements, and allows for 
proper crew training, readiness, and morale. 
  
Point Of Contact 
Office of Corporate Communication 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
Office of Corporate Communications (SEA 00D) 
Washington, D.C. 20376 
  
General Characteristics, Ohio Class 
Builder: General Dynamics Electric Boat Division. 
Date Deployed: Nov. 11, 1981 (USS Ohio) 
Propulsion: One nuclear reactor, one shaft. 
Length: 560 feet (170.69 meters). 
Beam: 42 feet (12.8 meters). 
Displacement: 16,764 tons (17,033.03 metric tons) surfaced; 18,750 tons (19,000.1 
metric tons) submerged. 
Speed: 20+ knots (23+ miles per hour, 36.8+ kph). 
Crew: 15 Officers, 140 Enlisted. 
Armament: 24 tubes for Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles, MK48 torpedoes, 
four torpedo tubes. 
Ships: 
USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730), Bangor, WA 
USS Alabama (SSBN 731), Bangor, WA 
USS Alaska (SSBN 732), Kings Bay, GA 
USS Nevada (SSBN 733), Bangor, WA 
USS Tennessee (SSBN 734), Kings Bay, GA 
USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735), Bangor, WA 
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USS West Virginia (SSBN 736), Portsmouth, VA 
USS Kentucky (SSBN 737), Bangor, WA 
USS Maryland (SSBN 738), Kings Bay, GA 
USS Nebraska (SSBN 739), Bangor, WA 
USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740), Kings Bay, GA 
USS Maine (SSBN 741), Bangor, WA 
USS Wyoming (SSBN 742), Kings Bay, GA 
USS Louisiana (SSBN 743), Bangor, WA 
  




Guided Missile Submarines - SSGN 
Description 
Ohio-class guided-missile submarines (SSGN) provide the Navy with unprecedented strike 
and special operation mission capabilities from a stealthy, clandestine platform. Armed with 
tactical missiles and equipped with superior communications capabilities, SSGNs are 
capable of directly supporting Combatant Commander’s strike and Special Operation Forces 
(SOF) requirements. 
Background 
The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review determined that the United States needed only 14 of its 
18 SSBNs to meet the nation’s strategic force needs. Therefore, the Navy decided to 
transform four Ohio-class submarines into conventional land attack and SOF platforms. This 
allowed the Navy to leverage existing submarine technology while at the same time 
expanding capability to meet the current and future needs of U.S. combatant commanders. 
 
The SSGN Program Office refueled and converted four SSBNs into SSGNs in a little more 
than five years at a significantly lower cost and less time than building a new platform. 
USS Ohio (SSGN 726) entered the shipyard on Nov. 15, 2002, completed conversion in 
December 2005 and deployed for the first time in October 2007. USS Florida (SSGN 728) 
commenced its refueling and conversion in August 2003 and returned to the fleet in April 
2006. USS Michigan (SSGN 727) started its shipyard availability in October 2004 and 
delivered in November 2006. USS Georgia (SSGN 729) completed conversion in December 
2007.  
 
The Navy entered into a unique partnership to bring the SSGN concept to fruition. All four 
submarines required an Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO) in addition to extensive 
conversion work. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Washington carried out the EROs for 
both Ohio and Michigan while Norfolk Naval Shipyard, located in Virginia, 
conducted Florida’s and Georgia’s refueling. The Navy awarded General Dynamics’ Electric 
Boat the contract to convert the SSBNs into SSGNs with the company carrying out that 
work within the Naval Shipyards-the first time such collaboration had been conducted. This 
first-of-a-kind partnership has proved highly successful as the program finished on time 
and on cost.  
 
Combined, the four SSGNs represent more than half of the Submarine Force’s vertical 
launch payload capacity with each SSGN capable of carrying up to 154 Tomahawk land-
attack cruise missiles. The missiles are loaded in seven-shot Multiple-All-Up-Round 
Canisters (MACs) in up to 22 missile tubes. These missile tubes can also accommodate 
additional stowage canisters for SOF equipment, food, and other consumables to extend 
the submarines’ ability to remain forward deployed in support of combatant commander’s 
tasking. The missile tubes are also able to accommodate future payloads such as new types 
of missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned undersea vehicles.  
 
The SSGNs have the capacity to host up to 66 SOF personnel at a time. Additional berthing 
was installed in the missile compartment to accommodate the added personnel, and other 
measures have been taken to extend the amount of time that the SOF forces can spend 
deployed aboard the SSGNs. The two forward most missile tubes were permanently 
converted to lock-out chambers that allow clandestine insertion and retrieval of SOF 
personnel. Each lock-out chamber can also accommodate a Dry Deck Shelter (DDS), 
enhancing the SSGNs' SOF capabilities.  
 
During conversion, each SSGN received the Common Submarine Radio Room and two High-
Data-Rate antennas for significantly enhanced communication capabilities. These additions 
allow each SSGN to serve as a forward-deployed, clandestine Small Combatant Joint 
Command Center.  
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The SSGN is a key element of the Navy’s future fighting force. With its tremendous payload 
capacity, dual crew deployment concept, and inherent stealth, each SSGN brings mission 
flexibility and enhanced capabilities to the warfighter. 
  
Point Of Contact 
Office of Corporate Communication (SEA 00D) 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
Washington, D.C. 20376 
  
General Characteristics, Ohio Class 
Builder: General Dynamics Electric Boat Division. 
Propulsion: One nuclear reactor, one shaft. 
Length: 560 feet (170.69 meters). 
Beam: 42 feet (12.8 meters). 
Displacement: 16,764 tons (17,033.03 metric tons) surfaced; 18,750 tons (19,000.1 
metric tons) submerged. 
Speed: 20+ knots (23+ miles per hour, 36.8+ kph). 
Crew: 15 Officers, 144 Enlisted. 
Armament: Up to 154 Tomahawk missiles, Mk48 torpedoes; 4 torpedo tubes. 
Ships: 
USS Ohio (SSGN 726), Bangor, WA 
USS Michigan (SSGN 727), Bangor, WA 
USS Florida (SSGN 728), Kings Bay, GA 
USS Georgia (SSGN 729), Kings Bay, GA 
  
Last Update: 6 December 2013 
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APPENDIX B. OUTPUTS OF THE EXECUTIVE TANG FORUM 
1. Submarine Operations Navigation Integrated Console–Wardroom Horizontal 
Integrated Planner (S.O.N.I.C.–W.H.I.P.)–Horizontal touch-enabled planning board 
using layered information on a geographic plot to enable better command-team 
planning. Solutions can be shared quickly from the main board to tablet devices for 
mobility around the submarine.  
2. Battlespace Operational Management Board (B.O.M.B.)–Permits real-time sketching 
by watch team members on their tactical displays, which then populate to the displays 
of the other team members and the CO. Portable tablet version as well. Permits quick 
annotation and complex communication between watch-standers to promote 
collaboration. 
3. SUBIPEDIA–Wiki-style lessons learned and information sharing system, fusing 
various information sources (classified and unclassified) into a single source. Offers 
“Yelp-style” helpfulness ratings and offers a way for users to provide additional, 
crowd-sourced input. 
4. Risk Assessment–Creates a visualization depicting factors of risk versus benefit to 
support collaborative decision making. Further provides mitigation options for 
consideration. Envisioned as a tool to promote holistic discussion between leadership, 
not a “decision-making machine.” 
5. Commanding Officer Safety and Tactical Automated Reporting System 
(C.O.S.T.A.R.)–Allows face-to-face communication between the watch team and the 
CO, regardless of the CO’s location aboard the submarine, using tablet 
communications technology, such as Face Time. 
6. Automated Solution Development (A.S.D.)–Automatically develops targeting 
solutions and sonar contacts while permitting editing and further evaluation by the 
sonar watch team, as necessary. 
7. Attack in a Minute (A.I.M.)–Creates an attack plan based on sensor data, tactics, 
targets, and employment options. Dynamically updates target data while eliminating 
the pre-launch and post-launch display requirements. 
8. Central Automated Navy Objective Lessons-learned Inventory (CANOLI)–
Geographically enabled lessons-learned library that offers commanding officers 
access to relevant lessons-learned for a particular geographic area. The data is 
sourced from the full submarine fleet and shared among all crews. 
9. Decision Support–Fused data system offering suggested courses of action to 
commanding officers for further consideration and comparison. Courses of action are 
developed using historical data, current intelligence, target plot, and threat conditions. 
10. Lessons-Learned Creation Suite–A quad plot combines rich media into a single file 
consisting of a narration video, fusion plot, common broadband, and all relevant data 
files. Allows a CO to record and play back an incident, positive or negative, and 
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narrate it. The contents are easily formatted into an audio or video report using a 
simple template to enable sharing of lessons learned between submarines and 
crewmembers.319 
                                                 
319 IDEO, Executive TANG Forum. 
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